THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


l>^^ 


PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND, 
AND  MORALS 


PROBLEMS  OF  MEN, 
MIND,  AND  MORALS 


BY 


ERNEST   BELFORT   BAX 

AUTHOR    OF 
'the   last   episode   of    the    FRENCH    RE\OLUTION,"   ETC. 


BOSTON 

SMALL,  MAYNARD   &    COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS 


l-RINTKD   BV 

NEILL   AND   CO..    LTD.,    EDINBURGH 

19X2 


l« 

PREFACE 

The  series  of  essays  comprised  in  the  present 
volume  includes  some  pieces  not  before  published, 
together  with  others  that  have  already  appeared  in 
substance  in  periodical  or  journalistic  form.  These 
latter,  however,  have  all  been  either  rewritten  in 
the  main,  or,  where  this  seemed  unnecessary,  have 
at  least  been  carefully  revised  and  brought  up 
to  date. 

In  the  first  chapter,  which  deals  with  the  pro- 
blem of  Ethical  Evolution,  I  have  endeavoured 
once  more  to  state  succinctly  and  clearly  what 
(apart  from  my  own  previous  writings)  I  take  to  be 
an  entirely  new  view  of  the  development  of  the 
moral  consciousness,  and  one  which  I  hold  will 
not  prove  unfruitful  in  results  when  worked  out 
in  detail. 

The  second  chapter  treats  of  the  application  to 
history  of  certain  philosophical  principles  arrived 
at  in  a  previous  work  of  mine,  IVie  Roots  of 
Reality.  Originally  designed  as  the  introduction 
to  a  volume  on  the  "  Philosophy  of  History," 
the  project  of  which  I  have  for  the   time   being 


6  PREFACE 

abandoned,  it  is  now  presented  to  the  public  in  an 
independent  form. 

The  essay  forming  Chapter  III.  is  an  exception 
to  most  of  the  others  in  the  volume  in  its  being 
strictly  educational  in  character,  i.e.  not  only  is  it 
non-controversial,  but  it  does  not  even  lay  claim  to 
any  specially  new  point  of  view.  It  took  its  origin 
from  the  suggestion  made  to  me  as  to  the  possibility 
of  giving  a  reasonably  intelligent  sketch  of  the 
history  of  philosophy  in  the  compass  of  a  couple 
of  magazine  or  review  articles.  Its  merit,  if  any, 
consists  in  such  success  as  may  have  been  achieved 
in  the  work  of  condensation. 

The  remaining  chapters  of  the  book  treat  of 
various  problems  of  a  practical  and  speculative 
character,  but  all  of  them,  1  take  it,  possessing 
more  or  less  of  actual  interest.  As  such  they 
will  speak  for  themselves. 

I  may  remark,  however,  that  a  certain  overlap- 
ping, and  here  and  there  repetition,  in  the  chapters 
specially  dealing  with  Socialism  in  its  several 
aspects,  which  are  due  to  the  original  conditions 
of  their  publication,  I  have  allowed  to  remain — 
the  more  so  inasmuch  as  they  are,  I  believe,  all 
concerned  with  points,  or  arguments,  of  special 
importance.  For  this  reason,  if  for  no  other,  I 
ask  the  reader's  indulgence  for  any  breach  of  the 
etiquette  of  literary  form  that  may  strike  him  in 
connection  with  them.  E.  B.  B. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAOK 

I.  The  Problem  of  Ethical  Evolution  .  9 

II.  The  Problem  of  History  and  Methods  for 

ITS  Solution  .  .  .  .43 

III.  The   Problem   of   the   Evolution  of  Specu- 

lative Thought       .  .  .  .65 

IV.  The  Problem  of  Socialist  Definition  .         98 
V.  The  Problem  of  the  Hearth,  the  Throne, 

AND  THE  Altar        .  .  .  .113 

VI.  The  Problem  of  Socialist  Fundamentals      .       146 

VII.  The  Problem  of  Misunderstood  Socialism    .        159 

VIII.  The  Problem  of  Modern  Feminism  .  .187 

IX.  The  Problem  of  Sex  and  Sentiment  .       202 

X.  The  Problem  of  Alcohol       .  .  .214 

XI.  The  Problem  of  Liberty  and  Libel  .       224 

XII.  The   Problem   of   Britain   and   the   Human 

Race  .  .  .  .  .232 

XIII.  The  Problem  of  the  Origin  of  Christianity       247 

XIV.  The  Problem  of  Christianity  as  "  Value  "  .       267 
XV.  The  Problem   of   the  Catholic   Church   as 

THE  Derelict  of  the  Ages  .  .       281 


CHAPTER  1 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  ETHICAL  EVOLUTION 

The  root  of  all  Ethic  is  to  be  found  in  the  feeling 
or  alogical  side  of  our  consciousness.  The  moral 
Trieb  is  an  ultimate  and  irreducible  factor  in  the 
psychic  system  into  which  it  enters.  This  Trieb, 
this  impulse,  consists  in  the  determination  of  the 
individual  mind  to  motives  of  action  outside  the 
sphere  of  its  own  circle  of  interests  qua  individual, 
and,  it  may  be,  even  incompatible  with  that  circle 
of  interests.  But  this  irreducible  potentiality  of 
the  "moral  sense,"  regarded  per  se,  is,  for  the 
thinker  whose  business  it  is  to  analyse  the  moral 
consciousness,  no  more  than  an  abstraction.  In 
order  for  it  to  become  realised,  it  must  acquire  a 
determinate  content,  and  it  is  almost  needless  to 
add  that  on  the  nature  of  this  content  the  whole 
problem  of  Ethic,  in  the  concrete,  hinges.  The 
original  irreducible  Trieb  indicates  indeed  that  the 
meaning  and  implications  of  individual  life  are  not 
exhausted  in  the  range  of  interests  of  the  individual 
as  such,  i.e.  of  the  individual  regarded  as  an  auto- 


10  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

matic  entity  abstracted  from  the  conditions  of  some 
larger  whole  of  which  he,  the  individual,  forms  part 
and  parcel.  But  again,  this  alone,  though  as  far  as 
it  goes  a  consideration  of  first  importance,  and  a 
distinct  recognition  of  which  is  essential  to  all  clear 
thinking  on  the  fundamental  ethical  problem,  does 
not  of  itself  carry  us  very  far.  The  nature  of  that 
larger  whole  into  the  organic  system  of  which  the 
individual  enters  as  subordinate  element  merely, 
requires  to  be  determined,  if  we  are  to  analyse  his 
ethical  consciousness,  no  less  than  does  the  ultimate 
end  which  this  ethical  consciousness  of  the  individual 
presupposes. 

Now  in  all  its  manifestations  and  throughout  all 
its  phases  of  development,  morality  is  concerned 
directly  or  indirectly  with  the  relation  of  the  indi- 
vidual to  society,  although  in  certain  phases,  to  be 
referred  to  presently,  this  relation  has  become  so 
indirect  and  attenuated  as  to  be  in  appearance 
little  more  than  rudimentary.  Briefly  stated,  the 
following  represent,  I  think,  the  chief  and  most 
salient  phases  under  which  the  ethical  consciousness 
has  manifested  itself: — 

1.  In  the  earliest  dawn  of  the  moral  conscious- 
ness, the  larger  whole  in  which  the  individual 
instinctively  feels  himself  as  a  subordinate  element 
and  which  he  instinctively  regards  as  his  truer  and 
larger  self,  is  the  society  or  kinship  group — the 
horde,  the  tribe,  the  clan,  the   "people" — out  of 


ETHICAL  EVOLUTION  11 

which  he  has  arisen,  and  in  which  his  whole  being 
centres.  At  this  stage  the  individual  has  not  yet 
become  conscious  of  himself  as  such ;  he  merely 
represents,  in  his  person,  the  kinship  society.  He 
is  not  conscious  of  himself  as  a  personality  in  our 
sense  of  the  word.  Hence  for  him,  for  the  tribes- 
man or  clansman  of  early  humanity,  all  conduct 
has  for  its  end  the  welfare  and  glory  of  the  kinship 
society.  For  this  he  fights,  for  this  he  lives,  and 
for  this  he  dies.  In  this  stage,  therefore,  con- 
science or  the  moral  consciousness  reahses  itself 
in  an  instinctive,  although  narrow  and  crude, 
social  ethic. 

2.  As  civilisation  supervenes  on  the  conditions 
of  early  society,  more  and  more  undermining  its 
institutions  and  sapping  the  old  ethical  sentiment 
which  corresponded  to  them,  the  centre  of  gravity, 
so  to  say,  of  the  moral  consciousness,  becomes 
shifted.  The  larger  whole  which  furnishes  the 
ultimate  object  and  sanction  of  the  individual 
conscience  gradually  changes.  The  issue  of  this 
change  is,  that  from  being  the  social  body,  out  of 
which  the  individual  arose  and  in  which  in  early 
society  he  very  literally  lived  and  moved  and  had 
his  being,  it  becomes  the  divine  essence  or  spiritual 
principle  of  the  universe  with  which  the  soul  of  the 
individual  human  being  is  conceived  as  standing  in 
a  more  or  less  mystic  relation.  The  welfare  and 
glory  of  this  mystic  relation  becomes  for  the  new 


12  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

religio-ethical  consciousness  the  primary  considera- 
tion— just  as  tlie  welfare  and  glory  of  the  kin- 
ship society  had  been  previously  —  the  ethical 
relation  of  the  individual  to  his  fellow-men  and 
to  society  becoming  indirect  and  subordinate. 
The  view  just  expressed  represents  at  least 
the  theory  and  ideal  of  the  phase  in  ques- 
tion. The  differentiation  and  ultimate  separa- 
tion of  ethics  from  religion  belongs  to  the  stage 
we  are  considering.  The  ultimate  appeal  is  now 
directly  from  the  individual  soul  to  God,  as  repre- 
senting the  order  of  the  universe,  and  conceived  of 
as  in  direct  relation  to  the  individual  soul,  and  no 
longer  to  tradition  and  custom  as  representing  the 
continuity  of  social  and  tribal  life.  In  so  far, 
therefore,  as  the  theory  of  this  form  of  the  ethical 
consciousness  obtains,  the  basis  of  morality  has 
ceased  to  be  social  and  has  become  individualistic 
on  the  one  side  and  mystical  on  the  other.  Where, 
however,  as  is  often  the  case,  the  religio-mystical 
side  has  fallen  into  the  background  or  is  absent,  so 
far  as  practical  relations  are  concerned,  the  sanction 
and  goal  of  conduct  are  alike  frankly  individualistic. 
The  individual  is  now  conscious  of  himself  as  a 
self-centred  personality.  The  ethical  value  of 
conduct  is  no  longer  gauged  by  a  crude  and  half- 
unconscious  feehng  for  social  utility,  but  by  a  more 
or  less  conscious  theory  of  personal  happiness, 
either  in  this  life  or  one  after  death.     The  indi- 


ETHICAL   EVOLUTION  13 

vidual  thus  becomes  the  centre  of  ethical  conduct. 
Of  course  all  morality,  however  conceived,  is  con- 
cerned either  directly  or  indirectly  with  social 
obligations.  Such  is  the  case,  therefore,  even  in 
the  stage  of  ethical  consciousness  in  question.  But 
here  the  moral  relation  of  the  individual  to  society 
becomes  indirect,  and  is  conceived  of  from  a  totally 
different  point  of  view  from  that  of  the  ethics  of 
primitive  kinship  or  tribal  society.  For  this 
mystical  introspective  stage  of  ethical  consciousness, 
the  salient  antithetic  categories  are  those  of  Sin 
and  Holiness. 

The  first  of  the  above  two  organic  phases  of  the 
ethical  consciousness  to  which  we  have  referred  is 
realised,  in  its  purity,  in  that  prehistoric  human 
world  which  is  the  special  domain  of  the  modern 
science  of  anthropology.  The  gradual  transition 
from  the  tribal  or  communal  ethics  of  the  early 
world  of  barbarism  to  the  individual  and  intro- 
spective ethics  of  the  later  world  of  civilisation 
and  history,  may  be  seen  in  the  institutions  and 
intellectual  progress  of  all  the  historic  races  and 
is  traceable  even  in  the  barbaric  civilisations  sur- 
viving in  the  present  day.  The  point  alluded  to  is 
brought  out  (to  cite  the  most  recent  and  certainly 
one  of  the  most  masterly  products  of  modern 
English  classical  scholarship)  in  Dr  Farnell's 
Cults  of  the  Gixek  States,  notably  in  the  case 
of  the  Delphian  Apollo  cultus  {cf.  vol.  ii.  pp.  210- 


14  PltOBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

213,  also  vol.  iii.  ch.  2,  on  the  Eleusinia^).  The 
Orphic  niovenient  was  also  undoubtedly  to  a  large 
extent  one  of  mystical  introspection.  But  to  the 
historical  and  anthropological  student  it  is  unneces- 
sary for  the  purpose  of  this  essay  to  dilate  at  length 
on  the  historical  instances  of  the  transition  from 
the  ethics  of  the  tribe,  the  clan,  the  people,  to  that 
of  the  individual  soul  and  the  higher  supernatural 
power  to  whom  it  owes  allegiance,  or  to  indicate 
in  detail  the  steps  and  accompanying  changes  by 
which  this  transition  was  signalised.  It  suffices 
to  remind  the  reader  that,  at  a  certain  stage  in 
social  progress,  the  old  rehgio-ethical  system  which 
in  various  forms  dominated  the  prehistoric  world 
and  the  earlier  periods  of  history  and  civilisation 
themselves,  loses  its  savour  and  becomes  mean- 
ingless and  even  morally  repellent  to  the  new 
religio-ethical  consciousness.  The  typical  historic 
expression  of  the  transition  spoken  of  would  prob- 
ably be  regarded  as  embodied  in  the  Hebrew  race 
and  enshrined  in  the  books  of  the  Old  Testament, 
with  the  change  there  indicated  from  the  Jahveh 
of  ritual  and  burnt-offerings,  the  symbol  of  the 
intertribal  unity  of  the  Israelite  people,  whose  care 
is  for  the  political  and  social  whole — Israel — to 
the  Jahveh   who   rejoiceth  not  in  burnt-offerings 

^  The  criticism  might  perhaps  be  made  that  Dr  Farnell  hardly 
brings  this  crucial  point  into  sufficient  proportional  relief  in  his 
treatment  of  the  evolution  of  Greek  religio-ethical  thought,  as 
against  other  subordinate  changes. 


ETHICAL   EVOLUTION  15 

and  sacrifices  but  who  is  the  searcher  of  hearts,  the 
symbol  of  the  new  ethical  aspirations  of  the  indi- 
vidualised Israelite  of  the  later  time. 

3.  But  there  appears  yet  another  stage  of  the 
ethical  consciousness,  emphatically  modern  but  as 
yet  inchoate  and  difficult  to  define  in  precise  terms. 
It  differs  alike  from  the  old  tribal  or  communal 
ethic  of  the  elder  world  and  from  the  individual- 
spiritual  ethic  which  succeeded  it.  This  new  phase, 
one  might  term  a  Humanist  Ethic,  or  the  Ethic  of 
Human  Solidarity.  The  sanctions  of  this  latter 
are  utilitarian — in  the  highest  and  widest  sense, 
indeed — but  they  are  utilitarian,  and  they  are  so 
with  a  full  and  definite  consciousness  of  the  impli- 
cations of  that  word.  Their  ultimate  appeal  is  to 
social  progress,  as  interpreted  in  the  light  of  what 
is,  at  basis,  the  old  revolutionary  principle  of 
liberty,  equality,  fraternity,  in  its  modern  applica- 
tions. Hence,  as  I  have  just  said,  the  new  ethic 
in  question  is  emphatically  utilitarian,  but  its 
utilitarianism  is  definite  and  conscious.  In  this 
respect  it  differs  from  the  early  communal  ethic 
of  group-society  which  was  also  social  as  regards 
its  object,  but  was  more  instinctive  than  con- 
sciously definite,  and  operated  through  naive  and 
animistic  conceptions  without  a  recognition  of  its 
own  implications.  In  addition  to  this,  its  object 
is  no  longer  confined  to  a  kinship-community,  as 
was  the  ethic  of  the  early  world,  but  is  coextensive, 


16  PROBLEMS  OF  JMEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

mutdt'is  mutandis,  with  the  human  race  and  even, 
in  certain  respects,  with  all  sentient  beings.  It 
differs,  needless  to  say,  from  the  individualist- 
introspective  ethic  in  that  it  is  social,  not  indi- 
vidual, in  its  immediate  object,  and  that  it  is  not 
through  the  short  cut  of  mysticism  that  it  seeks 
the  pathway  to  its  end,  but  in  the  creation  or  in 
the  furtherance  of  the  evolution  of  a  free  and  equal 
human  society.  In  this  object  and  in  the  high 
utility  which  this  object  implies  it  finds  its  ultimate 
sanctions.  Its  minor  and  everyday  manifestations 
take  the  form  of  the  prominence  of  the  notions  of 
comradeship,  loyalty  to  principle,  integrity  (apart 
from  supernatural  sanctions) ;  keenness  of  sym- 
pathy, sensitiveness  to  injustice  in  all  its  forms  ; 
and  finally,  of  the  continual  application  of  the 
touchstone  of  social-utility  to  test  the  goodness  or 
badness  of  any  given  line  of  action  or  mode  of 
conduct,  this  being  its  only  ethical  standard. 

The  foregoing  seems  to  the  present  writer  to 
represent  the  three  chief  phases  exhibited  by  the 
ethical  consciousness  in  the  course  of  its  evolution 
up  to  date.  Absolute  precision,  of  course,  is  not 
to  be  expected  in  dealing  with  these  matters. 
There  is  much  overlapping,  and  the  precise 
boundary  lines  between  one  phase  and  another 
are  not  always  clear.  There  are  also  subordinate 
cross-divisions.  But,  broadly  speaking,  I  think 
the   outline  given   will   be  found   to   correspond, 


ETHICAL   EVOLUTION  17 

even  more  than  roughly,  with  the  facts  of  human 
evolution  in  the  sphere  of  ethics.  Now  the  last- 
mentioned  and  most  recent  of  the  phases  of  ethical 
consciousness  I  take  to  represent  the  ethical  stand- 
point of  Modern  Socialism.  At  present  it  is,  of 
course,  by  no  means  confined  to  conscious  and 
avowed  Sociahsts.  But  none  the  less  does  it 
represent  the  ethical  attitude  of  the  vast  majority 
of  Sociahsts  throughout  the  world,  and  the  only 
possible  standpoint  on  which  a  Sociahst  code  of 
morals  can  be  based. 

It  is  necessary,  before  going  further,  to  discuss 
the  bearing  upon  ethics  of  the  theory  agitating  the 
thinkers  of  the  Socialist  party  throughout  the 
Continent  known  as  the  "Materialist  Doctrine 
of  History."  This  doctrine  has  for  its  originators 
the  late  Karl  JVIarx  and  Friedrich  Engels.  The 
best  short  exposition  of  its  general  principle  is 
given  by  Marx  himself  in  the  introduction  to  his 
work,  Zu7^  Kritik  der  Politischen  Economie.  This 
is  so  important  for  an  understanding  of  the  Socialist 
position  generally  that  I  give  it  in  full.  It  is  as 
follows  : — 

"  In  the  social  production  of  the  environment  of 
their  hfe,  human  beings  enter  into  certain  neces- 
sary relations  of  production  that  are  independent 
of  their  will,  and  that  correspond  to  a  determinate 
stage  of  development  of  their  material  productive 
forces.     The  totality  of  these  relations  of  produc- 


18  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

tion  form  the  economic  structure  of  the  society, 
the  real  basis  upon  which  a  juridical  and  political 
superstructure  raises  itself,  and  to  which  deter- 
minate forms  of  social  consciousness  correspond. 
The  mode  of  production  of  the  material  life  of 
society  conditions  the  socio-political  and  intel- 
lectual life-process  generally.  It  is  not  the  con- 
sciousness of  men  that  determines  their  existence, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  their  social  existence  that 
determines  their  consciousness.  At  a  certain 
stage  of  their  development  the  material  productive 
forces  of  society  come  into  contradiction  with  the 
existing  relations  of  production,  or,  to  speak  in 
juridical  language,  with  the  conditions  of  property- 
holding,  under  which  they  have  hitherto  worked. 
When  this  is  the  case,  the  forms  of  development 
proper  to  the  productive  forces  become  suddenly 
transformed  into  fetters  for  these  forces.  An 
epoch  of  social  revolution  is  then  entered  upon. 
AVith  the  transformation  of  the  economic  basis, 
the  whole  immense  superstructure  sooner  or  later 
undergoes  a  complete  bouleversement.  In  con- 
sidering such  revolutions  as  these,  one  must  always 
distinguish  between  the  material  revolution  in  the 
economic  conditions  of  production,  and  the  juridi- 
cal, political,  religious,  artistic  or  philosophical,  in 
short,  the  ideological,  form,  in  which  mankind 
becomes  aware  of  the  conflict  and  under  which  it 
is  fought  out.     Just  as  little  as  one  can  judge  an 


ETHICAL   EVOLUTION  19 

individual  by  what  he  thinks  of  himself  can  we 
judge  such  a  period  of  revolution  from  its  own 
consciousness  alone.  On  the  contrary,  we  must 
rather  explain  this  consciousness  by  the  contradic- 
tions obtaining  in  the  material  life  of  the  time,  in 
the  conflict  existing  between  the  social  forces  of 
production  and  the  social  relations  of  production. 
A  social  formation  never  passes  away  before  all 
the  productive  forces  immanent  within  it  have  had 
time  to  develop  themselves,  and  new  and  higher 
relations  of  production  never  establish  themselves 
before  the  material  conditions  of  their  existence 
have  already  been  formed  within  the  womb  of  the 
old  society.  Hence  mankind  only  sets  itself  tasks 
that  it  can  accomplish,  for  if  we  consider  the 
matter  carefully  we  shall  find  that  the  problem  to 
be  solved  never  arises  except  where  the  material 
conditions  of  its  solution  are  already  present,  or  at 
least  where  they  are  already  in  process  of  realising 
themselves.  In  their  broader  outlines,  oriental, 
classical,  feudal,  and  modern,  modes  of  production 
may  be  designated  as  progressive  epochs  in  the 
economic  formation  of  society.  The  bourgeois 
relations  of  production  are  the  last  of  the  antagon- 
istic forms  of  the  social  process  of  production, 
antagonistic,  not  in  the  sense  of  individual  antag- 
onism, but  of  an  antagonism  arising  out  of  the 
social  conditions  underlying  the  life  of  individuals. 
These  are  created  by  the  productive  forces  develop- 


20  PROBT.EMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

ing  themselves  within  the  womb  of  bourgeois 
society,  which  forces  create  at  the  same  time  the 
material  conditions  for  the  resolution  of  the 
antagonism  thus  created.  With  the  present 
social  formation,  therefore,  the  introductory  period 
of  the  history  of  human  society  is  closed." 

The  above  is  the  classical  formulation  of  what 
may  be  termed  the  orthodox  Socialist  doctrine  of 
the  philosophy  of  history,  as  accepted  in  its  main 
features  by  the  bulk  of  the  Socialist  party  through- 
out the  world.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that 
ethics,  as  pertaining  to  the  ideological  side  of 
human  affairs,  is,  as  regards  its  evolution,  explained 
by  the  doctrine  in  question  with  reference  to  the 
economic  phases  of  the  various  epochs  of  social 
progress,  and,  more  directly,  as  the  outcome  of  the 
class  antagonisms  which  are  the  immediate  product 
of  these  economic  forces  and  relations. 

Now  of  the  enormous  amount  of  truth  contained 
in  the  above  doctrine  no  impartial  student  of 
history  can  be  in  doubt.  The  fact  of  the  change 
which  takes  place  in  all  the  relations  of  human  life, 
be  they  intellectual,  aesthetic,  or  moral,  concurrent 
with,  or  following  close  upon,  any  great  change  in 
the  mode  of  the  production  and  distribution  of 
the  wealth  of  a  given  society,  is  undeniable.  Marx 
was  the  first  thinker  to  recognise  this  crucial  truth 
of  social  progress.  It  is  now  taken  account  of  by 
all  historians  of  importance.     The  only  question 


ETHICAL   EVOLUTION  21 

that  may  be  raised  is  as  to  the  universal  appli- 
cability of  the  category  of  cause  and  effect  to 
relations  between  the  material-economic  basis  and 
the  "  higher  "  aspects  of  human  life — a  universal 
applicability,  which  is  apparently  assumed  by 
Marx  himself,  and  certainly  by  many  of  the  pre- 
sent-day exponents  of  the  doctrine  in  question. 
That  a  direct  causal  connection  is  legitimately 
traceable  in  a  large  number  of  cases  where  it  is 
least  suspected  not  only  by  the  ordinary  man  but 
also  by  many  who  lay  claim  to  the  appellation  of 
thinkers  and  scholars,  is  undoubtedly  true.  Yet 
without  in  any  way  denying  or  minimising  this 
truth,  it  is  also,  I  think,  arguable  that  the  totality 
of  social  progress  cannot  be  interpreted  by  any 
theory  of  economic  fact  as  the  sole  determining 
cause,  in  the  sphere  of  intellectual  and  moral  re- 
lations. This  position  has  been  maintained  on 
more  than  one  occasion  by  the  present  writer,  both 
in  this  country  and  on  the  Continent,  as  against 
the  partisans  of  the  more  strictly  orthodox  Marxian 
doctrine.  The  position  I  have  contended  for  finds 
throughout  human  development  ab  initio  a  double 
line  of  causation,  that  of  material,  chiefly  economic, 
condition,  and  that  of  human  intelligence  pe7^  se^ 
or  psychological  condition.  Progress  has  two 
roots,  not  one.  Each  of  these  constitutes  a  causal 
series  of  its  own,  but  it  is  in  the  reciprocal  action 
{Wechselwirkung)  of  both  these  elementary  series 


22  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

on  each  other  that  the  reahty  we  call  human 
evolution,  or  social  progress,  is  constituted.  This 
modification  of  the  JMarxian  doctrine  as  originally 
formulated  is,  I  think,  necessitated  by  a  more 
thorough-going  analysis  of  the  whole  conditions. 
To  enter  more  fully  upon  the  larger  question  in 
all  its  ramifications  would,  however,  carry  us  out- 
side the  scope  of  the  present  essay.  Let  us  con- 
sider the  bearing  of  the  foregoing  considerations 
on  the  problem  of  ethics,  properly  so-called,  in  its 
relation  to  the  general  theory  of  modern  SociaUsm  1 
Ethics,  i.e.  the  principle  of  moral  relation,  is, 
we  have  said,  always  concerned,  directly  or  in- 
directly, with  the  social  relations  of  men.  This  is 
so  even  under  the  second  phase  of  the  ethical 
consciousness  alluded  to  in  the  earlier  part  of  the 
present  chapter.  The  concern  with  human  relations 
it  is  which,  in  the  first  place,  has  come  in  the 
course  of  evolution  to  mark  off  the  sphere  of  ethics 
from  that  of  religion.  Even  where  most  under 
the  domination  of  mystical-religious  influences  of 
an  introspective  character,  the  ethical  consciousness 
does  not  cease  to  concern  itself,  indirectly  at  least, 
with  the  relations  and  conduct  of  men  with  each 
other  and  toward  society  as  a  whole.  It  therefore 
behoves  us  to  consider  the  essential  element  in 
all  morality,  i.e.  in  any  theory  of  the  duty  of  the 
individual  toward  the  society  of  which  he  is  a 
member,  or,  it  may  be,  toward  all  other  sentient 


ETHICAL   EVOLUTION  23 

beings  outside  himself.  This  theory  need  not  be 
explicitly  present  as  such  to  the  ordinary  mind  ;  it 
may  be  rather  instinctive  than  explicitly  conscious. 
But  it  is  there  none  the  less  as  the  background 
of  conduct. 

Now  there  are  certain  lines  of  conduct  which 
are  essential  in  all  societies  whatever,  however 
rudimentary  their  organisation  may  be,  while 
others  vary  from  age  to  age  and  from  one  form  of 
social  organisation  to  another.  The  first  represent 
the  root-principles  of  ethics,  while  the  second  are, 
as  we  may  term  them,  the  phenomenal  applications 
of  those  principles  as  determined  by  the  conditions 
of  the  society  in  question.  The  problem  here  is 
to  find  out  the  most  general  conception,  so  to  say 
the  common  denominator,  in  regard  to  which  all 
other  ethical  notions  are  derivative,  together  with 
the  principle  which  that  conception  presupposes. 
Can  we  arrive  at  such  a  ground-principle  ?  I 
think  we  can,  and  that,  in  accordance  with  the 
hints  of  Aristotle  and  the  Greeks,  we  may  track 
down  all  ethical  notions  to  being  ultimately  appli- 
cations, direct  or  indirect,  of  the  conception  of 
justice  or  equity.^ 

^  Exception  is  to  be  made  here,  it  should  be  said,  of  notions 
special  to  the  mystical-introspective  phase  of  the  ethical  con- 
sciousness and  concerning,  not  the  relation  of  the  individual  to 
the  society  outside  of  him,  but  that  of  the  individual  to  the 
Divine  Being  who  is  assumed  to  be  revealed  within  him.  For 
the  essentially  individualist  morality  of  the  mystical-introspective 


24  rRORI.EMS  OF  MEN.  MIND,  MORALS 

If  it  be  asked  from  what  the  concept  of  justice 
or  equity  itself  is  derived,  the  answer  is :  It  has  its 
root  in  the  principle  of  sympathy.  But  sympathy 
is,  an  fond,  an  alogical  principle.  It  cannot,  any 
more  than  any  other  emotion  as  such,  be  reduced 
to  logical  terms.  It  is  not  translatable  into  thought 
except  in  a  symbolical  manner.  Justice,  or  equity, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  essentially  a  principle  of  rela- 
tion, in  other  words,  a  logical  principle.  Basing 
itself  on  the  primal  unreasoned  emotional  factor 
of  sympathy  as  its  postulate,  this  being  the  prin- 
ciple of  all  association  in  community  whatever, 
justice  formulates  equality  in  some  sense  as  the 
basis  of  social  relations.  (Aristotle  speaks  of  justice 
as  being  "  a  sort  of  equality."  The  Golden  Rule 
itself  is  but  a  statement  of  the  principle  in  the  form 
of  a  categorical  imperative.)  The  principle  of 
equality  which  is  identifiable  with  that  of  justice 
applies  in  the  first  instance  solely,  or  mainly,  to  the 
kinship  group,  be  it  larger  or  smaller,  constituting 
the  early  tribal  community.  From  this  cause  the 
notion  of  equality  becomes  obscured  and  often  lost 
in  the  subsequent  evolution  of  society,  barbaric  and 
civilised.  The  primal  communal  group  of  which 
equality  was  the  essential  condition  gets  broken 

phase  referred  to,  while  recognising  and,  in  a  manner,  absorbing 
notions  derived  from  the  earlier  social  ethics  of  tribal  humanity, 
often  entirely  changes  their  significance  and  incorporates  with 
them,  as  having  an  equal  or  even  higher  validity,  notions  peculiar 
to  itself.     But  to  these  we  shall  have  occasion  to  refer  later  on. 


ETHICAL   EVOLUTION  25 

up  ;  individualism  enters ;  distinctions  of  rank,  of 
wealth,  arise,  largely  owing  to  the  introduction  of 
the  institution  of  slavery  in  the  shape  of  captives, 
the  members  of  alien  communities  taken  in  war, 
and  other  causes.  Hence,  as  just  said,  the  notion 
of  Justice,  of  equitable  equality,  though  always 
remaining  as  the  groundwork  of  the  ethical  con- 
sciousness, becomes  obscured  and  distorted  in  vari- 
ous ways,  lapsing  for  the  most  part  into  the  position 
of  a  "  pious  opinion,"  an  ideal  which  it  is  not  even 
attempted  to  realise.  Or  again,  it  may  be  con- 
ceived as  realised  under  forms  altogether  foreign 
to  its  original  conception.  With  the  enlargement 
and  development  in  complexity  of  the  economic 
basis  of  social  life,  the  notion  of  Justice,  as  above 
defined,  undergoes  strange  metamorphoses,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  conditions  based  on  class  distinc- 
tion. With  the  modification  of  the  idea  of  Justice, 
the  keystone  of  the  whole,  all  ethical  conceptions 
become  changed. 

Still  more  important,  perhaps,  is  the  fact  that 
what  I  have  termed  in  the  early  part  of  this  chapter 
the  "  larger  whole,"  to  which  the  individual  looks 
up  as  at  once  his  completion  and  the  supreme  end 
of  his  conduct,  is  no  longer  a  natural  society  with 
which  his  whole  existence  is  interwoven,  but  the 
supernatural  divinity  with  whom  his  personality 
is  supposed  to  stand  in  direct  relation.  Hence  the 
ultimate  ideal,  the  final  test  of  all  conduct,  from 


26  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

being  the  maintenance  and  prosperity  of  a  kinship- 
society,  has  become  the  will  and  glory  of  a  super- 
natural being.  The  religious  sanction  of  ethics,  in 
other  words,  from  being  social  and  human,  has 
become  personal  and  theological.  It  is  no  longer 
social  custom  that  decides  questions  of  right  and 
wrong,  but  sacred  oracles,  written  or  otherwise. 
This  is  so  nominally,  at  least.  But  even  if  in  the 
earlier  stages  of  this  phase  of  the  ethical  conscious- 
ness it  is  also  largely  so  in  reality,  it  is  an  obvious 
fact  that  during  the  period  of  civilisation  (as  dis- 
tinguished from  that  of  the  tribal  society  which 
preceded  civihsation)  it  is  the  exigencies  of  the 
dominant  classes  of  a  given  society  which  mainly 
determine  the  whole  detail  of  its  rules  of  conduct. 
It  is  the  morality  which  is  most  conducive  to  the 
maintenance  of  the  prevailing  form  of  class-society 
which  is  covered  by  the  theological  sanction  and 
enforced  by  law  and  public  opinion.  That  included 
in  this  class-morality  of  the  civilised  world  we  should 
find  principles  of  Justice  common  to  all  forms  of 
society,  goes  without  saying.  But  even  these  are 
interpreted  or  explained  away  in  a  sense  favourable 
to  the  needs  of  the  dominant  class-society,  whenever 
they  come  into  conflict  with  the  latter.  This  is  one 
of  the  important  derivative  truths  emphasised  in  the 
doctrine  of  history  proclaimed  by  Marx  and  Engels. 
The  later  aspects  of  this  second  phase  of  the 
ethical   consciousness  —  Individualism  —  which   is 


ETHICAL   EVOLUTION  27 

largely  coterminous  with  the  history  of  civilisation 
up  to  its  latest  development  in  the  "  Manchester 
school  "  doctrine  of  nineteenth- century  capitalism, 
exhibits  various  and  some  even  apparently  con- 
tradictory aspects.  The  ethic  of  primitive  society 
was,  as  yet,  undifferentiated  from  its  religion. 
Both  were  alike  social  and  this-worldly,  rather 
than  personal  and  other-worldly.  The  transition 
from  early  social  conditions  to  those  of  civilisation 
is  everywhere  characterised  in  proportion  to  the 
completeness  of  the  change,  by  the  separation  of 
aspects  of  human  life  into  distinct  and  often 
opposing  interests.  This  appears  in  the  material 
as  well  as  in  the  intellectual  and  moral  worlds. 
In  the  last-named,  upon  the  demarcation  of  the 
natural  from  the  supernatural  order  and  of  the 
human  from  the  divine,  the  subordination  of  the 
former  to  the  latter  logically  followed.  To  early 
man  the  gods  were  one  with  nature,  and  their 
relations  similar  to  those  of  human  society,  or,  at 
least,  there  was  no  clear  line  of  cleavage  between 
the  two.  In  the  same  way  every  member  of  the 
tribal  community  was  at  once  master  and  servant, 
the  equal  of  other  members  of  the  tribal  whole, 
having  a  share  in  the  communal  possessions  and 
a  voice  in  the  ordering  of  affairs,  but  at  the  same 
time  owing  allegiance  and  duties  to  the  tribe  itself. 
With  the  full  disruption  of  the  tribal  idea  by 
civilisation,  a  form  of  religion,  as  already  remarked, 


28  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

obtains,  which  chiims  the  individual  soid  for  its 
own  province  and  human  morahty  for  a  mere 
department  of  that  province.  At  the  same  time, 
with  the  division  of  society  into  classes,  in  the 
main  into  a  possessing  class  and  a  non-possessing 
class,  religion  itself  becomes  a  mere  servant  of 
dominant  class  -  interest  and  fashions  morality 
accordingly,  though  without,  of  course,  entirely 
suppressing  the  notion  of  Equity  as  its  basis,  the 
latter  always  remaining  as  a  background,  however 
obscured  in  practice. 

In  accordance  with  the  foregoing,  every  social 
formation,  every  economic  change,  implies  a 
modification  of  ethical  no  less  than  of  religious 
conceptions.  Thus  what  was  ethically  defensible 
to  a  feudal  baron  of  the  fifteenth  century  was  not 
so  to  a  nonconformist  manufacturer  of  the  nine- 
teenth century.  What  represented  Equity  to  the 
latter  may  be  viewed  with  abhorrence  by  the 
Socialist  conscience  of  the  twentieth  century.  The 
striking  illustration  of  the  interdependence  of  ethical 
ideas  with  the  whole  social  and  intellectual  life  is 
afforded  by  the  results  of  missionary  efforts  to 
impose  a  bourgeois- Christian  standard  upon  savage 
races.  The  savage  taken  out  of  tribal  conditions, 
even  though  they  may  be  of  a  more  or  less  debased 
sort,  does  not  really  appreciate  the  introspective 
and  personal  morality  proper  to  Christian  civilisa- 
tion, the  net  result  being  that  having  shed,  at  the 


ETHICAL   EVOLUTION  29 

instance  of  the  missionary,  his  tribal  ethics  and  not 
assimilating  the  mixture  provided  for  him  by  his 
new  father-in- God,  he  ceases  to  have  any  moral 
principles  at  all.  The  converted  Kaffir  is  pro- 
verbially to  be  shunned  so  far  as  intimate  personal 
or  business  relations  are  concerned.  A  corresponding 
phenomenon  may  be  observed  in  certain  anarchists 
who,  while  having  broken  with  the  morality  of 
the  bourgeois  world  and  being  unable  to  act  up 
to  a  Socialist  ethic,  partly  owing  to  the  conditions 
of  the  existing  bourgeois  society  not  admitting  it, 
and  partly  owing  to  their  not  having  themselves 
grasped  the  real  distinctions  between  the  two, 
considers  himself  justified  in  committing  deeds 
oftentimes  of  the  most  undoubtedly  criminal 
character.  (This  remark,  I  may  observe,  is  made 
without  prejudice  to  any  view  we  may  hold  as 
to  the  justifiability  of  a  "  terrorist  policy  "  under 
certain  circumstances,  which  is  another  question.) 

One  of  the  characteristics  of  the  ethical  theory 
proper  to  the  period  of  civilisation  is  the  double 
character  of  its  individualism.  In  its  original 
form,  as  based  on  mystical  religion,  it  was  intro- 
spective and  mystical  in  its  character.  And  this 
character  it  has  continued  to  retain  nominally  up 
to  the  present  day.  But  with  the  growth  of  the 
world  of  modern  industry  and  commerce,  another 
individualist  morality  has  grown  up  beside  it,  based 
on  the  Manchester-school  formula,  of  "  every  man 


30  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

for  himself  and  the  devil  take  the  hindmost." 
The  original  notion  of  Justice  which  the  so-called 
"  ethical "  or  "  universal "  religions  had  taken  under 
their  a?gis  in  their  own  way  is  here  almost  com- 
pletely cast  to  the  winds  in  favour  of  the  principle 
of  frank  self-seeking.  This  principle  is  only  modi- 
fied by  the  sheer  necessities  of  even  a  commercial 
community,  for  no  society  whatever  can  hold  to- 
gether without  a  recognition  of  the  ethical  principle 
of  Equity  in  some  shape.  This  Manchester-school 
conception  of  individualist  ethic,  although  only 
formulated  first  in  the  early  nineteenth  century, 
has  been  present  tacitly,  though  not  avowedly,  in 
different  guises  throughout  the  whole  period  of 
civilisation.  For  the  mystical-introspective  ethic 
was  too  indirect  in  its  relation  to  everyday  social 
life  to  influence  the  conduct  of  the  mass  of  men 
continuously.  Hence  the  attitude  of  these  so- 
called  "  spiritual "  religions,  of  which  Christianity 
is  the  typical  expression,  though  equally  indivi- 
dualistic in  its  own  way,  was,  more  often  than 
not,  in  practical  life  a  dead  letter,  and  its  place 
taken  by  this  other  individualist  attitude  of  mere 
personal  self-seeking. 

We  have  spoken  of  a  new  ethical  attitude  which 
has  begun  to  show  itself,  more  or  less  noticeably, 
within  the  last  generation  or  thereabouts.  It  con- 
sists in  a  rehabilitation  of  social  life  as  the  sphere 
and   object   of  ideal  (or  "  religious,"  if  you   will) 


ETHICAL   EVOLUTION  31 

sentiment  and  its  resulting  ethical  principles  of 
conduct.  Hence  it  is,  as  already  said,  utilitarian, 
but  in  the  broadest  sense  of  the  word.  As  such 
it  opposes  itself  to  the  narrow  individualistic  utili- 
tarianism— the  business-morality  of  the  Manchester 
school.  At  the  same  time  it  is  equally  out  of 
sympathy  with  the  introspective-mystical  frame 
of  mind  and  the  ethical  attitude  which  immedi- 
ately results  from  it.  The  self-communings  and 
aspirations  toward  the  supersensible  holiness  of  an 
Augustine,  or  of  the  pietist  generally  in  all  ages, 
have  lost  their  savour,  nay,  have  no  meaning  for 
it.  Its  highest  ideal  is  political  and  social  rather 
than  personal  and  spiritual.  In  this,  its  immediate 
aim  is  the  realisation  here  below  of  that  notion  of 
Justice  which  we  have  seen  is  the  one  immutable 
centre  in  ethics,  as  being  common,  in  some  sense, 
to  all  phases  of  the  ethical  consciousness.  This 
we  may  term  the  negative  formulation  by  the 
logical  understanding  of  the  intrinsically  alogical 
emotion  of  sympathy.  But  there  is  also  a  positive 
representation  in  the  sphere  of  the  same  logical 
understanding  of  this  basic  emotion.  It  is  ex- 
pressed in  the  notion  of  Brotherhood.^     This  forms 

1  It  is  necessary  here  to  enter  a  word  of  caution  against  the 
notion  that  "  Brotherhood  "  (Fraternity)  necessarily  implies  an 
equally  close  personal  affection  for,  or  intimacy  with,  everybody, 
which  is  manifestly  absurd,  and,  moreover,  does  not  as  a  rule 
obtain  even  among  brothers  according  to  the  flesh,  who  do  not 
always  embrace  each  other  promiscuously  in  Box  and  Cox  fashion. 


32  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

the  more  positive  idenl  which  it  is  also  the  aim  of 
the  new  ethic  to  reaHse.  Finally,  both  of  these 
principles  alike  presuppose  freedom,  i.e.  non-coer- 
cion from  without,  of  the  individual  as  of  society, 
in  the  development  of  each. 

Hence  we  have  once  more  the  old  republical 
triune-principle  of  Liberty,  Equality,  and  Frater- 
nity. This  principle  which  I  have  endeavoured  to 
show  forms  the  theoretical  foundation  of  all  ethical 
conduct  it  is  which  Socialism  makes  its  own  in  a 
special  sense.  It  does  not  do  so  merely  in  the 
sense  of  accepting  it  as  an  ideal  to  be  striven  for, 
well  knowing  the  while  that  it  is  impossible  of  at- 
tainment, in  short,  as  a  mere  "  pious  opinion."  In 
this  sense  it  has  been  adopted  by  the  old  Republi- 
canism. But  Socialism  claims  for  the  first  time 
in  history  to  furnish  the  possibility  of  its  realisa- 
tion. Hitherto  material  circumstance,  economic 
condition,  in  short  the  constitution  of  society, 
have  stood  in  the  way  of  this  and  condemned  it  to 
remain  no  more  than  a  phrase. 

What  I  have  termed  the  New  Ethic,  implicitly, 

where  not  avowedly  and  in  so  many  words,  bases 

the  test  of  conduct  and   the   standard   of  moral 

aspiration  upon  social  utility.     That  this  is  so  is 

illustrated   by  the   fact  that  well-meaning  people 

The  personal  equation  is  even  here  recognised.  Brotherhood 
ethic  means  the  practical  recognition  of  mutual  sympathy  in 
the  affairs  of  life  and  in  the  recognition  of  the  same  ideal  aims. 
(See  also  note  on  p.  157.) 


ETHICAL   EVOLUTION  33 

from  out  the  various  Christian  sects  are  proclaim- 
ing "true  Christianity"  to  consist,  not,  as  was 
conceived  aforetime,  in  a  mystical  relation  of  the 
individual  soul  to  the  Divinity,  but  in  working  for 
the  amelioration  of  the  masses  and  for  a  higher 
social  state,  whatever  may  be  the  means  by  which 
they  think  to  further  this  state.  The  change 
in  the  attitude  of  the  religious  sects  in  this  con- 
nection is  very  significant.  It  may  be  readily 
tested  by  opening  a  modern  up-to-date  book  by  a 
representative  man  of  almost  any  of  the  leading 
Christian  bodies,  and  comparing  it  with  a  corre- 
sponding book  of  homiletic  reflections  of  a  previous 
age,  even  of  half  a  century  ago,  when  the  new 
wine  with  which  it  is  nowadays  attempted  to 
infuse  the  old  bottles  becomes  strikingly  apparent. 
This  new  or  third  of  the  salient  phases  of  the 
ethical  consciousness,  which  is  noticeable  in  a 
vague  and  indefinite  way  amongst  serious-minded 
persons  in  general,  acquires  in  Socialism  its  full 
content  and  a  definite  meaning.  Its  negative  side 
is  as  important  to  grasp  as  its  positive — that  which 
differentiates  it  from  the  other  phases  of  the  ethical 
consciousness,  as  the  positive  tendencies  of  its  new 
point  of  view.  Moral  notions  belonging  to  the 
earlier  phases  must  inevitably,  as  survivals,  tend  to 
become  rudimentary  in  this  new  phase,  especially 
when  the  material  conditions  which  it  implies, 
and   for   which   modern   Socialism   as   a    politico- 

3 


34  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

economic    movement    stands,   shall   have   become 
realised. 

This  point  is  important  in  view  of  the  accus- 
ations brought  by  politically  interested  persons 
against  Socialism,  anent  "  Atheism "  and  "  Free 
Love."  Absurd  as  the  statements  often  made  by 
these  enemies  of  Socialism  are  in  themselves,  yet 
the  fact  that  they  are  sufficiently  plausible  to  be 
worth  making  at  all  is  due  to  their  having  a  certain 
basis  of  truth.  For  example,  on  the  one  side, 
Socialism,  it  is  alleged,  involves  Atheism.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  pointed  out  with  perfect  truth  that 
no  declaration  of  speculative  belief  or  disbelief  is 
demanded  of  Socialists  by  any  party-programme. 
But  this  disclaimer,  although  technically  correct, 
does  not  really  dispose  of  the  question.  The  fact 
remains,  not  merely  that  the  whole  tradition  of 
Socialism  and  of  the  popular  proletarian  movement 
which  is  the  material  basis  of  Socialism,  as  it  is 
understood  to-day,  is  anti-theological,  but  that  the 
whole  theoretical  foundation  on  which  Socialism 
is  built  up  is  that  of  modern  science,  with  its  sole 
recognition  of  fact  and  law,  and  the  supreme 
authority  of  human  reason  operating  on  the  results 
of  experience,  in  the  affairs  of  human  life.  Hence 
it  is  necessarily  altogether  outside  the  introspective 
supernaturalism  which  has  played  so  prominent 
a  part  in  various  periods  of  civilisation.  No  less 
is  it  outside  the  naive  supernaturalism  of  primitive 


ETHICAL   EVOLUTION  35 

man.  This  attitude  it  shares  in  common  with 
what  is  known  as  the  "  modern  spirit "  and  modern 
thought  in  general.  What  distinguishes  SociaHsm 
in  this  respect  is  that  while  the  average  cultivated 
bourgeois  finds  it  necessary  to  give  a  certain  out- 
ward and  formal  homage  to  creeds  and  cults  which 
no  longer  represent  his  real  convictions,  the 
Socialist  frankly  recognises  the  intellectual  change 
that  has  reduced  these  to  absurdity.  The  hypoc- 
risy and  lip-homage  of  the  bourgeois  in  this  con- 
nection, largely  the  result  of  the  notion  that  the 
old  creeds  are  necessary  bulwarks  of  existent 
society,  is  naturally  repellent  to  a  Socialist  who 
aims  at  the  radical  transformation  of  existent 
society.  The  difference  in  this  respect  between  the 
Socialist  and  the  average  educated  bourgeois  is  not 
so  much  one  of  real  conviction  as  of  the  import  of 
that  conviction  in  practical  life.  In  a  word,  the 
Ethic  of  Socialism  has  not  only  no  need  of  a 
personal  Deity,  but  may  well  find  a  personal  Deity 
in  the  way.  Hence  naturally  it  cannot  admit 
religious  dogma  to  be  either  necessary  or  desirable 
for  "the  masses." 

Similarly  as  regards  the  question  of  so-called 
"Free  Love."  The  theological  ethic  of  introspec- 
tion, whatever  form  it  took,  has  always  regarded 
sexual  relations,  as  such,  with  repulsion  and  hostility. 
On  the  precise  grounds  and  origin  of  this  attitude 
much  may  be,  and  has  been,  written.     But  these 


36  PROBT.EIMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

do  not  concern  us  here.  It  suffices  for  our  purpose 
to  note  the  ftict,  which  is  incontestable,  and  to 
point  out  that  the  reasons  for  this  attitude  un- 
questionably flow  from  the  general  speculative 
position  occupied  by  introspective  mysticism.  Now 
principles  of  conduct  originating  in  a  speculative 
position  that  has  been  abandoned  naturally  lose 
their  force.  But  there  is  an  additional  reason, 
corresponding  to  that  just  mentioned  as  regards 
traditional  creeds,  why  existing  bourgeois  society 
should  cling  to  these  principles  even  apart  from 
the  speculative  theory  which  is  their  only  logical 
support,  and  that  reason  is — setting  aside  inherited 
sentiment — purely  economic  in  its  nature.  A 
distinction  has  never  yet  been  drawn  between  the 
sexual  relation  per  se  and  its  social  results  in  the 
bringing  of  new  members  into  the  community.  It 
is  here  that  the  politico-economic  significance  of 
the  matter  comes  in.  In  a  society  based  on  private 
property-holding,  it  is  clear  that  the  production  of 
offspring  must  be  taken  cognisance  of,  or  regulated, 
with  a  view  to  the  cost  of  maintenance,  etc.  The 
confused  state  of  public  opinion  as  to  the  true 
meaning  of  sexual  ethics  is  appalling.  The  average 
man  mixes  up  sentiment  derived  from  the  intro- 
spective-theological Weltansicht  with  considerations 
having  the  reason  of  their  being  in  the  exigencies 
of  modern  capitalistic  civilisation.  Yet  to  attain 
a  scientific  view  of  the  subject,  the  first  necessity 


ETHICAL   EVOLUTION  37 

is  to  clearly  distinguish  the  several  strains  which 
go  to  make  up  the  sentiment  of  existing  public 
opinion  on  the  subject.  If  we  do  this  with  im- 
partial care  we  shall  probably  be  driven  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  sexual  relation  per  se,  like  any 
other  animal  function,  does  not  really  come  within 
the  province  of  ethics  at  all,  understanding  by 
ethics  the  new  phase  of  the  ethical  consciousness 
for  which  the  standard  of  conduct  is  direct  social 
utility.  As  tested  by  this  standard,  I  repeat  that 
the  sexual  relation  per  se  would  seem  to  occupy 
neutral  ground.  Of  course  any  action,  however 
neutral  in  itself,  may  readily,  owing  to  condition- 
ing circumstances,  be  brought  into  the  sphere  of 
ethical  judgment  and  thus  take  on  a  definitely 
moral  or  immoral  colour,  as  the  case  may  be.  And 
so  it  is  here.  The  most  obvious  and  comprehensive 
of  these  conditioning  circumstances  in  the  domain 
of  sexual  conduct  is,  of  course,  the  production  of 
offspring.  The  difference  between  the  logical 
attitude  of  the  older  introspective- theological  ethics 
as  regards  this  question,  and  the  logical  attitude  of 
the  new  social  ethics,  lies  in  the  fact  that  for  the 
former  the  sexual  relation  was  j^^r  se  moral  or 
immoral,  while  for  the  latter  it  only  becomes  so 
per  aliud,  i.e.  owing  to  conditions  external  to  itself 
as  such. 

The  change  implied  in  the  aim  of  Social  Demo- 
cracy involves  then  the  shifting  of  ethical  judgment 


38  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

in  various  directions.     For  example,  so  far  from,  as 
is  sometimes  alleged,  tending  to  weaken  the  moral 
responsibility  of  the  individual,  it  will  tend  in  many 
ways  to  give  it  backbone.      As  things  are  in  the 
present  social  order,  organised,  as  it  is,  on  a  bureau- 
cratic basis,  for  the  coercio?i  of  men  rather  than 
the  administration  of  things,  we  find  the  bureau- 
crat or  functionary  separated  into  two  moral  selves. 
Bis  character  as  man  is  entirely  severed  from  his 
character  as  functionary.     Now  a  Socialistic  society 
organised  primarily  for  the  adjiiinistration  of  things 
rather  than  for  the  coercion  of  men  would  have 
naught  of  such  a  severance  as  this,  which  is  re- 
pellent even  to  the  aspirant  to  such  a  society.     We 
often  hear  it  said,  in  exculpation  of  some  act  of 
intrinsic  cruelty  or  injustice,  as  dictated,  it  may  be, 
by  law,  policy,  or  expediency,  such  a  one  "  was  only 
doing  his  duty"  (as  judge,  military  commander,  or 
what  not).     A  Socialist  would  not  recognise  official 
"duty"  as  ever  having  the  priority  over  human 
conscience  or  ethical  duty.    The  j  udge  who  deprived 
a  fellow-creature,  brought  up  before  him   in  the 
course  of  his  functions,  of  liberty  or  life  because 
an  evil  law  he  was  supposed  to  administer  directed 
him  to  do  so,  there  is  little  doubt  would  be  execrated 
by  a  healthy  Socialist  public  opinion.     The  public 
opinion  of  the  bourgeois  world,  by  way  of  exception, 
sanctioned  this  ethical  position  on  one  memorable 
occasion.      I  refer   to  the  trial  and  execution  of 


ETHICAL   EVOLUTION  39 

Fouquier  Tinville  for  the  part  he  had  taken  in  his 
official  capacity  as  Procureur  of  the  Revolutionary 
Tribunal,  in  giving  effect  to  Robespierre's  law  of 
Prairial  during  the  Terror.  In  this  case,  owing  to 
the  exceptional  circumstances,  it  suited  the  book 
of  the  dominant  classes  to  act  in  opposition  to  the 
principle  of  ethical  duality  usually  invoked  by  them. 
This  they  carried  to  the  length  of  criminally  ar- 
raigning Fouquier  Tinville,  refusing  to  accept  his 
plea  that  he  acted  as  ordered  by  his  government 
in  accordance  with  the  duty  imposed  upon  him  by 
his  office.  That  they  should  have  done  this  is  ex- 
tremely significant  as  a  precedent. 

The  above  is  only  one  among  many  instances  of 
the  manner  in  which  the  new  ethic — the  Socialist 
Ethic  of  human  solidarity  —  would  traverse  the 
judgments  and  distinctions  prevalent  in  the  world 
of  modern  Capitalism.  The  latter  has  moulded 
the  plastic  substance  of  the  individualistic  ethic  as 
handed  down  to  it,  for  its  own  purposes.  There 
are  many  other  ways  in  which  present-day  moral 
notions  must  inevitably  be  modified,  as  the  reader 
will  see  for  himself.  I  have  merely  mentioned  the 
above  as  indicating  one  direction,  at  least,  in  which 
increased  responsibility  would  be  placed  upon  the 
individual  conscience. 

To  sum  up  in  a  few  words  the  leading  positions 
of  the  foregoing  argument :  The  moral  impulse,  as 
such,  is  irreducible  to  anything  beyond  itself.     It 


40  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

is  an  alogical  ultimate,  indicating  that  the  meaning 
of  tlie  individual  human  being  is  not  exhausted 
within  his  own  personality  but  reaches  out  beyond 
this  as  an  element  of  some  larger  synthesis.  The 
nature  of  any  system  of  ethic  is  determined  by  that 
of  this  larger  whole  into  which  the  individual 
conceives  himself  as  entering,  and  which  he  feels 
to  be  his  truer  life,  in  relation  to  which  he,  as 
an  individual,  is  subordinate. 

There  are,  in  the  evolution  of  the  moral 
consciousness,  three  distinct  stages  traceable:  1. 
The  ethic  of  early  tribal  society,  in  which  the 
object  of  the  moral  relation  is  the  community,  of 
which  the  kinship-group  is  the  type.  At  this  stage 
the  individual  is  merged  in  the  social  group  to 
which  he  belongs.  2.  Concurrently  with  the 
break-up  of  group-society  and  the  rise  of  the 
autonomy  of  the  individual,  the  moral  basis  gets 
shifted.  Ethics,  instead  of  implying  the  relation 
of  the  individual  to  the  society  without  him,  tends 
to  become,  primarily  at  least,  based  on  a  relation- 
ship between  the  individual,  conceived  now  as  a 
spiritual  being  or  soul,  and  a  spiritual  Divinity 
supposed  to  reveal  himself  directly  to  this 
individual  soul.  Ethic  now  separates  itself  from 
religion,  while  at  the  same  time  its  ultimate 
sanction  rests  in  religion.  This  stage  I  have 
termed  the  individuahst-mystical,  or  the  intro- 
spective.     Its  ethical  ideal  is  personal  holiness  as 


ETHICAL   EVOLUTION  41 

opposed  to  the  older  tribal  or  civic  "virtue."  As 
a  consequence,  in  proportion  as  the  mystical  or 
religious  sanction  is  absent,  or  fallen  into  the 
background,  does  all  ethics  in  this  stage  tend  to 
become  dissolved  into  mere  atomistic  individualism. 
The  latter  finds  its  classical  formulation  in  the 
doctrine  underlying  the  Manchester-school  of 
economics.  This  second  phase  of  the  ethical 
consciousness  has  obtained,  in  one  or  other  of  its 
forms,  up  to  the  present  day.  A  change,  however, 
is  even  now  making  itself  felt.  3.  The  change  in 
question  consists  in  a  view  of  ethics  as  essentially  a 
social  matter.  In  this  respect  it  represents  a  return 
to  the  view  of  the  early  world.  But  it  is  a  return  on 
a  higher  plane.  The  present  social  ethics  has  for 
its  object  not  any  limited  social  whole,  such  as  that 
of  early  man,  but  humanity  as  such. 

We  have  directed  attention  to  the  Marxian 
doctrine,  the  so-called  "  materialist  theory  of 
history,"  in  its  bearing  on  ethics.  The  point  of 
view  as  regards  the  detail  of  conduct  in  each  social 
formation,  we  have  found  to  be  as  pointed  out  by 
Marx,  dictated  mainly  by  the  interests  of  the 
dominant  classes  in  any  given  society,  though 
purely  ethical  conceptions  may  also  react  on  the 
economic  society  itself. 

We  have  traced  the  fundamental  idea  at  the  basis 
of  conscience  and  of  moral  conduct  to  be  that  of 
Equality  or  of  Justice.    This  again  we  have  pointed 


42  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

out  as  the  root-principle  of  the  revolutionary 
trinity^Liberty,  Equality,  and  Fraternity.  But 
this  idea  of  Justice  itself  we  have  traced  back  to  its 
origin  in  that  alogical  somewhat,  or  feeling,  termed 
Sympathij.  This  emotion  is  immediate  and  absolute, 
and  hence  inexpressible  per  se  in  any  logical  formula. 
As  to  the  new  ethical  attitude  we  have  referred 
to  as  already  showing  itself  in  modern  thought  and 
feeling,  and  which  we  have  forecast  as  indicating 
the  dominant  trend  in  the  Ethics  of  Socialism,  we 
have  seen  it  to  be  the  recognition  of  social  and 
political  life,  as  the  object  and  as  embodying  the 
only  sanction  of  conscience.  Under  Socialistic 
conditions,  as  we  believe,  this  fact  will  be  formally 
acknowledged,  and  what  I  have  termed  the  third 
phase  in  the  evolution  of  the  ethical  consciousness 
will  be  definitively  affirmed.  What  the  detail  of 
the  canons  of  action  will  be  under  the  new  condi- 
tions we  cannot,  of  course,  foresee  with  any  com- 
pleteness. This  much,  however,  we  may  venture 
to  predict — that  some  courses  of  conduct  which 
are  to-day  regarded  as  coming  within  the  purview 
of  ethics,  will  cease  to  have  any  moral  bearing  in 
the  society  of  the  future,  while  other  courses  of 
conduct,  now  regarded  as  indifferent  or  even 
ethically  commendable,  will  be  condemned  by  the 
moral  law  of  the  time  to  come. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE    PROBLEM    OF    HISTORY    AND    METHODS 
FOR    ITS    SOLUTION 

History  means  the  content  of  past  social  reality. 
We  may  either  treat  this  content  descriptively, 
endeavouring  to  reproduce  in  mental  imagery  the 
reality  of  the  past,  its  life  and  action,  or  we  may 
search  out  the  general  laws  of  historical  change 
and  development,  irrespective  of  concrete  time  or 
place ;  or  we  may  combine  the  two  methods  in 
taking  history  in  the  concrete,  the  history  of  a 
given  country,  or  people,  or  period ;  or  universal 
history,  understanding  by  this  the  evolution  of 
progressive  humanity  from  the  beginnings  of 
civilisation  in  Western  Asia  and  Egypt  up  to  the 
present  time,  and  connect  the  phantasmagoria  of 
particular  events,  incidents,  and  persons  with  the 
abstract  laws  on  which  all  history  is  based.  The 
present  inquiry  deals  with  history  in  the  second 
and  third  senses  mentioned,  the  senses  usually 
understood  by  the  phrase,  the  Philosophy  of 
History. 

43 


44  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

Now  it  behoves  us  to  consider  on  what  the 
possibiUty  of  these  two  ways  of  treating  history 
ultimately  rests.  The  laws  determining  the  his- 
torical development  we  find  embedded  as  part  of 
the  reality  of  history.  But  what  strikes  the  eye 
at  first  sight  is,  not  the  laws  but  the  phantasmagoria 
itself,  the  events,  incidents,  and  personalities — in  a 
word,  the  phenomena  of  history.  Now  the  infinite 
phenomena  of  history,  the  play  of  incidents  and 
personalities,  taken  in  their  totality,  are  irreducible 
to  law,  i.e.  to  any  formulation  based  on  the  causal 
category.  This  is  shown  by  the  impossibility  of 
foretelling  concrete  events.  The  action  of  any  law 
is  constant,  ejc  hypothesi,  and  can  be  foretold  with 
accuracy.  But  it  is  only  where  a  law  not  merely 
enters  into,  but  absolutely  dominates,  a  concrete 
situation,  that  the  issue  of  that  situation  can  be 
foreseen  with  any  approach  to  accuracy,  which  is 
certainly  not  the  case  with  human  history.  In  a 
word,  this  phenomenal  element  in  history  is  the 
domain  of  the  antithesis  of  law  {i.e.  of  the  formul- 
able  causal  relation) — is  the  domain  of  what  we  call 
chance.  We  have  then  two  primary  elements  in 
history,  the  general  or  universal  trend  of  things 
in  their  several  departments,  economical,  political, 
intellectual,  and  we  have  the  particular  things 
themselves — persons,  incidents,  events — constituting 
the  material  in  and  through  which  the  causal 
relations,   or   laws   of  historical   change,   manifest 


HISTORY   AND   ITS    SOLUTION      45 

themselves.  The  particular  phenomena  of  history 
often  modify,  suspend,  or  deflect  the  law  as  given 
in  its  universal  formula,  and,  although  the  law 
may,  in  the  long  run,  rehabilitate  itself,  it  is  usually 
the  chance  element,  the  play  of  individual  character, 
fortuitous  incident,  etc.,  which  seems  to  dominate 
history  in  any  determinate  period,  limited  geo- 
graphical area,  or  ethnical  section  of  the  human 
race.  Our  ultimate  antithesis  of  history  then  is 
that  between  the  particular  events  and  persons 
constituting  its  raw  material  and  the  universal 
tendencies  expressed  in  what  we  call  its  laws,  i.e. 
the  determination  of  the  causal  category  governing 
its  movement. 

But  traversing  this  fundamental  abstract  anti- 
thesis is  a  more  concrete  one.  We  may  discover 
in  the  historical  process  two  sides,  the  unconscious 
and  the  conscious,  or  the  material  and  the  psycho- 
logical, as  we  may  choose  to  term  it.  History  may 
either  be  treated  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
conscious  process  as  determining  the  unconscious, 
or  the  unconscious  process  as  determining  the 
conscious.  We  may  either  view  the  course  of 
man's  conceptions  and  beliefs,  etc.,  as  conditioning 
the  course  of  the  material  facts  of  his  life  and  the 
development  of  his  environment,  or  we  may  regard 
the  material  facts  of  his  life  as  determining  his  ideas, 
beliefs,  and  general  mental  constitution.  History, 
until  quite  recently,  was  invariably  written  on  the 


46  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

basis  of  the  former  hypothesis.  The  late  Lord 
Acton,  even,  had  no  hesitation  in  propounding  it 
as  though  it  were  a  self-evident  truth.  The 
tendency  is  now,  on  the  contrary,  to  regard  the 
material  environment  as  either  wholly,  or  mainly, 
conditioning  the  ideological  (as  it  is  sometimes 
called)  side  of  human  life  and  social  development. 
There  is  a  third  view  possible  as  regards  this 
problem,  and  that  is,  to  conceive  the  unconscious 
and  the  conscious  process  as  reciprocally  determining 
each  other.  On  this  view  neither  is  the  cause  of 
the  other,  but  each,  at  once,  determines,  and  is 
determined  by,  the  other.  The  latter  is,  I  take  it, 
the  true  and  scientific  view.  But,  even  here,  it 
can  hardly  be  denied  that  the  unconscious  factor, 
the  material  conditions  of  life,  has,  up  to  the  present 
time,  had  a  certain  priority  over  the  conscious 
factor.  The  modes  of  the  production  of  wealth, 
which  have  shaped  social  life  on  its  material  side, 
have,  hitherto,  on  the  whole,  more  directly  in- 
fluenced habits  of  thought  and  the  conscious  will 
of  men  than  ideas  and  habits  of  thought  have 
influenced  material  progress. 

The  tendency  is  for  the  conscious  element  of 
human  life  more  and  more  to  acquire  that  deter- 
minative power  which  formerly  accrued  to  the 
unconscious.  External  circumstances  have,  more- 
over, hitherto  often  determined,  not  merely  the 
relations  of  men,   but   also    their  ideas   of  those 


HISTORY   AND   ITS   SOLUTION      47 

relations,  and  have  even  modified  their  conceptions 
of  the  meaning  of  reaHty  in  general.  Yet,  admitting 
thus  much,  on  the  one  side,  not  only  do  we  notice, 
at  present,  an  increasing  influence  of  the  conscious 
will  of  man  in  modifying  his  environment,  but  in 
no  past  phase  of  the  history  of  civilisation  is  pro- 
gress entirely  reducible  to  an  unconscious  factor : 
understanding  by  this  a  factor  outside  the  psycho- 
logical element  in  human  life.  Side  by  side  with 
the  series  of  material  causation,  there  is  always  a 
parallel  series  of  psychical  causation,  and  either 
could  be  viewed  in  the  abstract  as  relatively  inde- 
pendent of  the  other. 

This  is  especially  noticeable  in  certain  sides  of 
intellectual  development — the  history  of  specula- 
tive opinion,  for  example,  where  we  can  distinctly 
trace  the  evolution  from  one  idea  to  another, 
apart  from  all  direct  external  influence.  We  can 
follow  one  system  of  conception  developing  into 
its  successor  without  any  direct  modification  from 
outside.  The  order  is  purely  psychological  con- 
sidered per  se.  Similarly,  on  the  other  hand,  in 
economical  evolution  we  can  often  trace  a  chain 
of  cause  and  effect  due  to  the  force  of  circumstances, 
apparently  without  any  essential  intervention  of 
the  human  mind.  But  viewing  the  historical 
movement  as  a  whole,  we  can  see  that  its  reality 
consists  in  the  mutual  determination  of  its  two 
sides.     One-sided  causation,  as   between  the   un- 


48  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

conscious  physical  surroundings  and  conditions  of 
social  life  and  the  human  intelligence  and  will  as 
such,  no  more  obtains  than  does  the  one-sided 
determination  of  physical  conditions  by  the  in- 
telligently directed  will  of  man.  Each  is  at  once 
limited  by,  and  limits  the  other.  Conscious  will 
cannot  effect  change  without  the  co-operation  of 
the  unconscious  forces  constituting  its  environment. 
The  unconscious  forces,  though  they  may  destroy 
a  given  society,  it  is  equally  clear,  cannot  effect 
evolutionary  changes  in  it  without  the  co-operation 
of  intelligent  will  as  embodied  in  certain,  at  least, 
of  its  members.  It  is  only  a  question  of  which 
factor  is  predominant  in  any  given  case. 

But  there  are,  again,  still  more  concrete  anti- 
theses which  an  analysis  of  human  development 
presents  to  us.  These  we  may  term  dynamic 
antitheses.  History  implies  the  organic  movement 
of  human  society,  with  its  economical,  political, 
juridical,  its  intellectual,  ethical,  emotional,  aesthetic 
sides.  Now  the  question  imposes  itself  what  is 
the  most  basal  antithesis  underlying  the  whole 
progress  of  social  life  and  manifesting  itself  in  all 
these  departments  ?  The  most  salient  antithesis 
of  this  dynamic  kind,  the  one  which  dominates  all 
others  in  the  development  of  social  life  from  the 
dawn  of  history  (or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  from 
the  dawn  of  civilisation),  seems  to  the  present 
writer  to  be  that  between  the  individual  and  the 


HISTORY   AND   ITS   SOLUTION      49 

community  into  which  he  enters.  There  are,  of 
course,  as  remarked,  other  antitheses — there  is  the 
antithesis  of  race  in  its  widest  sense,  there  is  the 
great  economic  antithesis  of  civihsation  issuing  in 
the  struggle  of  classes. 

These  antitheses  seem  deep-lying,  but  however 
deep-lying  they  may  be  in  the  very  constitution 
of  society  itself,  as  exhibited  in  the  evolution  of 
civilised  man  in  his  present  state,  they  are  not 
so  deep-lying  as  the  antithesis  of  the  Individual 
considered,  on  the  one  hand,  as  per  se,  and, 
on  the  other,  as  the  constituent  merely  of  that 
larger  whole,  the  Community.  The  entire  course 
of  history  shows  us  the  struggle  of  the  individual 
to  emancipate  himself  from  that  close  and  organic 
union  with  some  social  whole,  be  it  clan,  tribe, 
people,  or  what  not,  that  characterised  pre-civilised 
and  pre-historic  humanity.  In  the  earlier  periods 
of  civilisation  and,  indeed,  till  a  considerable  ad- 
vance has  taken  place,  the  individual  is  still  over- 
shadowed in  importance  by  the  community,  finally 
in  the  form  of  the  patriarchal  family  at  one  end, 
and  the  city-state  at  the  other. 

Last  of  all  the  general,  industrial,  and  economic 
development,  together  with  its  accompanying  in- 
tellectual development,  severs  the  individual  from 
his  social  group  and  from  the  community,  as  such, 
and  converts  him  into  an  independent  self-subsistent 
entity.     At  the  other  extreme,  the  State,  becoming 


50  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

ever  more  impersonal  and  mechanical  and  extend- 
ing itself  over  ever-increasing  areas  of  population, 
assumes  the  function  of  the  government  of  men,  at 
the  same  time  gradually  undermining  and  destroy- 
ing the  administrative  functions  and  powers  of  the 
social  groups,  kinship,  and  otherwise,  of  the  earlier 
world.  This  relation  of  the  individual  to  the  com- 
munity, determined,  as  it  is,  by  the  general  current 
of  social  evolution,  we  contend  then  to  be  the 
most  salient  and  the  most  deep-lying  relation  in 
historical  development.  Let  us  now  consider,  for 
a  moment,  the  two  other  pairs  of  antitheses  also, 
that  of  higher  and  lower  race  and  of  possessing  and 
non-possessing  class,  the  latter  of  which,  at  least,  is 
of  supreme  importance.  Let  us  take,  first  of  all, 
the  antithetic  relation  of  higher  race  to  lower  race. 
There  are  some  historical  thinkers  who  would 
base  the  movement  of  history,  or,  otherwise  ex- 
pressed, the  progress  of  civilisation,  upon  the 
antagonism  of  colour  or  race.  Thus  it  has  been 
argued  that  the  condition  of  the  rise  of  civilisation 
out  of  barbarism  is  the  duality  of  an  intellectually 
and  physically  superior  dominant  race  and  an 
inferior  dominated  race,  and  the  gradual  fusion  of 
the  two.  But  whatever  part  difference  of  colour 
or  of  race  may  have  played  in  history,  I  think  a 
very  little  reflection  will  show  it  is  impossible  to 
regard  the  racial  or  colour  relation  as  in  any  way 
an  ultimate  one.     For  one  thing,  such  an  assump- 


HISTORY   AND    ITS    SOLUTION      51 

tion  begs  the  question  as  to  the  real  origin  of 
racial  difference.  It  might  be  argued  that  such 
difference  is  itself  traceable  to  deeper-lying  economic 
or  climatic  causes,  and  hence  was  in  no  wise  an 
original  element  in  social  change.  The  second  of 
the  antitheses,  that  between  economic  interests 
within  the  social  organism  resulting  in  the  class 
struggle  of  the  more  developed  phases  of  civilisa- 
tion is,  without  doubt,  more  far-reaching  and  more 
fundamental  than  the  last  mentioned,  and  on  it, 
in  conjunction  with  the  technical  development  of 
industrial  processes,  is  based  the  doctrine  of  the 
economic  interpretation  of  history  of  Marx  and 
Engels.  But  while  conceding  the  immense  range 
of  explanation  which  the  opposition  of  economic 
interests  is  capable  of  affording  us  in  matters 
historical,  there  are,  unquestionably,  regions  in 
human  affairs  of  which  it  cannot  exhaust  the 
explanation,  even  in  its  most  extended  sense.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  clash  of  economic  interests  can, 
in  most  cases,  be  very  obviously  treated  as  a  special 
manifestation  of  the  antagonism  between  individual 
and  community,  resulting  from  the  efforts  of  the 
former  to  emancipate  itself  from  its  organic  union 
with  the  latter.  One  thing  is  clear,  and  that  is, 
that  history  viewed  as  a  synthetic  development  of 
society  has,  as  its  mainspring,  the  rise  of  oppositions 
issuing  from  irreconcilable  contradictions,  in  their 
turn  manifesting  themselves  as  antagonisms  within 


52  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

the  social  synthesis  itself.  That  this  is  so,  I  say,  is 
clear,  w'^hatever  view  we  may  take  as  to  the  special 
contradiction,  the  special  antithesis,  which  we  are 
to  regard  as  the  turning-point  of  the  whole  process 
of  history. 

In  pre-historic  society  the  principle  of  contra- 
diction, and  hence  of  antagonism,  lay  outside  the 
society  itself.  The  primitive  kinship-group  and 
its  offshoots  had  no  principle  of  internal  opposition 
in  so  far,  at  least,  as  it  was  free  and  independent ; 
it  had  no  contradiction  of  interest  within  itself. 
It  was  opposed  as  a  social  whole  to  similar  social 
wholes,  to  similar  kinship  societies,  outside  itself. 
Hence  the  origin  of  war.  This  external  opposition, 
or  contradiction,  was,  at  this  stage,  the  only  opposi- 
tion of  interest  that  it  knew.  With  the  rise  and 
progress  of  civilisation,  opposition,  contradiction, 
and  hence  antagonism  arose  within  the  social 
organism  itself.  And  it  is  this  principle  of  internal 
contradiction  and  antagonism  that  constitutes  the 
lever  of  historical  movement  and  progress. 

We  have  now  to  consider  what  we  mean  by 
Reality  as  applied  to  history,  namely,  in  what  sense 
we  are  to  regard  history  as  real,  considered  as  a 
concrete  series  of  events,  in  a  concrete  system  of 
social  life.  Now,  how  shall  the  content  of  the  past 
be  represented  ?  What  constitutes  a  true  present- 
ment of  history  as  opposed  to  a  true  understanding 
of  history  ?     To  obtain  a  true  presentment  of  any 


HISTORY   AND   ITS   SOLUTION      53 

period  of  history  we  should,  of  course,  have  to 
identify  the  content  of  our  consciousness  with  the 
content  of  a  consciousness  of  a  past  age.  This 
is  what  the  historical  imagination  endeavours  to 
attain.  But  such  reconstruction  as  the  historical 
imagination  by  means  of  research  and  archaeological 
lore  can  effect,  must  obviously  remain,  in  its  total 
result,  an  artificial  product,  since  its  correspondence 
with  fact  cannot  be  controlled  by  a  reference  to 
the  living  reality.  And,  again,  the  living  reality 
itself  is  different,  according  to  the  facet  from  which 
it  is  regarded.  Each  individual  lives  in  his  own 
world,  albeit  that  world  at  once  conditions  and  is 
conditioned  by  the  conception  which  enters  into 
it  of  the  general  world  of  the  time.  And  this 
constitutes  another  difficulty  of  reproducing  any 
image  of  a  past  age,  whether  in  the  form  of 
descriptive  historical  narrative  or  of  pure  romance. 
We  merely  call  attention  to  this  point  here 
(although  it  is  susceptible  of  not  unfruitful  elabor- 
ation), since  it  does  not  directly  concern  the 
subject-matter  of  the  present  essay.  We  are  here 
concerned  with  historical  truth  from  the  stand- 
point of  the  understanding  of  history,  not  with 
the  attempted  reproduction  in  imagination  of  the 
content  of  the  past  in  our  present-day  minds, 
which  is  the  province  of  the  historiographer  and 
of  the  historical  romancist.  The  reproduction  of 
the  past  in  this  latter  sense,  we  may  observe,  is  a 


54  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

matter  of  feeling  and,  to  a  large  extent,  immediate 
intuition/  The  aim  of  all  historical  narrative  and 
historical  romance  should  be,  through  the  medium 
of  picture-writing,  to  do  tliis  in  its  own  way. 

But  what  we  are  here  concerned  with,  we  repeat, 
is  not  the  reproduction  of  the  past  in  terms  of 
feeling,  but  its  interpretation  in  terms  of  thought. 
We  are  concerned  with  the  endeavour  to  pluck 
out  the  heart  of  history's  meaning  and  present  it 
in  the  formulae  of  abstract  reflection.  Attempting 
in  this  way  to  reconstruct  history,  we  take  as  our 
guide  that  antithesis,  that  particular  pair  of  oppo- 
sites,  discoverable  in  the  realisation  of  historical 
progress,  which  seems  the  most  fundamental, 
understanding  by  this  that  opposition  to  which 
others  are  to  the  greatest  extent  reducible.  Now 
this  opposition  or  antithesis,  which  embraces 
within  itself  more  than  any  other  single  opposi- 
tion traceable  in  the  evolution  of  society,  would 
seem  to  be,  as  already  pointed  out,  the  opposition 
between  the  Individual  and  the  Community.  This 
relation  of  the  Individual  to  the  Community,  as  a 
relation,  seems  as  nearly  as  possible  the  central 
one  in  the  historical  movement. 

^  One  of  the  most  remarkable  instances  of  this  reproduction 
of  the  atmosphere  of  a  past  age  in  the  art  of  the  present  is 
to  be  found  in  Wagner's  Meister singer.  We  feel,  in  some 
inexplicable  way,  that  the  music  brings  us  in  contact  with  the 
consciousness  of  the  late  mediaeval  German  city.  We  feel  that 
it  touches  in  us  some  nerve  in  our  consciousness  that  reawakens 
an  echo  of  the  consciousness  of  that  remote  time. 


HISTORY   AND   ITS   SOLUTION      55 

The  freeing  of  the  individual  from  the  bonds  unit- 
ing him  with  his  community,  in  early  pre-historic 
society  so  closely  knit  as  to  constitute  him  a  mere 
element,  so  to  say,  a  cell  in  the  tissue  of  that  society 
itself,  became,  under  various  guises  and  in  various 
subsidiary  forms,  the  battle-ground  of  human  pro- 
gress during  the  historical  period.  The  aim  of  the 
individual  was  to  constitute  himself  a  self-contained, 
independent  entity,  his  relations  to  society  to  be 
reduced,  as  far  as  possible,  to  such  as  were  neces- 
sary for  protection  against  other  individuals.  This 
tendency  has  persistently  maintained  itself  as  a 
crucial  one  throughout  the  whole  historical  period. 
It  is  before  all  things  traceable  in  the  economic 
development  of  society,  but  scarcely  less  so  in  its 
intellectual  development.  Political  and  social  con- 
flicts have  usually  turned  upon  this  question  as  their 
raison  d'etre,  whatever  form  they  may  have  more 
immediately  taken  on.  Alike  in  the  production 
and  distribution  of  material  wealth,  in  the  political 
ordering  of  society,  in  social  custom,  in  philo- 
sophical speculation,  and  in  theological  belief,  we 
find  this  crucial  antithesis  asserting  itself. 

It  would  be  a  mistake,  however,  to  regard  this 
relation  of  Individual  and  Community,  deep-lying 
though  it  may  be  in  the  structure  of  historical 
movement  and  historical  reality,  as  what  the 
Germans  would  call  a  Schablone,  i.e.  as  a  magic 
formula  with  which  to  conjure  all  other  relations, 


56  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

or  a  Procrustean  bed  into  which  the  facts  have  to 
be  fitted.  Pedantry  of  this  kind  always  vitiates 
the  conclusions  of  historical  investigation.  The 
object  of  the  Philosophy  of  History  is  to  find 
formuliB  for  the  laws,  or  causal  processes,  under- 
lying the  reality  of  history.  But  these  causal 
relations  do  not  exhaust,  or  even  suffice  to  explain, 
the  whole  of  historical  reality.  They  are,  at  best, 
universal  forms  persisting  throughout  history.  The 
whole  particular  element,  constituting  the  life  of 
history,  the  phantasmagoria  of  actual  things,  events, 
and  persons,  cannot  be  absorbed  by  them  without 
remainder  over.  The  alogical  element  maintains 
itself  stubbornly  over  against  the  logical.  But 
even  regarding  the  theoretical  element  per  se,  it 
may  fairly  be  doubted  whether  it  is  possible  to 
find  a  formula  that  shall  cover  all  causal  relations 
that  disclose  themselves  on  analysis.  What  is 
claimed  for  the  relation  of  Individual  and  Com- 
munity is,  that  it  is  the  most  persistent,  the  most 
salient  relation  in  history,  not  that  history  cannot 
be  regarded  from  other  points  of  view  which  traverse 
more  or  less  the  lines  of  this  relation,  and  hence 
which  cannot  always  be  satisfactorily  expressed  in 
its  terms,  taken  by  themselves. 

It  may  be  well  now  to  summarise  the  results  of 
the  preliminary  investigation  we  have  been  engaged 
upon.  The  reality  of  history,  we  have  found,  con- 
sists  of  two  elements :  ( 1 )  the  element  of  causal 


HISTORY   AND    ITS   SOLUTION      57 

relation  giving  us  the  universal  laws,  the  general 
trend  of  historic  evolution  ;  and  (2)  the  infinite  mass 
of  facts,  incidents,  and  personalities  constituting 
the  particular  element  at  the  basis  of  these  laws, 
the  material  which  the  causal  form  presupposes. 
Hence  it  is  that  any  theory  of  history  must  neces- 
sarily be  in  a  sense  a  dead  abstraction.  No  theory 
of  history,  no  formula  defining  the  laws  dominating 
the  sequence  of  historical  phenomena,  can  ade- 
quately explain  the  life  of  a  society  considered  as 
a  living  whole.  The  meaning  of  history,  as  pre- 
sented in  any  theory  of  history,  is  hence  never 
more  than  approximative. 

But  beyond  the  above  primary  distinction  of 
factors  in  the  content  of  historical  reality,  we  have 
seen  that  within  social  life  itself,  viewed  concretely, 
we  can  distinguish  two  aspects :  ( 1 )  the  material 
aspect  of  material  surroundings,  modes  of  the  pro- 
duction and  distribution  of  wealth,  ways  of  life, 
etc. ;  and  (2)  the  ideal  side  as  represented  by  the 
reaction  of  the  human  mind  and  will  upon  its 
environment.  The  causal  efficacy  may  accrue  to 
either  of  these  sides,  or  to  both,  in  conjunction. 
In  any  given  situation  or  in  any  given  period, 
either  may  be  predominant.  There  are  certain 
periods  in  which  the  material,  especially  the 
economic  development,  determines  the  whole  social 
content  of  that  period.  It  suffices,  in  the  main, 
to  explain  even   the   intellectual,   emotional,  and 


58  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

moral  characteristics  of  those  periods.  There 
are,  again,  other  periods  when  the  course  of  social 
life  and  the  current  of  progress  seem  deter- 
mined by  an  ideal,  a  belief.  In  truth,  however, 
there  is  always  an  interaction  between  these 
two  sides.  Each,  undoubtedly,  has  its  own  line 
of  causation  up  to  a  certain  point,  though  in  the 
long  run,  in  the  total  result,  their  co-operation 
is  manifest.  But  traversing  these  fundamental 
antitheses  we  have  sought  for  an  antithesis,  opera- 
tive throughout  the  entire  historical  period,  which 
should  afford  us  some  sort  of  clue  to  the  special 
forms  progressively  assumed  by  the  life  of  human 
society  during  the  course  of  history,  and  should 
hence  indicate  to  us  a  necessary,  a  universal  form, 
in  which  human  society  develops.  Some  have 
found  this  cardinal  historical  relation  in  the  racial 
antithesis,  that  of  higher  and  lower  race.  In  the 
conflicts  and  the  fusions  of  such  races  they  believe 
themselves  to  have  discovered  the  key  to  the 
development  from  pre-historic  barbarism  to  his- 
toric civilisation,  and  therewith  the  impulse  and 
the  direction  of  all  subsequent  changes.  Others, 
again,  with  much  greater  reason  on  their  side, 
would  find  the  clue  to  those  specific  forms, 
material,  intellectual,  and  moral,  which  society  has 
assumed  at  different  epochs,  in  the  economical  side 
of  social  life,  i.e.  in  the  material  conditions  of  the 
epoch  in  question.     According  to  this  view,  there- 


HISTORY   AND   ITS   SOLUTION      59 

fore,  the  causes  of  every  form  of  social  life  are 
discoverable  in  technical  development,  but  also  and 
chiefly  in  the  antagonism  and  the  resulting  con- 
flict of  classes,  which,  arising  within  the  economic 
sphere,  leaves  its  impress  throughout  the  entire 
range  of  social  life,  even  in  departments  seemingly 
most  remote  from  economic  interests. 

The  inadequacy  of  the  first  of  the  theories 
mentioned  is,  I  think,  fairly  obvious,  more  par- 
ticularly since,  as  already  remarked,  it  is  open 
to  the  criticism  that  racial  and  colour  differences 
themselves  are  not  necessarily  inherent  from  the 
beginning,  but  may  themselves  be  traceable  to 
differences  of  environment  lying  far  back  in  pre- 
historic time.  As  regards  the  second  theory,  every 
advance  in  anthropological  and  historical  research 
tends  to  show,  more  and  more,  the  enormous 
measure  of  truth  contained  in  it.  The  chief  criti- 
cism to  which  it  is  susceptible,  as  hitherto  formu- 
lated, turns  upon  its  one-sidedness.  Its  advocates, 
too  often,  handle  it  as  a  Schablone,  sl  magic  key 
to  unlock  every  secret  and  solve  every  problem 
in  the  development  of  human  life  and  thought. 
They,  as  a  rule,  entirely  ignore  the  independent 
action  of  the  mental  life,  no  less  than  the  reaction 
of  the  mental  life  on  the  development  and  modi- 
fication of  its  environment.  According  to  the 
so-called  "materialist  doctrine  of  history,"  the 
whole  content  of  the   mental   life   is   determined 


60  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

solely  by  economic  conditions  and  by  the  class 
struggles  arising  out  of  them.  This  is  a  point, 
however,  which  requires  to  be  discussed  at  greater 
length  than  is  here  possible,  and  to  which  we, 
therefore,  merely  refer  in  passing.  The  above,  then, 
however  unequal  in  point  of  merit,  are,  1  think,  the 
two  leading  standpoints  as  regards  this  problem. 

For  our  part  we  would  trace  even  the  last-named 
antithesis,  that  of  classes  having  their  origin  in 
economic  relations  of  private  property-holding, 
down  to  a  deeper  antithesis  still,  namely,  the  anti- 
thesis of  Individual  and  Community  as  such.  This 
antithesis,  which  evolves  in  the  fulness  of  time 
into  the  opposition  of  Individualism  and  Socialism, 
would  seem  the  fountain-head  whence  spring  those 
very  class  conflicts  themselves  which  have  rent  society 
from  within  throughout  the  whole  historical  period. 
The  most  salient  intellectual  tendencies  in  history 
may,  in  the  main,  also  be  interpreted  in  terms  of 
the  foregoing  antithesis. 

Besides  the  general  laws  of  historical  evolution 
deducible  from  the  antagonism  latent  within  these 
leading  antitheses  we  have  mentioned,  there  are 
numerous  empirical  laws  which  it  is  difficult  to 
reduce  to  any  comprehensive  principle  in  the 
present  state  of  historical  thought.  These  laws,  or 
apparent  laws,  are  discoverable  by  a  mere  method 
of  induction  from  the  facts  of  history.  As  yet, 
however,  the  collation,  the  sifting,  of  the  facts  and 


HISTORY   AND   ITS   SOLUTION      61 

the  assignment  of  the  true  values  of  the  respective 
relations  they  present  to  us — in  other  words,  the 
systematic  study  of  the  past — has  not  advanced  far 
enough  to  allow  us  to  view  these  empirical  laws  in 
their  just  proportions,  or  in  their  bearing  on  those 
wider  principles  already  discussed.     For  the  reduc- 
tion of  history  to  the  simplest  formula,  or  formulas, 
to  which  in  the  nature  of  things  it  is  capable  of 
being  reduced,  a  much  greater  amount  of  spade 
work  has  to  be  accomplished  than  has  yet  been 
done.     When  greater  advances  are  made  in  this 
respect,  we  may  hope,  with  reason,  to  acquire  an 
insight  that  will  enable  us  to  view  these  empirical 
generalisations  as  special  applications  of  the  larger 
principles  in  question.     We  have,  of  course,  in  all 
cases  to  deal  with  the  special  difficulty  attendant 
on  all  theorising  in  the  domain  of  history,  namely, 
the  want  of  precision  that  all  attempts  to  reduce 
historical  reality  to  a  definite  formula  have  to  con- 
tend with.     The  alogical  element  in  the  manifold 
phenomena   of  history  is  more  difficult  to   bring 
under  the  definiteness  of  a  thought-formula  with 
success  than  in  the  case  of  any  other  department  of 
the  real  world.    The  extreme  concreteness  of  human 
society  as  compared  with  these  other  more  abstract 
departments  of  science,  as  has  been  indicated  by 
Comte  and  other  thinkers,  though  from  a  different 
point  of  view,  has  rendered  human  society  the  last  de- 
partment of  reality  amenable  to  scientific  treatment. 


62  PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

After  all,  considered  not  merely  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  totality  or,  if  you  will,  of  the 
infinity  of  things,  but  even  from  that  of  the 
existence  of  man  on  the  earth,  the  span  of 
the  filled  content  of  time  that  we  call  history  is 
little  more  than  infinitesimal.  Yet,  infinitesimal 
though  it  be  as  compared  with  other  real  contents 
of  time  and  space,  yet  it  none  the  less  contains 
infinity,  infinite  multiplicity  within  itself.  This 
point  of  the  "  infinitely  little  "  in  history  is,  seldom, 
properly  realised,  even  by  scholars  and  thinkers, 
and  not  at  all  by  the  world  at  large.  History,  to 
the  mind  of  the  world  at  large,  even  including  the 
average  educated  man,  is  little  more  than  a  loose 
congeries  of  symbols.  Every  epoch,  every  con- 
nection of  events  appears  to  his  mind  merely  in  an 
abstract  symbolical  form.  And  this  is  not  merely 
confined  to  the  ordinary  man.  We  all  of  us,  in 
looking  back  upon  history,  have  present  to  our 
minds  ideas  which  are  in  truth  mere  symbols. 
The  difference  between  the  scholar  or  thinker  and 
ordinary  man,  in  this  respect,  is  that  the  former 
recognises  the  fact  that  his  ideas  of  history  are  mere 
symbols,  whereas  the  latter  does  not.  These  sym- 
bols often  express  the  reality  of  history  about  as 
much  as  a  roughly  sketched  map  does  a  landscape. 
The  limitless  multiplicity  of  detail,  an  insight  into 
which  alone  brings  us  nearer  to  the  life  and  reality 
of  the  past,  is  unsuspected  by  the  intelligence  of 


HISTORY   AND   ITS   SOLUTION      63 

the  average  citizen.  Even  to  the  scholar  and 
thinker,  the  insight  spoken  of  belongs,  in  any  posi- 
tive degree,  seldom  to  more  than  a  limited  portion 
of  history— limited,  that  is,  as  regards  time,  or 
space,  or  both.  For  the  rest,  he  also  has  to  be 
content  with  the  usual  symboHc  conceptions. 

What  the  detail,  the  "  infinitely  little,"  in  history 
really  means  may  be  realised  by  a  consideration  of 
the  constitution  of  the  small  fraction  of  contem- 
porary life  which  comes  under  the  direct  conscious- 
ness of  any  given  person.  Every  country,  every 
district,  every  city  or  village,  every  street,  every 
family,  every  social  circle  has  its  sequence  of  events 
partly  its  own  and  partly  not  its  own,  as  touching 
and  modifying  the  larger  life  at  certain  points.  It 
is  too  often  forgotten  or,  at  least,  is  not  explicitly 
apprehended,  that  every  moment  of  the  historical 
past  embraces  such  complexity  of  detail  as  this. 
We  speak  of  Augustus,  of  Charlemagne,  of  Napo- 
leon as  marking  epochs,  but  do  we  adequately 
apprehend  that  every  obscure  town,  say  in  Asia 
Minor,  in  the  reign  of  Augustus,  every  manor  of 
the  time  of  Charlemagne,  every  countryside  of  the 
time  of  Napoleon,  had  each  its  own  life  and  con- 
temporary history,  with  its  persons  and  events, 
trivial  daily  rounds,  etc.,  just  as  we  have  to-day  in 
a  suburb  of  twentieth-century  London?  Does,  I 
ask,  any  average  educated  man  realise  this  ?  Yet 
it   is   this,  the   particular,  the   infinitely   little,  in 


64  PROBLEISrS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

history,  which  in  the  historical  concepts  of  the 
average  man  is  not  merely,  as  is  natural,  subordi- 
nated to  the  essential  features  of  the  historical 
movement,  but  is  completely  absent.  In  the  mind 
of  the  ordinary  man  the  landmarks  of  history  obtain 
in  the  form  of  blurred  and  colourless  images,  sym- 
bolic concepts  of  leading  events  and  leading  figures, 
and  that  is  all.  That  every  period  has  a  life  of  its 
own,  with  all  the  infinite  minutite  of  which  all  life 
mainly  consists,  though  the  fact  would,  of  course, 
be  admitted  formally  by  everyone  if  challenged  in  so 
many  words,  is  truly  apprehended,  at  most,  by  a  few 
historical  thinkers.  This  difficulty  in  the  imaginative 
reproduction  of  history  is,  in  itself,  a  fruitful  cause 
of  misconception,  arising  from  the  failure  to  take 
into  account  in  their  relative  proportion  the  forces 
that  give  their  direction  to  the  main  currents  of 
history. 


CHAPTER   III 

THE    PROBLEM    OF    THE    EVOLUTION    OF 
SPECULATIVE    THOUGHT 

I 

In  the  earliest  phases  of  man's  social  and  mental 
life  we  find  no  trace  of  conscious  reflection  on  the 
conditions  of  his  existence.  His  view  of  the  world 
is  a  vague  fluid  mass  of  assumptions  arising  without 
conscious  will  or  intention  on  his  part  out  of  a 
welter  of  crude  analogies,  moulded  in  the  forms  in 
which  his  mind  operated,  and  accumulating  from 
untold  generations.  This  was  the  era  of  myth- 
ology, folk-lore,  of  primitive  thought  and  imagina- 
tion. It  had  as  its  counterpart  in  the  material 
sphere  the  world  of  a  common  tribal  and  clan  life, 
to  which  the  individual  human  being  was  sub- 
ordinated, and  apart  from  which  he  had  no 
significance.  As  this  material  side  of  primitive 
society  yielded  to  civilisation,  by  which  the  old 
social  bonds  became  loosened  and  the  independence 
of  the  individual  began  to  emerge,  the  intellectual 
outlook  also  became  gradually  modified.    The  great 

65  5 


66   PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

factor  in  this  modification  was  the  awakening  of 
conscious  reflection  upon  himself,  his  beHefs  and 
surroundings,  on  the  part  of  the  individual. 

The  awakening  self-consciousness  of  the  indi- 
vidual took  various  forms,  moral  and  intellectual, 
and  it  passed  through  many  phases,  consisting 
largely  in  a  modification  and  systematisation  of 
myth  and  traditional  modes  of  thought,  before  the 
conscious  attempt  to  explain  the  universe  on 
rational  principles,  as  we  now  term  them — in  other 
words,  before  the  dawn  of  philosophy  properly 
so-called. 

But  it  was  not  given  to  every  race  of  ancient 
times  to  inaugurate  philosophic  inquiry  in  its  true 
sense.  We  can  trace  detached  fragments  of  philo- 
sophic thought  at  an  early  stage  in  more  than  one 
of  the  Oriental  civilisations  of  antiquity,  while  in 
ancient  India  something  like  a  definite  line  of 
philosophic  development  is  discoverable.  But  for 
universal  history — that  is,  for  history  considered  as 
a  continuous  evolution  of  man  from  early  beginnings 
up  to  the  present  time — there  is  only  one  classical 
line  of  philosophic  development,  and  that  is  the 
one  inaugurated  by  Ancient  Greece  in  the  sixth 
century  B.C.,  with  which  the  modern  thought  of 
the  Western  world  is  directly  affiliated. 

Before  proceeding  further  it  is  necessary  to  define 
more  clearly  what  constitutes  philosophy  as  such. 
Philosophy  is  something  more  than  a  mere  attempt 


^    SPECULATIVE   THOUGHT  67 

at  an  explanation  of  things  in  general.  The  early 
mythologies  and  theogonies  were  also,  for  that 
matter,  attempts  to  explain  the  nature  of  things ; 
but  what  distinguishes  philosophy  from  all  earlier 
ways  of  looking  at  man  and  the  world  is  the  fact 
that  it  is  the  product  of  conscious  reflection,  that 
it  works  through  reason  and  its  processes  of  logic, 
and  not  by  mere  imagination  or  by  the  acceptance 
of  traditional  authority.  That  it  was  a  product  of 
conscious  reflection,  and  that  its  methods  were 
those  of  observation  and  logical  reasoning,  as 
opposed  to  naive  imagination  and  tradition,  clearly 
differentiates  philosophic  thought  from  the  thought 
that  preceded  it. 

When  Thales  asked  the  question,  what  consti- 
tuted the  ultimate  physical  substance  of  the 
Universe,  that  to  which  all  others  are  reducible, 
and  thought  that  the  true  answer  to  that  question 
was  that  water  was  that  substance,  he  started  a  new 
era  in  human  thought  of  inestimable  importance 
for  the  intellectual  future  of  mankind.  This  problem 
of  the  primary  and  ultimate  physical  substance  of 
the  Universe  which  occupied  the  Ionic  School,  of 
which  Thales  was  the  reputed  founder,  and  to 
which  his  successors  gave  solutions  differing  from 
his  own,  crude  and  futile  though  it  may  seem  to 
us,  gave  the  impulse,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  all 
subsequent  thought.  New  problems  and  their 
attempted  solutions — problems   of  the   nature   of 


68    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

being  and  becoming,  of  the  one  and  the  many,  and 
(in  a  crude  form)  of  reality  and  appearance,  besides 
those  directly  concerned  with  the  origin,  the  struc- 
ture, and  the  working  of  the  material  Universe — 
rose  successively,  and  exercised  the  subtlety  of  the 
rapidly-expanding  Greek  intellect  until  the  rise,  in 
the  fourth  century,  of  the  Sophist  Schools. 

The  comparatively  sudden  development  of  the 
Greek  world — economically,  politically,  and  in- 
tellectually— induced  a  movement  of  scepticism 
in  things  speculative,  and  in  self-seeking  indi- 
vidualism in  things  practical,  in  which  the  lecturers 
called  Sophist,  who  formulated  these  tendencies 
and  who  taught  their  wisdom  for  money,  found  a 
ready  market  for  their  wares.  The  significance  of 
this  movement  was  that  it  implied  a  shifting  of  the 
philosophic  problem.  Hitherto,  for  nearly  two 
centuries  past,  the  inquiry  had  been  into  the  nature 
of  things  considered  as  existing  pe7'  se  ;  first  of  all, 
as  to  the  ultimate  physical  nature  of  the  Universe, 
and  then  as  to  the  meaning  and  implications  of 
its  abstract  conditions,  these  conditions  themselves 
being  regarded  as  independent  realities.  An  illus- 
tration of  the  latter  may  be  found  in  the  hypostat- 
isation  of  Number  ascribed  to  Pythagoras,  the 
Numbers  being  conceived  as  real  existences. 

The  inconsistencies,  the  impossibility  of  proof, 
and  the  apparent  insolubility  of  certain  questions, 
resulting  in  a  general  scepticism,  led  the  way  to 


SPECULATIVE   THOUGHT  69 

a  new  statement  of  the  philosophic  problem. 
Different  thinkers  had  arrived  at  different  con- 
clusions. What  to  one  man  seemed  true,  to 
another  seemed  false ;  what  the  custom  of  one 
city  approved  as  good,  the  custom  of  another  city- 
condemned  as  bad.  The  impetus  taken  by  trade 
and  travel  at  this  time  enlarged  the  horizon  of 
everyone.  Hence  the  Sophist  movement,  which 
was  summed  up  in  the  well-known  formula  of  the 
Sophist  Protagoras :  "  Man  is  the  measure  of  all 
things." 

Rhetorical  arts,  plausible  speculation,  and  smart 
tricks  of  controversy  became  the  fashionable  studies 
in  the  leading  Greek  cities,  and  not  the  least  so  in 
Athens.  In  the  latter  city  there  was,  however, 
one  disciple  of  the  new  movement  who  did  not 
rest  satisfied  with  the  results  taught  him  by  his 
Sophist  instructor.  This  was  Sokrates.  With  the 
general  decay  of  traditional  standards  of  thought 
and  life  Sokrates  was  not  content  to  rest ;  above 
all,  he  was  not  content  with  the  doctrine  which 
reduced  virtue  to  a  mere  private  or  individual 
opinion.  On  the  other  hand,  he  was  by  no  means 
disposed  to  be  false  to  the  current  intellectual 
movement  of  his  time.  He  felt  there  was  no  going 
back  upon  the  prevalent  Sophism.  His  aim  was, 
by  means  of  the  very  principle  which  had  under- 
mined old  sanctions  and  assumptions,  to  acquire  a 
new  objective  standard,  as  we  should  say  in  the 


70   PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

present  day,  in  the  first  instance  of  conduct  (virtue), 
with  which  he  was  chiefly  concerned,  but  indirectly 
of  intellectual  theory  also.  The  famous  saying  that 
Sokrates  "  brought  down  philosophy  from  heaven 
to  earth "  meant  that  he  definitely  shifted  the 
problem  from  an  inquiry  concerning  the  principles 
of  existence  to  one  concerning  the  principles  of 
knowledge.  Man  was  the  measure  of  all  things, 
it  was  true,  yet  not  man  considered  as  an  indi- 
vidual, but  the  reason  or  the  logical  faculty  in 
man,  the  instrument  of  "  dialectic."  Hence  it  was 
Sokrates'  aim,  by  means  of  question  and  answer,  to 
discover  a  definition  of  "  virtue  "  and  the  "  good  " 
that  would  be  recognised  as  valid  by  all  men. 

If  he  was  not  successful  in  this,  he  was  eminently 
so  in  producing  a  stimulus  in  the  minds  of  his 
contemporaries,  a  stimulus  that  inaugurated  a  new 
era  in  human  thought.  It  was  the  dialectical 
Sokrates  that  produced  the  thought  of  Plato,  and 
through  Plato  furnished  Aristotle  with  the  intel- 
lectual training  which  enabled  him  to  build  up  his 
encyclopaedic  system.  The  thought  common  to 
all  men,  the  insight  or  truth  that  Sokrates  strove 
to  evolve  by  means  of  his  dialectic,  for  practical 
purposes,  became  with  Plato  the  world  of  general 
concepts,  of  which  the  world,  as  perceived  by  us, 
is  merely  the  imperfect  copy  or  appearance.  The 
"  good  "  of  Sokrates  became  for  Plato  the  supreme 
idea,  that  which  embraced  all  other  ideas,  and  to 


SPECULATIVE   THOUGHT  71 

which  they  led  up  as  their  end  and  completion. 
Plato's  division  of  all  things  into  the  world  of 
intellect  and  the  world  of  sense  would,  of  course, 
have  been  quite  unrecognised  by  Sokrates  himself ; 
but  it  may  unquestionably  be  traced  to  Sokrates' 
insistence  on  clearness  of  definition  and  on  the 
capacity  for  universal  application  of  all  valid  mental 
concepts. 

With  Plato  the  old  problems  of  philosophy  again 
came  to  the  front,  but  treated  on  the  method 
which  Sokrates  had  employed  for  the  attainment 
of  ethical  truth.  Plato's  pupil,  Aristotle,  could 
not  accept  Plato's  sharp  separation  of  the  world  of 
sense  from  the  world  of  ideas.  For  Aristotle  the 
universals  of  logic  were  already  contained  in  the 
particular  objects  of  sense.  There  were  not  two 
worlds  over  against  each  other,  but  one  world 
containing  two  elements  :  an  element  of  sense — 
the  particular  sense-impression — and  an  element  of 
thought — the  universal  concept  or  idea. 

For  all  this,  Aristotle,  no  less  than  Plato,  in- 
sisted on  the  ideal  element  in  the  real  world  as 
constituting  its  true  "  inwardness."  The  alpha 
and  omega  of  the  real  world,  that  which  gave  to  it 
its  meaning  and  its  final  purpose,  was  the  univer- 
saHsing  intellect.  But  none  the  less,  to  the  realisa- 
tion of  the  ideal  purpose  of  the  world  the  sense- 
element  was  necessary.  To  the  Platonic  idea  of 
universalia  ante  rem,  universal  ideas  prior  to  the 


72   PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

things  of  sense,  Aristotle  opposed  his  universalia 
in  rebus,  universal  ideas  as  an  inseparable  element 
in  the  world  of  things  from  which  it  is  the  function 
of  the  reflective  reason  to  disentangle  them  through 
the  logical  process.  The  "  creative  intellect "  of 
Aristotle  realised  itself  in,  and  through,  the  world 
of  appearance.  The  world  was  an  eternal  evolu- 
tion from  matter  to  form,  from  potential  to  actual 
reality.  The  unformed  matter  of  one  stage  be- 
came the  formed  reality  of  the  next  which  was  its 
essence.  The  antithesis  of  matter  and  form — of 
sense-material  and  its  ideal  determination — is,  in 
the  world  perceived  by  us,  relative.  To  employ  a 
crude  illustration,  the  matter  of  the  brass  m-formed 
by  the  idea  of  the  sculptor,  becomes  the  reality,  the 
essence,  statue.  But  Aristotle  distinguishes,  as 
the  ultimate  elements  of  the  real  world,  a  primal 
matter  and  the  primal  intellectual  activity.  The 
ideas,  however,  or  the  general  concepts,  formed  by 
this  Creative  Activity  have  not,  as  with  Plato, 
any  independent  reality  in  themselves.  They  are 
realised  only  in  indissoluble  union  with  the  sense- 
impression.  In  the  real  world  that  we  perceive 
and  know,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  formless 
matter  or  matterless  form.  Reality  implies  the 
indissoluble  union — synthesis — of  both  elements. 
In  the  perceived  object  the  creative  idea  is  realised 
as  essence  or  substance  (ovo-ia).  The  above  is  the 
root-principle  of  the  Aristotelian  philosophy,  and 


SPECULATIVE   THOUGHT  73 

it  is  to  Plato  and  Aristotle  that  the  main  stream  of 
subsequent  thought  may  be  traced. 

In  the  period  following  the  Macedonian  con- 
quest, when  the  whole  basin  of  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean  came  under  Greek  influence — the 
so-called  Hellenistic  period — under  the  auspices  of 
the  dynasties  founded  by  the  generals  of  Alexander 
the  Great,  the  practical  or  ethical  side  of  philosophy 
again  came  to  the  fore,  and  philosophic  schools 
acquired  prominence  whose  professed  aim  was  to 
teach  the  true  guiding  principles  of  life  and  con- 
duct. The  ostensible  objects  of  these  schools,  it 
may  be  surmised,  would  have  been  more  congenial 
to  the  temperament  of  Sokrates,  with  whom  they 
claimed  a  direct  or  indirect  connection,  than  the 
speculative  systems  of  Plato  and  Aristotle.  These 
schools  were  the  Stoic,  the  Epicurean,  and  the 
Sceptic,  which  have  their  protagonists  in  those 
founded  a  century  or  so  earlier  by  direct  disciples 
of  Sokrates  and  termed  the  Cynic,  the  Cyrenaic, 
and  the  Megaric  respectively. 

The  old  independent  life  of  the  free  cities  had 
for  the  most  part  disappeared,  and  the  movement 
of  introspection,  of  self-brooding,  already  apparent 
in  Sokrates,  became  the  dominant  spirit  of  the  age 
It  was  no  longer  the  social  life  and  ideals  of  the 
tribe  or  the  city  that  appealed  to  men,  it  was  the 
ideal  life  of  the  individual  and  his  happiness  that 
was  their  primary  object  of  interest.     At  the  same 


74    PROBLEMS  OF  INIEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

time  originality  in  speculative  thought   died  out. 
Old   positions   were   crudely  restated,  where  they 
were   not  taught   in    their    original    form.      The 
Lyceum  at  Athens   remained   the   seat   of  Aris- 
totelian teaching  and  the   Academy   of  Platonic. 
In  the  latter  case  the  carrying  out  of  the  dialectical 
methods   of  Plato's   dialogues   had   resulted   in  a 
general    sceptical    attitude.      Rome    entered   the 
political  arena  and  began  absorbing  the  Hellenistic 
States   of  Eastern   Europe.      Philosophy  in    the 
shape  of  the  four   recognised    Schools,   the   Aris- 
totelian, the  Platonic,  the  Stoic,  and  the  Epicurean, 
not  to  mention  the  Neoscepticism  of  the  school  of 
Pyrrho,  got  carried  to  Rome  and  struck  root  there. 
The  "  philosopher  "  now  became  largely  a  profes- 
sional  moralist  and   sermoniser,  corresponding   to 
the  clergyman  of  modern  times.     It   became  the 
fashion  for  great  families  to  keep  a  philosopher,  as 
it  was  a  few  generations  ago  of  aristocratic  houses 
to  keep  a  chaplain.     The  Pagan  priesthood   and 
ritual,  it  should  be  observed,  were  concerned  ex- 
clusively with  ceremonial  observances  and  not  with 
preaching  or  moral  exhortation. 

The  next  important  development  of  Philosophy 
proper,  however,  did  not  take  distinct  literary 
shape  till  the  third  century  of  the  Christian  era. 
This  was  the  movement  which  gradually  absorbed 
all  other  philosophies,  and  ultimately  the  various 
theories   and   cults   generally  of  Pagan  antiquity, 


SPECULATIVE   THOUGHT  75 

into  itself,  and  which  became  known  as  the  "  new 
Platonism  "  (Neoplatonism).  Its  first  systematic 
literary  exponent  was  Plotinus,  a  native  of  Egypt, 
hailing  directly  from  Alexandria,  who  settled  in 
Rome.  He  is  the  author  of  numerous  works 
dealing  with  the  great  problem  of  the  one  and  the 
many,  of  the  universe  of  thought  and  the  manifold 
of  sense.  Unlike  the  early  Platonists,  but  fully 
in  accord  with  the  religio-mystical  movement  of 
which  his  writings  may  be  regarded  as  the  fullest 
and  most  definite  philosophical  expression,  Plotinus 
assumed  a  faculty  of  intuition,  rather  than  intellect 
or  logical  reasoning,  as  the  ultimate  and  highest 
source  of  knowledge.  In  accordance  with  this 
view  the  ultimate  principle  was  not,  as  with  Greek 
philosophy  at  its  zenith,  vovq  (intellect  or  reason), 
but  that  out  of  which  reason  arises,  the  infinite 
unity  which  is  its  ultimate  source  and  background. 
This  principle  Plotinus  calls  variously  the  One, 
the  Being,  the  First  Father,  etc.  The  world  of 
thought,  of  logical  universals,  is  an  emanation  from 
this  primal  alogical  principle.  Our  real  world, 
which,  as  Aristotle  had  shown,  was  a  mixture  of 
thought  and  sense,  of  universal  and  particular,  is 
again  an  emanation  from  the  second  or  logical 
principle,  the  "  intelligible  world,"  as  it  was  called. 
The  creative  principle  of  the  world  of  ordinary 
reality  is  the  world-soul,  to  which  Plotinus  ascribes 
a  dual  character,  on  the  one  hand  as  reaching  up 


76   PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

toward  the  "  intelligible  world,"  the  world  of  logical 
forms,  and  on  the  other  tending  downward  to  the 
purely  negative  matter  of  sense.^  In  the  above  we 
have  the  celebrated  Alexandrian  Trinity  with  its 
three  hypostases,  as  they  are  termed.  The  human 
soul,  it  is  almost  needless  to  observe,  represented  a 
flash  or  efflorescence  of  the  world-soul.  After 
Plotinus  the  Neoplatonic  movement  tended  to 
become  more  and  more  mere  mysticism  with  a 
Pagan  religious  character,  absorbing  finally  the 
whole  of  contemporary  Paganism  into  one  eclectic 
system,  under  whose  auspices  the  final  intellectual 
struggle  with  Christianity  on  the  part  of  the 
ancient  world  was  fought  out. 

The  last  philosophic  figure  of  antiquity  with 
which  we  need  concern  ourselves  is  Boethius,  who 
flourished  at  Rome  early  in  the  sixth  century.  He 
is  interesting  as  the  very  last  representative  of 
ancient  philosophy  in  the  Western  world,  and 
important  for  history  as  having  laid  the  foundation 
of  the  Aristotelianism  which  dominated  the  schools 
of  the  Middle  Ages.  His  works,  although  they 
seemed  to  have  produced  no  effect  at  the  time, 
became  the  text-books  of  early  mediaeval  learning. 

The  first  figure  in  medieeval  Philosophy  was 
Johannes  Scotus  Eregina  (John  the  Scot  of  Ire- 

^  By  this  iSj  of  course,  not  meant  matter  in  the  sense  of 
physical  substance,  which  latter  is  already  partly  mformed  by 
the  universalising  reason,  but  matter  in  the  special  philosophical 
or  Aristotelian  sense  as  the  formless  substratum  of  real  existence. 


SPECULATIVE   THOUGHT  77 

land),  who  flourished  in  the  ninth   century,  and 
who    wrote    a    metaphysical    treatise    of    strong 
Platonic  or  Neoplatonic  tendencies.     But  the  true 
philosophy  of  the  mediaeval  schools,  thence  termed 
Scholasticism,  took  shape  later.     Such  writings  of 
Aristotle  as  were  known  and  the  works  of  Boethius 
formed    the    text  -  books.       From    the    eleventh 
century  onwards  philosophy  as  Scholasticism  formed 
the  main  branch  of  mediseval  learning.     The  great 
problem  was  still  the  relation  of  the  universal  of 
thought  to  the  particular  of  sense.     Did  ideas,  did 
logical  forms,  have  an  existence  independently  of 
the  real  world,  as  Plato  had  asserted,  or  did  they 
only  subsist  as  an  element  in  a  world  of  objects,  or, 
lastly,  were  they  mere  figments  obtaining  solely  in 
our   minds  ?     These   were  the   questions   occupy- 
ing the   schools   of  the  Middle   Ages,   especially 
of  the   earlier   Middle   Ages,   but   their  thought 
was   throughout   dominated   by  the   antithesis  of 
Philosophy    and    Theology,    profane    and    sacred 
learning.     The  aim  of  Philosophy  for  the  School- 
men was  the  provision  of  a  rational  basis  for  the 
dogmatic  structure  of  the  Church.     The  elaborate 
systems  of  Thomas  Aquinas  and  of  Duns  Scotus 
were    primarily    concerned    with     this    problem, 
though  they  brought  within  their  range  the  whole 
body  of  the  learning  of  their  age.     The  doctrine 
known  as  Nominalism,  originally  the  old  Aristo- 
telian doctrine  of  the  universal  as  element  in  the 


78   PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

object,  became  developed  by  William  of  Occam 
into  a  thorough-going  theory  of  existence  as  solely 
attributable  to  the  particulars  of  sense  as  per- 
ceived. This  doctrine  grew  and  acquired  popularity 
as  the  philosophical  side  of  the  general  tendency 
of  the  later  Middle  Ages  and  the  Renaissance 
towards  individualism,  political,  economic,  and 
social,  grew.  It  had  its  full  fruition,  however,  at 
a  later  time. 

Modern  Philosophy,  as  distinguished  from  that 
of  the  Middle  Ages  and  Renaissance,  is  usually 
dated  from  the  French  Descartes,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  English  Bacon  on  the  other.  These  sharp 
divisions  are,  of  course,  more  or  less  arbitrary. 
But  there  is  a  very  good  reason  for  regarding 
Descartes  as  the  starting-point  of  modern  thought. 
For,  not  unlike  Sokrates  in  the  ancient  world,  he 
radically  shifted  the  standpoint  of  Philosophy.  It 
had  already  become,  during  the  Renaissance  period, 
freed  from  its  slavery  to  dogma  on  the  one  side 
and  to  the  formulas  of  Aristotle  on  the  other,  but 
only  partially  from  its  reliance  on  ancient  models 
generally.  Descartes,  in  his  well-known  formula 
Cogito  ergo  sum,  which  is  as  much  as  to  say  /  exist 
thinking,  brought  back  Philosophy  to  the  bed-rock. 
At  the  same  time  the  establishment  of  psychology 
as  the  central  problem  of  Philosophy  became  fixed. 
Henceforth  the  problems  of  Philosophy  began  to 
be  treated  psychologically.     This  was  notably  the 


SPECULATIVE   THOUGHT  79 

case  with  the  English  school,  who  applied  the  new 
method  of  Bacon  to  inquiries  concerning  the 
operations  of  the  mind.  Thomas  Hobbes,  of 
Malmesbury,  was  the  first  to  start  in  a  systematic 
form  these  investigations,  which  continue  through 
Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume,  and  the  Scotch  psycho- 
logists. To  this  line  of  philosophic  thought  we 
shall  revert  directly. 

As  for  Descartes,  notwithstanding  that  he  had 
started  with  pure  self-consciousness,  the  criterion 
of  truth  which  he  thought  he  had  derived  from  it, 
that  a  "  clear  and  distinct  idea "  was  the  test  of 
truth,  led  him  to  postulate  mind  and  matter  as 
separate  substances,  of  which  the  attribute  of  one 
was  Thought  and  of  the  other  Extension.  He  thus 
lost  his  philosophical  foothold,  so  to  say,  in  dis- 
cussions concerning  the  mutual  relationship  of  the 
two  substances,  matter  and  mind,  the  attributes  of 
which,  extension  on  one  side  and  thought  on  the 
other,  seemed  to  have  nothing  mutually  in  common. 
That  self-consciousness,  considered  not  as  an  indi- 
vidual, but  as  an  ultimate  fact,  was  the  key  to 
the  difficulty,  never  occurred  to  Descartes  or  his 
followers.  The  difficulty,  raised  in  the  form  it  was 
by  Descartes,  was  solved  in  the  only  way  possible 
on  the  given  conditions  of  the  controversy  by  the 
Dutch-Jewish  thinker  Spinoza,  who  proclaimed 
*'  God  "  or  the  Absolute  as  the  infinite  and  only 
substance,  of  M^hich  Thought  and  Extension  were 


80   PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

the  attributes.  Matter  and  mind  were  reduced  to 
a  position  of  mere  modes  of  these  two  attributes, 
whose  only  principle  of  unity  was  to  be  found  in 
the  "One  Substance." 

In  contradistinction  to  Spinoza,  Leibnitz  (born 
at  Leipsic,  1646)  solved  the  problem  of  the  relation 
of  Descartes'  two  substances,  mind  and  matter, 
with  their  two  attributes,  Thought  and  Extension, 
by  the  assumption  of  an  infinity  of  souls,  each 
individual  soul  being  a  self-contained  unity  or 
universe  within  itself  existing  for  itself  alone. 
This  is  the  celebrated  monadology  of  Leibnitz. 
The  God  of  Leibnitz  was  the  supreme  monad  from 
which  all  other  monads  or  souls  proceeded  like 
sparks  from  the  fire. 

The  criterion  of  truth  for  Spinoza  and  Leibnitz, 
as  for  Descartes,  was  the  "  clearness  and  distinct- 
ness "  of  ideas,  but  the  type  of  the  clearness  which 
proclaimed  the  truth  of  a  conception  was  to  be 
found  in  mathematics.  Hence  we  find  in  Spinoza, 
the  most  powerful  original  thinker  of  the  seven- 
teenth century,  the  exposition  of  his  system  carried 
out  on  the  model  of  a  treatise  on  geometry. 
Spinoza,  as  we  have  seen,  postulated  Thought 
and  Extension  as  the  attributes,  not  of  mind  and 
matter,  but  of  his  One  Substance,  or  pantheistic 
God.  In  the  course  of  the  working  out  of  his 
system,  however,  it  is  the  attribute  of  Thought 
with  its  universalising  that  comes  to  dominate  the 


SPECULATIVE   THOUGHT  81 

whole,  and  we  thus  arrive  at  what  is  substantially 
a  new  form  of  the  old  Platonic  Idealism. 

The  battle  of  the  British  school  during  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  turned  largely 
on  the  psychological  question  of  the  existence  of 
"  innate  ideas."  Does  the  individual  receive  all  his 
experience  from  without,  or  is  it  partly  derived 
from  ideas  originally  obtaining  in  his  mind  ?  This 
was  another  way  of  approaching  the  old  question 
of  universals,  but  it  had  lost  the  comprehensive 
metaphysical  character  that  it  possessed  with  the 
ancients,  and  which  to  some  extent  clung  to  it 
throughout  the  Middle  Ages,  and  had  become 
reduced  to  the  proportions  of  a  purely  psychological 
issue. 

The  British  school  solved  the  problem  in  the 
sense  of  the  later  "  Nominalist "  schoolmen. 
Abstract  ideas,  universals,  were  names  for  figments 
of  the  mind  resulting  directly  or  indirectly  from 
the  experience  of  real  things  derived  through  the 
senses.  The  theory  of  innate  ideas  assumed  by 
Descartes  and  his  followers  and  the  Continental 
thinkers  generally,  to  the  eiFect  that  innate  ideas 
existed  in  the  human  mind,  was  inadmissible. 
Out  of  this  psychological  problem  the  question 
of  the  reality  of  the  material  world  as  perceived 
through  the  senses  emerged  in  a  different  form  and 
with  an  explicitness  it  had  never  acquired  before. 
The  notion  of  substance  as  a  substratum  of  the 

6 


82   PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

qualities  of  matter  as  also  of  those  of  mind  (the 
two  substances  of  Descartes,  in  fact)  was  the  only 
innate  idea  corresponding  to  a  reality  beyond  itself 
that  was  admitted  by  Locke. 

It  was  this  substance  of  Locke,  the  substratum 
of  material  qualities,  which  the  celebrated  Bishop 
Berkeley  set  himself  to  demolish.  The  idea  of 
substance,  he  said,  is,  like  other  abstract  concepts, 
merely  a  figment  of  the  mind,  having  no  indepen- 
dent existence  corresponding  to  it  any  more  than 
any  other  universal  concept.  The  general  term 
"matter"  (i.e.  physical  substance)  meant  no  more 
than  a  sum  of  perceived  qualities,  i.e.  a  bundle  of 
affections  of  our  senses  perceived  by  the  mind. 
The  conclusion  was  obvious,  that  matter  exists 
only  as  an  idea  in  the  mind,  a  mental  concept. 

David  Hume  took  up  the  parable  of  Locke 
and  Berkeley,  showing,  however,  that  Berkeley's 
criticism  of  the  notion  of  substance  as  the  sub- 
stratum of  qualities  did  not  go  far  enough,  for 
that  Berkeley,  while  he  had  legitimately  de- 
molished the  validity  of  the  notion  of  material 
substance  as  the  substratum  of  the  qualities 
perceived  through  the  outer  senses,  had  left  un- 
touched the  notion  of  mind  or  soul  as  the  mental 
substance  in  which  our  thoughts  and  feelings 
inhere.  There  is  no  more  reason,  said  Hume,  for 
accepting  this  concept,  this  figment  of  the  mind, 
viz.,  substance,  as  an  independent  existence  in  the 


SPECULATIVE   THOUGHT  83 

latter  case  than  there  is  in  the  former.  Psychical 
substance  has  no  more  rational  validity  than  physi- 
cal substance.  We  can  affirm  the  existence  of 
nothing,  he  contends,  save  a  succession  of  impres- 
sions and  ideas  ;  all  else  is  an  unprovable  assumption 
having  no  rational  justification.  The  psychological 
philosophy  of  the  British  school  becomes  at  this 
point,  therefore,  dissolved  in  scepticism. 

II 

We  have  now  reached  the  turning-point  in 
the  history  of  modern  philosophy.  Five  years 
after  Hume's  death  appeared  the  great  treatise 
(1781)  of  the  Konigsberg  professor,  Immanuel 
Kant.  This  treatise,  the  Kritik  der  i^einen 
Vernunft^  was  the  product  of  the  lifelong  thought 
of  its  celebrated  author,  one  of  the  greatest  in- 
tellects of  all  time.  The  problem  attacked  by 
Kant  was  the  old  problem,  the  problem  of  the 
universal  of  thought  and  the  particular  of  sense ; 
or,  to  give  it  its  wider  signification,  of  the  alogical 
and  the  logical  in  knowledge  or  experience.  But 
he  attacked  it  from  a  new  standpoint,  from  the 
standpoint  won  by  the  thought  of  the  seventeenth 
and  eighteenth  centuries.  Descartes  had  definitely 
broken  away  from  the  philosophical  traditions  of 
the  Greeks  and  of  the  schoolmen,  and  had,  with 
his  cogito  ergo  sum,  brought  philosophy  to  the 
bed-rock    of   self-consciousness,    though    without 


84   PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

grasping  the  implications  of  his  own  thought.  As 
a  consequence  he  fell  back  upon  "  clear  and  distinct 
ideas  "  as  a  test  of  truth,  and  placed  in  the  forefront 
of  his  system  certain  dead  abstractions,  substance 
and  accident,  mind  and  matter,  etc.,  as  its  prin- 
ciples. The  British  school,  as  we  have  seen,  had 
reduced  the  philosophical  problem  to  one  of 
psychology.  The  individual  mind  considered  as 
an  independent  existence  over  against  an  equally 
independent  material  world  were  the  principles 
from  which  it  started.  The  crisis  arrived  when 
Berkeley  on  the  one  side  and  Hume  on  the  other 
destroyed  the  assumption  of  an  independent 
material  substance  and  an  independent  mental 
substance  respectively. 

In  Kant  the  two  lines  of  thought,  that  of  Great 
Britain  and  that  of  the  Continent,  met  together. 
The  careful  study  of  both  lines  of  thinkers  enabled 
the  genius  of  Kant  to  restate  the  philosophic 
problem  and  to  place  its  solution  firmly  on  a  new 
basis.  Kant  once  for  all  brought  philosophy  back 
to  self-consciousness  as  the  ultimate  principle  and 
ground  of  its  problem.  He  once  again  brought  it 
back  from  being  to  knowing.  And  he  not  merely 
stated  the  problem  in  greater  definiteness  and 
completeness  than  had  ever  been  done  before,  but 
he  discussed  it  in  all  its  bearings  with  a  view  of 
arriving  at  a  solution.  To  this  new  way  of  looking 
at  the  philosophical  problem  he  gave  the  name  of 


SPECULATIVE   THOUGHT  85 

"theory  of  knowledge,"  and  the  method  he  em- 
ployed in  its  solution  he  called  "  criticism."  The 
test  of  truth  for  him  was  not,  as  with  Descartes, 
the  loose  and  ineffectual  one  of  "  clear  and  distinct 
ideas "  in  the  mind,  but  the  necessity  of  thought 
as  involved  in  the  self-consistency  of  consciousness- 
in-general.  He  thus,  at  a  stroke,  raised  philosophic 
discussion  to  a  higher  level.  Neither  the  substances 
and  attributes  of  the  Continental  metaphysicians, 
nor  the  psychological  analysis  of  the  British 
thinkers,  proved  satisfactory  to  Kant  as  a  starting- 
point.  The  primary  problem  was  the  analysis  of 
the  conditions  of  knowledge  itself  as  such — in 
other  words,  philosophy  implied  for  Kant  primarily 
an  inquiry  into  the  meaning  of  reality. 

Kant  was,  of  course,  not  the  first  to  catch  a 
glimpse  of  the  true  problem  of  philosophy.  Plato, 
and  still  more  Aristotle,  in  the  ancient  world,  had 
great  and,  in  the  latter  case,  sustained  flashes  of 
insight  in  this  connection,  and  the  same  may  be 
said  in  the  modern  world  of  Spinoza.  But  the 
great  merit  of  Kant,  and  what  constitutes  him  an 
epoch-making  figure  in  philosophy,  is  the  fact  that 
he  was  the  first  thinker  to  clearly  grasp  the 
principle,  and  never  to  lose  sight  of  it  throughout 
his  investigations.  It  is  not  that  Kant  himself 
was  altogether  free,  on  the  one  hand,  from  the 
abstractions  of  the  Continental  schools,  or,  on  the 
other,  from  the  too  psychological  point  of  view  of 


86   PROBLEIMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

the  British  school.  He  assumed  "  things-in-them- 
selves  "  as  the  basis  of  the  object  world  (of  external 
reality),  while  the  perceiving  Subject  often  appears 
to  coincide  for  him  with  the  individual  mind,  the 
"  empirical  ego,"  as  it  is  sometimes  termed.  But, 
in  spite  of  his  backshdings,  Kant,  in  the  main, 
holds  fast  the  position  that  all  that  is,  that  reality, 
in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word,  implies  conscious- 
ness, possible  or  actual. 

The  influence  of  Kant  and  his  great  work  showed 
itself  after  a  few  years  of  polemical  discussion  in  the 
works  of  Kant's  successors,  foremost  amongst  whom 
were  Fichte,  ScheUing,  Hegel,  Schopenhauer,  etc. 
Fichte  would  have  none  of  Kant's  things-in-them- 
selves.  He  recognised  clearly  what  Kant  also 
recognised,  although  he  sometimes  faltered,  at  least 
in  his  exposition,  namely,  that  there  is  nothing  out- 
side Consciousness,  which  is  another  way  of  saying 
there  is  nothing  outside  the  Ego  which  all  con- 
sciousness implies.  Here,  again,  Fichte  emphasised 
a  point  on  which  Kant  had  expressed  himself 
dubiously.  Fichte  was  careful  to  point  out  the 
now  familiar  distinction  between  the  Ego  as 
subject  of  all  consciousness,  the  "  3Ioi  premier  et 
eternal,''  as  M.  Jaures  has  it,  and  the  Ego  as  object 
of  this  consciousness,  the  individual  object-self  or 
personal  mind  with  which  it  is  identified  in  ordinary 
thought. 

Fichte  thus  fixes  and  defines  the  philosophical 


SPECULATIVE   THOUGHT  87 

ground  taken  up  by  Kant.  He  shows  that  the 
time-honoured  problem  of  the  One  and  the  Many, 
of  the  Universal  of  thought  and  the  Particular  of 
sense,  can  be  only  properly  understood,  much  less 
solved,  from  this  new  point  of  view,  that  of  the 
method  of  the  "transcendental  philosophy,"  as  it 
was  called.  Fichte's  one-time  coadjutor  and  one- 
time successor  in  the  great  philosophical  movement 
with  which  we  are  dealing,  Schelling,  introduced 
a  modification  into  the  Fichteian  system.  The 
unconditioned  principle  at  the  root  of  all  Con- 
sciousness or  Experience  he  found  neither  in  the 
experiencing  Subject  (Ego)  nor  in  the  experienced 
Object  (perceived  world)  as  such,  but  in  the  element 
of  identity  between  them,  that  in  which  each  side 
of  this  transcendental  equation  participated.  This 
principle  of  Indifference,  as  Schelling  termed  it, 
i.e.  the  common  element  in  the  Ego  experiencing 
and  that  which  it  experiences,  was  for  Schelling 
the  Absolute,  viz.,  the  ultimate  principle  of  all 
reality.  Schelling  sometimes  identifies,  or  hints 
at  the  identification  of,  this  principle  with  Will  or 
Energy. 

Schelling's  contemporary  (but  in  the  order  of 
thought  his  successor),  Hegel,  propounded  the 
thesis  that,  not  the  subject  of  Consciousness,  as 
with  Fichte,  nor  an  indefinite  element  of  Identity, 
implicit  alike  in  subject  and  object,  as  with 
Schelling,  but  Thought  itself,  the  Concept,  or,  as 


88   rilOBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

Hegel  prefers  to  term  it,  following  Plato,  the  Idea, 
is  the  Absolute  to  which  all  things  may  be  reduced. 
Like  Plato's  supreme  idea  of  the  "  Good,"  Hegel's 
"Idea"  at  once  embraced  within  itself  all  reality 
under  the  forms  of  the  logical  concept,  and  is  the 
supreme  end  and  purpose  of  all  reality.  In  Hegel's 
system  the  assumption  postulated  by  Plato  at 
Athens  in  the  fourth  century  B.C.  first  received  its 
final  and  complete  development.  For  Hegel  the 
forms  of  thought  taken  in  their  totality  are  absolute. 
The  absolute  Subject,  the  "  I "  of  Fichte  and  the 
"  Absolute  Identity "  of  Schelling  themselves  are 
thus  mere  modes  of  the  process  of  the  self-thinking 
of  thought.  Thought,  or  the  categories  of  logic, 
are,  for  Hegel,  all  in  all.  Hence  his  system  has 
been  termed  Panlogism,  or,  more  correctly,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  euphony,  Pallogism. 

The  antithesis,  in  the  great  German  philosophic 
movement  dating  from  Kant  to  Hegel,  is  typically 
represented  by  the  metaphysic  of  Schopenhauer. 
For  Schopenhauer  the  logical,  the  thought-element 
in  reality,  was  subordinate  and  derivative.  The 
true  Absolute,  of  which  Reality  was  the  expres- 
sion, and  the  thought-element,  in  Reality  a  mere 
form  of  this  expression,  was  that  which  we  term, 
in  its  highest  phenomenal  manifestation,  i.e.  in 
ourselves.  Will.  It  is  this  Will,  the  "  will-to-live," 
which  expands  itself  and  recognises  itself  in  the 
real  world  with  its   infinity   of  particulars.     The 


SPECULATIVE   THOUGHT  89 

logical  forms  by  which  the  understanding  appre- 
hends these  particulars  of  sense  are  merely  the 
products  of  the  primal  Will  for  the  purpose  of  its 
own  recognition  of  itself.  As  is  well  known, 
Schopenhauer's  pessimism  assumed  that  the  com- 
plete recognition  by  itself  of  the  Will  would  lead 
to  the  renunciation  of  life  altogether  as  futile, 
worthless,  and  evil. 

We  have  seen  now  how  the  old  problem 
formulated  by  the  ancient  Greeks  of  the  One  and 
the  Many,  the  abiding  thought-form  of  the  Intel- 
lect, and  the  infinite  flux  of  the  particulars  of 
Sense,  remained  still  a  problem  for  the  thinkers  of 
the  great  German  philosophical  movement  of  the 
late  eighteenth  and  early  nineteenth  centuries, 
and  received  diverse  solutions  at  their  hands.  The 
point  of  view  from  which  the  problem  is  treated  is, 
however,  not  the  same.  For  Plato,  Aristotle,  the 
Neoplatonists,  and  the  ancients  generally,  hypo- 
statised  these  elements  or  aspects  of  reality,  that 
is,  they  treated  them  as,  in  themselves,  independent 
realities.  Plato's  ideas  were  reals  in  themselves. 
Aristotle,  also,  although  aware  of  the  fallacy  in 
Plato's  doctrine,  and  in  spite  of  marvellous  insights 
at  times,  did  not  consistently  maintain  his  grasp 
of  the  wider  point  of  view  reached  in  modern  times 
by  the  German  classical  philosophy.  This  wider 
point  of  view  consists  in  regarding  the  whole 
problem    of    metaphysic    as    having    its    root   in 


90   PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

Consciousness.  All  that  is,  it  was  recognised  by- 
Kant  and  his  successors,  is  but  in  and  for  conscious- 
ness, of  which  self-consciousness  is  the  apex. 
There  are  no  substances  and  attributes  existing  in 
vacuo,  but  only  as  modifications  of  consciousness, 
possible  or  actual.  This  point  of  view  the  ancients 
never  succeeded  in  reaching,  with  the  exception, 
perhaps,  of  Aristotle,  and  even  he,  as  stated,  failed 
to  retain  it,  and  slid  back  into  what  may  be  termed 
the  old  abstract-metaphysical  attitude  proper  to 
his  time.  Since  Kant,  it  is  impossible  for  any 
serious  thinker  to  philosophise  on  the  lines  of  the 
older  metaphysics,  whatever  material  he  may  draw 
from  them.  The  new  standpoint  has  to  be 
reckoned  with  by  everyone  who  aspires  to  be  a 
metaphysician. 

Leaving  out,  for  the  sake  of  brevity,  all  that  is 
intermediate,  we  will  now  turn  to  the  consideration 
of  the  position  of  philosophy  as  regards  this  its 
main  problem,  in  the  present  day,  more  especially 
in  this  country.  This  still  turns  mainly  on  the 
relation  of  the  Alogical  to  the  Logical,  of  the  flux 
of  sense-particulars  (the  matter  of  sense)  to  the 
abiding  concepts  which  give  it  meaning  (the  pure 
forms  of  thought).  Therewith  is  connected  the 
problem  of  the  relation  of  the  indeterminate,  the 
Potential,  to  the  determinate,  the  Actual,  both 
alike  being  elements  of  the  real  world  in  time. 

The  problem  is  to  find  a  formula  of  explanation 


SPECULATIVE    THOUGHT  91 

satisfactory  to  reflective  thought,  employing  the 
self-consistency  of  Consciousness  as  a  test,  which 
shall  explain  the  meaning  of  Reality,  or,  which  is 
the  same  thing,  of  Experience.  We,  as  individual 
minds,  are  born  into  a  common  experience,  "  con- 
sciousness-in-general," as  Kant  termed  it.  The 
task  of  philosophy  as  metaphysic  is  to  re-read  this 
Experience,  to  analyse  it,  and  to  restate  it  in  the 
terms  of  reflective  thought. 

There  are  two  main  currents  in  the  metaphysic 
of  the  present  day:  (1)  there  is  the  old  Hegelian 
Pallogism  for  which  Thought  is  the  ultimate 
principle  of  Reality,  all  Reality  being  in  the  last 
resort  the  interweaving  of  thought-forms — concepts 
or  categories.  The  sense-element  in  the  Real  is 
but  Thought  in  its  lowest  and  barest  expression, 
from  which  we  can  trace  it  upwards  till  we  arrive 
at  Thought  in  its  fullest,  conceived  as  the  Absolute 
and  immanent  Reason  of  the  world-order.  The 
modern  work  in  which  this  point  of  view  receives 
its  best  literary  expression,  is  Lord  Haldane's 
Pathway  of  Reality.  The  old  Hegelian  principle 
is  subjected  here  to  an  admirable  recasting  in 
modern  English  literary  form. 

(2)  This  ^a;i-logical  standpoint,  or  Intellectual- 
ism,  as  it  is  now  the  fashion  to  call  it,  in  its  various 
manifestations,  is  confronted  by  its  opposite,  the 
alogical  standpoint.  While  we  can  confidently 
recommend  Lord  Haldane's  book  as  the  best  all- 


92   PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

round  English  exposition  in  modem  terms  of  the 
Hegehan  Logism,  it  is  difficult  to  fix  upon  any- 
one statement  of  Alogism,  understanding  by  this 
the  doctrine  of  those  who  regard  the  alogical 
principle  of  the  world.  Will-energy,  the  eternal 
flux  of  the  content  of  time,  the  particulars  of  sense, 
in  a  word,  the  ^logical  in  Reality,  as  the  ultimate 
rather  than  the  logical — it  is  difficult,  I  say,  to 
name  any  single  book  or  presentation  of  this  point 
of  view — as  representative,  notwithstanding  that  it 
may  be  regarded  as  the  growing  theory  in  modern 
philosophy/ 

There  is  a  movement  very  popular  in  Oxford 
of  recent  years,  which  calls  itself  Pragmatism, 
that  would  identify  reality  and  truth  with  the 
serviceable,  with  that  which  most  adequately 
subserves  a  given  dominant  purpose.  This,  it  will 
be  seen,  is  little  more  than  a  present-day  adapta- 
tion of  the  doctrine  of  Schopenhauer,  in  which 
Reality  or  Experience,  with  its  logical  forms,  is 
simply  the  expression  of  the  means  by  which  the 
infinite  Will-to-Uve  manifests  itself.  In  the  newer 
form  of  the  doctrine  the  consistency  of  the  older 
statement  of  it  seems  wanting.  It  is,  indeed, 
somewhat  difficult  to  arrive  at  any  positive  or 
constructive  doctrine  from  a  perusal  of  the  works 

1  Since  the  above  was  written  M.  Bergson's  L Evolution 
Creatrice  may  fairly  be  deemed  to  have  conquered  for  itself  this 
position. 


SPECULATIVE   THOUGHT  93 

of  the  late  Professor  James,  of  Harvard,  or  of  Mr 
Schiller,  of  Oxford,  who  may  be  regarded  as  the 
two  leading  exponents  of  "  Pragmatism."  Whether 
their  followers  will  make  headway,  or  remain  the 
small  academic  sect  they  are  at  present,  remains  to 
be  seen. 

Another  recent  exponent  of  the  Alogical  as  the 
ultimate  principle  of  real  existence  is  M.  Henri 
Bergson,  who,  in  his  work,  U Evolution  Creatrice, 
seeks  to  show  that  the  logical  forms  in  which 
Reality  clothes  itself  for  the  perceiving  conscious- 
ness, and  still  more  for  the  reflective  conscious- 
ness, are  secondary  makeshifts,  hiding  rather  than 
revealing  the  true  nature  of  the  Real.  The  inner 
meaning  of  Conscious  Reality,  of  L.ife  and  evolu- 
tion, cannot  be  expressed  in  any  logical  formula. 
It  is  beyond  logic,  the  thought-categories  under 
which  reality  is  fixed  for  us  are  but  its  mask.  For 
Bergson,  therefore,  the  logical,  the  conceptual 
side  of  things,  is  something  unessential  to  their 
real  nature,  which  is  to  be  looked  for  in  the  infinite 
and  indivisible  flux  of  sensible  particulars  in  time 
rather  than  in  the  universal  concepts  which  seem 
to  give  them  their  meaning  and  without  which 
they  would  appear  to  have  no  reality  in  any 
comprehensible  sense. 

Bergson's  doctrine  has  attracted  considerable 
attention  in  this  country  lately,  and  we  have  taken 
him   as   a  typical   illustration   of  a  direction  of 


94   PROBT.EMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

modern  philosophic  development ;  but  his  doctrine, 
like  others  that  occupy  the  same  general  stand- 
point, seems  open  to  the  objection  that  it  ignores 
the  thought-element  that  obtains  in  the  barest 
sense-perception  that  can  enter  into  Consciousness 
at  all,  as  object,  i.e.  as  reality.  The  moment  we  fix 
a  given  perception  as  this  object,  we  can  distinguish 
in  it  the  thought-category,  otherwise,  we  could  not 
distinguish  it  as  object  at  all.  It  would  seem  surely 
as  impossible  to  construct  Reality  out  of  a  mere 
alogical  flux  of  time-content  as  it  is  to  construct  it 
out  of  a  mere  bundle  of  logical  forms  (as  the  ortho- 
dox Hegelian  would  do).  This  has  been  pointed  out 
by  the  present  writer,  in  The  Roots  of  Reality,  in 
which  justice  is  sought  to  be  done  to  both  of  these 
antagonistic  positions.  The  point  of  view  taken  is 
that  in  the  possibility  of  Consciousness  as  such, 
both  the  Logical  and  the  Alogical  alike  have  their 
roots  and  constitute  the  two  elements  in  all  Reality 
— but  that  taken  per  se  either  falls  short  of  Reality, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  an  abstract  element  merely,  and 
not  real,  i.e.  is  not  an  independent  whole,  which 
only  obtains  in  the  inseparable  unity  of  these  two 
elements.  The  alogical  and  the  logical  are 
indicated  as  the  lowest  or  most  abstract  terms  into 
which  Reality,  i.e.  consciousness  as  a  systematic 
whole,  can  be  analysed.  To  these  two  factors 
every  content  of  consciousness  may  be  reduced. 
Every  real  has  a  universal  (logical)  and  a  particular 


SPECULATIVE   THOUGHT  95 

(alogical)  side.  The  one  cannot  be  deduced  from 
the  other  or  merged  into  the  other.  The  thinker 
who  would  deduce  the  logical  from  the  alogical 
side  of  given  Reality  is  on  this  view  equally  at 
fault  with  the  thinker  who  would  regard  the 
alogical,  as  is  the  case  with  Hegel,  as  no  more 
than  a  low  stage  of  the  logical.  That  out  of  which 
both  alike  emerge,  if  I  may  use  a  metaphor,  is 
the  principle  of  Consciousness.  In  the  unity 
of  Consciousness  alone  have  they  subsistence  and 
significance.  For  this  view  the  world  is  not  mere 
Reason  (logic),  neither  is  it  mere  spontaneous 
Flux. 

In  the  foregoing  very  brief  sketch  it  has  been 
impossible  to  do  much  more  than  trace  in  the 
barest  outline  the  historic  evolution  of  one  of  the 
main  problems  of  philosophic  thought.  I  have 
been  unable  to  follow  even  this  out  into  some  of 
its  leading  bearings  —  e.g.  as  exhibited  in  that 
antithesis  of  Will  and  Intellect  which  has  played 
such  an  important  part  in  the  speculative  thought 
of  the  last  two  or  three  generations.  In  the 
present  essay  I  have  had  to  content  myself  with 
indicating  the  historic  development  of  the  antithesis 
of  the  One  and  the  Many,  the  Universal  and  the 
Particular,  in  its  more  immediate  form  as  problem. 
Again,  the  desire  for  conciseness  has  induced  me 
for  the  most  part  to  omit  calling  attention  to 
parallels     Otherwise,  I  might  have  shown  the  close 


96   PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  INIORALS 

analogy  in  many  respects  traceable  between  the 
present  Oxford  movement  of  "  Pragmatism  "  and 
the  mid-nineteenth  century  philosophy  of  Ludwig 
Feuerbach,  or  the  century-end  thought  of  Friedrich 
Nietzsche,  and  many  similar  correspondences. 

It  may  be  remarked  in  conclusion,  that  the  task 
of  modern  philosophy  is  not  merely  to  discover 
entirely  new  problems  or  even  entirely  new  solutions 
of  old  problems — Aristotle  in  the  ancient  world, 
for  that  matter,  left  few  problems  and  few  possible 
solutions  entirely  untouched — but  rather  to  open 
out  new  aspects  of  old  problems,  and  new  formula- 
tions of  solutions  of  those  problems  which  in  a 
cruder  form  may  be  by  no  means  unfamiliar  to 
the  student  of  the  history  of  philosophic  thought. 

The  original  thinker  shows  himself  mainly  in  the 
adaptation  to  the  modern  outlook  and  the  recasting, 
in  the  light  of  modern  knowledge,  of  problems, 
and  attempted  solutions  of  those  problems,  which 
in  other  guises  have  presented  themselves  in,  it 
may  be,  various  periods  of  history. 

The  aim  of  philosophy  is  to  formulate  the 
conditions  and  the  meaning  of  Reality  in  the 
terms  of  reflective  thought,  in  a  systematic  guise 
that  must  prove  satisfactory  to  the  mind  when 
adequately  grasped.  As  yet,  only  a  very  few  of 
the  foremost  thinkers  of  the  world's  history  have 
succeeded  in  even  approaching  this  ideal.  Com- 
pletely actualised  it  has  never  been  as  yet.     The 


SPECULATIVE   THOUGHT  97 

history  of  philosophy  shows  us  the  varying  fortunes 
of  the  quest  for  the  foregoing  ideal  in  the  evolution 
of  reflective  thought.     But  given  the  accomplish- 
ment of  this  task  of  philosophy,  given  the  formu- 
lation   of    a    completely    satisfactory    system    of 
explanation  of  Reality,  would  speculative  thought 
necessarily  become  stationary  and  cease  to  have  a 
development  ?      By  no   means.      Such   a   system 
could,  at  best,  only  be  completely  satisfactory  to 
the  age  in  which  it  was  formulated.     Sooner  or 
later,  and   sooner   rather   than   later,   though  the 
main  positions  might  remain  unshaken,  the  form  in 
which  they  were  expressed  would  cease  to  appeal 
to  the  new  age — new  facets  of  the  old  truths  would 
have  to  be  recognised  and  emphasised — while  their 
applications  and  the  details  of  their  working-out  in 
the  original   statement  would  necessarily  become 
belated  by  the  progress  of  knowledge,  and  hence 
require   indefinite   modification   as  time  went  on. 
Hence  the  problems  of  life  and  destiny — first  and 
foremost  the  central  one  as  to  the  meaning  of  our 
Experience,    the    significance    of  what  we   term 
Reality  —  even  though  the  general  lines  of  their 
solution   were   acknowledged   once    for   all,    must 
inevitably  continue  to  occupy  their  place  in  the 
progressive  intellectual  life  of  mankind. 


CHAPTER   IV 

DEFINITIONS    OF    SOCIALISM 

The  term  Socialism  is  usually  supposed  to  date  from 
Robert  Owen.  It  is  doubtful,  however,  whether 
Owen's  claim  to  having  invented  the  word  is  alto- 
gether sustainable.  Pierre  Leroux,  Louis  Rey- 
baud,  and  others  have  similar  claims  to  have  been 
its  originators.  The  truth  would  seem  to  be  that 
it  came  into  being  about  the  same  time  in  more 
than  one  quarter.  It  soon  began  to  be  applied  in- 
differently to  the  theories  of  the  three  great  Utopian 
systems  which  arose  during  the  early  part  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  namely,  those  of  Owen,  Fourier, 
and  Saint  Simon.  Now  these  three  systems  had  this 
in  common,  they  proposed  to  revolutionise  human 
life  in  its  various  aspects,  primarily  its  economic 
basis,  the  mode  under  which  production  and  dis- 
tribution of  its  wealth  takes  place.  This  economic 
reconstruction  was  regarded  as  a  lever  for  revolu- 
tionary changes  in  other  departments  of  human 
life,  notably  in  marriage  and  the  family  relation, 
and   in   the   mental   and   moral   attitude   of  man 


DEFINITIONS   OF   SOCIALISM       99 

towards  society  and  the  universe.  As  wiU  be 
seen,  the  word  arose  at  a  time  when  the  new 
capitahst  class,  based  upon  the  machine  industry, 
was  rising  to  power.  It  thus  connoted  on  its 
negative  side  the  antithesis  to  the  individuaHsm 
— "  each  for  himself  and  the  devil  take  the  hind- 
most "  —  which  was  the  expression  of  the  new 
capitalist  view  of  social  life. 

It  should  be  remarked  that  the  systems  to  which 
the  term  Socialism  was  originally  applied,  one  and 
all  included  revolutionary  changes  in  the  relations 
of  the  sexes  and  in  religious  belief,  in  addition  to 
economic  reconstruction,  as  part  and  parcel  of  their 
programme.  In  1848,  with  the  national  workshops 
scheme  of  Louis  Blanc,  the  term  Socialism  first 
came  within  the  sphere  of  practical  pohtics.  The 
principle  of  co-operative  production  at  the  basis  of 
all  the  Utopian  systems  to  which  the  name  of 
Socialism  had  been  hitherto  apphed,  was  now  about 
to  enter  the  arena,  as  it  seemed,  of  actual  social  and 
political  life.  (Of  course,  as  every  man  knows,  who 
cares  to  know  at  the  present  day,  Louis  Blanc's 
scheme,  defective  as  it  was,  never  had  a  chance  on 
this  occasion.  But  this  has  nothing  to  do  with  our 
present  subject.) 

From  the  revolution  of  1848  may  possibly  be 
dated  the  tendency  to  narrow  down  the  definition 
of  Socialism  to  an  exclusively  economic  issue.  In 
1847,  less  than  a  year  before  the  outbreak  of  the 


100    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

great  revolutionary  movement,  Marx  and  Engels 
drew  up  a  document  which  may  be  regarded  as  the 
literary  inauguration  of  the  Modern  Socialist  Move- 
ment, to  wit,  the  celebrated  Communist  Manifesto. 
Under  the  name  of  Communism — the  word  Social- 
ism having  by  that  time  become  somewhat  use, 
owing  to  its  association  not  only  with  the  three 
great  Utopian  systems  of  the  beginning  of  the 
century,  but  with  inferior  imitations,  and  crude 
theories  emanating  from  them — the  two  protagonists 
of  the  modern  movement  drew  up  a  statement  of 
the  scientific  and  historical  conditions  of  which  the 
co-operative  commonwealth,  which  constituted  the 
essential  ideal  of  what  had  hitherto  gone  under  the 
name  of  Socialism,  would  be  the  issue.  The  term 
"  Communism  "  adopted  throughout  the  manifesto 
soon  fell  into  disuse  and  became  supplanted  by  the 
phrase  Social  Democracy,  and  by  the  old  word 
Socialism,  which  seems  destined  to  triumph  finally 
over  all  competitors.  In  the  Communist  Manifesto, 
as  is  well  known,  the  point  of  view  of  historic 
evolution  of  the  class-struggle  under  the  para- 
mountcy  of  the  economic  side  of  human  affairs, 
was  expounded  for  the  first  time  in  a  succinct  and 
definite  form.  That  democracy  was  the  essential 
condition  of  Communism  (Socialism)  was  em- 
phatically insisted  upon,  and  that  the  transfor- 
mation of  the  Civilisation  of  to-day  into  the 
Socialism  of  to-morrow  must   be   brought  about 


DEFINITIONS   OF   SOCIALISM     101 

through  a  political  revolution  involving  a  change  in 
the  possessors  of  power,  was  made  clear.  Hence- 
forward the  Socialist  movement  in  the  modern 
sense  began  slowly  to  shape  itself. 

We  come  now  to  the  main  question  of  this 
chapter :  namely,  as  to  the  definitions  of  Socialism 
in  its  modern  acceptation.  A  thoroughly  super- 
ficial definition  is  one  quoted  by  Mr  G.  K.  Chesterton 
in  an  article  in  the  Daily  News  a  year  or  two 
back.  "  Socialism,"  said  Mr  Chesterton,  means 
"the  assumption  by  the  State  of  all  the  means 
of  production,  distribution,  and  exchange."  Mr 
Chesterton's  aim  was  to  discredit  Socialism  by 
showing  that  it  did  not  necessarily  involve  demo- 
cracy, relative  economic  equality,  or  anything  else 
it  is  usually  supposed  to  imply.  This,  of  course, 
was  no  difficult  task,  starting  from  the  above 
inadequate  definition,  and  easily  allowed  Mr 
Chesterton  to  assume  with  an  affected  naivete 
that  "  the  State  "  referred  to  might  be  a  "  despotic 
State,  an  aristocratic  State,  or  a  Papal  State." 
This  is,  of  course,  merely  a  reductio  ad  absurdum 
of  the  definition  itself.  And  yet  how  many 
persons  who  consider  they  know  something  about 
the  subject  would  not  be  disposed  to  accept,  or  at 
least  to  acquiesce  in,  the  above  definition  without 
comment ! 

The    idea    that    all     Socialism    means    is    the 
concentration   of  the  means   of  production,   etc., 


102    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

in  the  hands  of  any  corporate  entity  that  may 
be  called  a  State,  irrespective  of  what  that 
State  may  be,  is  often  regarded  in  the  present 
day  as  showing  a  well-informed  and  up-to-date 
condition  of  mind  on  the  subject.  This  notion 
that  the  one  and  only  salient  point  about  Socialism 
is  the  concentration  of  productive  wealth  in  the 
hands  of  a  power  supposed  to  represent  the 
community,  has  been  fostered  in  recent  years 
by  many  adherents  of  Socialism  as  a  counterblast 
to  the  ascription  to  Socialism  of  certain  definite 
tendencies  of  a  political,  social,  or  religious  char- 
acter. In  opposition  to  the  latter  it  has  been 
sought  to  narrow  the  definition  down  to  the 
economic  issue  exclusively,  and  even  to  this 
issue  in  its  crudest  and  most  abstract  form.  It 
is  manifest  at  a  glance  that  the  mere  concentration 
of  production,  etc.,  in  the  hands  of  a  despot  or  an 
aristocratic  oligarchy  would  not  be  Socialism  in 
any  sense  under  which  the  word  has  hitherto  been 
understood. 

The  idea  of  democracy  has  always  formed 
an  essential  element  in  the  conception  of  Social- 
ism as  such.  Where  this  has  been  absent  and 
the  word  Socialism  has  been  retained  in  popular 
usage,  it  has  invariably  been  qualified  as  Christian 
Socialism,  State  Socialism,  "Socialism  of  the  Chair," 
etc.,  to  distinguish  what  is  meant  from  Socialism 
proper.     For  the  latter,  the  democratic  basis  and 


DEFINITIONS   OF   SOCIALISM     103 

end  is  every  whit  as  essential  as  the  economic 
concentration  itself.  Of  course,  anyone  may  define 
a  word  as  he  pleases,  but  no  one  has  any  right  to 
claim  general  recognition  for,  or  to  argue  from, 
any  definition  that  runs  seriously  counter  to  the 
meaning  attached  to  a  term  by  the  majority  of 
mankind,  and  which  it  has  connoted  from  its 
earliest  historical  use.  Hence,  to  take  the  case 
in  point,  we  are  bound  to  regard  Mr  Chesterton's 
definition  of  Socialism,  as  given  above,  as  inadmis- 
sible, and  any  argumentation  based  upon  it  as 
invalid.  Every  man  in  the  present  day  knows 
perfectly  well  that  despotic,  aristocratic,  or  papal  con- 
ditions exclude  the  notion  of  Socialism  at  the  very 
outset.  But  the  significance  of  Mr  Chesterton's 
fallacious  definition  is  not  confined  to  the  defini- 
tion itself.  When  stated  by  him,  together  with 
the  consequences  he  draws  from  it,  the  absurdity 
will  be  at  once  apparent  to  the  majority  of  readers. 
The  real  source  and  origin  of  the  fallacy,  however, 
will  be  found,  1  think,  to  lie  in  the  tendency  before 
spoken  of,  to  narrow  down  the  definition  of  Social- 
ism too  exclusively  and  too  formally  to  the  central 
economic  issue.  This  tendency  is,  more  or  less, 
recent  in  origin.  All  the  Utopian  systems  of  the 
first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  whilst  placing 
the  economic  re-organisation  of  society  in  the  fore- 
front, included  far-reaching  ethical,  intellectual, 
and  social  changes  other  than  economic,  as  coming 


104    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

under  the  definition  of  Socialism  as  they  under- 
stood it. 

In  the  Communist  Manifesto  of  Marx  and  Engels, 
the  standpoint  of  the  Marxian  historical  materialism 
is  insisted  upon  in  the  sense  that  the  other  changes 
in  the  "  superstructure  "  of  society,  as  they  termed 
it,  the  direction  of  which  was  foreshadowed  in  the 
main  by  the  early  Utopian  thinkers,  must  inevit- 
ably follow  on  the  economic  revolution  effected  in 
the  Socialism  or  "  Communism  "  they  set  forth.  It 
is  well  known  that  the  modern  movement  of  revolu- 
tionary Socialism  has  been,  in  all  its  phases,  more 
or  less  openly  hostile  to,  and  invariably  critical  of, 
the  various  institutions  obtaining  in  the  bourgeois 
world  of  to-day,  whether  as  regards  religious  beliefs 
and  churches,  present  forms  of  marriage  and  the 
family,  or  the  current  ideas  of  duty,  patriotism, 
etc.  At  the  same  time,  while  the  general  trend 
alike  of  the  popular  movement,  as  well  as  of  its 
literary  and  intellectual  exponents,  has  been  in 
this  direction,  there  has,  nevertheless,  been  a 
general  hesitancy  to  identify  the  movement  too 
closely  with  matters  other  than  politico-economic. 

Yet,  as  1  have  more  than  once  pointed  out,  it  is  un- 
warrantable to  limit  the  term  Socialism  to  a  purely 
economic  formula.  It  is,  in  fact,  impossible  to  do 
so  without  violating  principles  universally  recog- 
nised by  modern  Socialists  as  part  of  their  ideal. 
The  definition  of  Mr  Chesterton  above  referred  to 


DEFINITIONS   OF   SOCIALISM     105 

is  a  sufficient  illustration  of  this.  By  omitting  all 
reference  to  the  basis  of  democracy  and  the  end 
of  economic  equality,  relative  or  absolute,  it  is  easy 
to  infer  a  result  the  very  opposite  to  that  which 
is  really  intended  by  those  who  use  the  word. 
Democracy,  for  example,  has  primarily  reference 
to  politics  rather  than  economics,  and  yet  it  is  as 
essential  to  the  modern  conception  of  Socialism 
as  that  of  economic  concentration  in  the  hands  of 
an  executive  power.  The  whole  question,  indeed, 
hinges  upon  what  the  administrative  power  is  that 
has  the  effective  control  over  the  public  wealth. 
Its  concentration  in  the  hands  of  a  despot  or  an 
oligarchy,  with  control  amounting  de  facto  to 
possession,  is  no  more  Socialism  than  the  Standard 
Oil  Trust  is  Socialism.  (The  foregoing  remark 
does  not,  of  course,  apply  to  such  temporary  con- 
centration or  control  in  the  hands  of  an  exceptional 
Dictatorship  designed  to  tide  over  a  period  of 
revolutionary  crisis.)  Moreover,  the  economic 
equality,  which  is  the  avowed  aim  of  Socialism, 
would  be  unthinkable  were  the  productive  wealth 
of  society  given  over  to  the  control  of  despots  and 
oligarchists.  In  other  words,  the  political  question 
is  inseparably  bound  up  with  the  economical. 

The  same  might  be  said  of  other  issues — 
questions  of  the  family,  of  the  principles  of  ethics, 
etc.  It  is  impossible  to  draw  a  ring-fence  round 
one  department  of  human  affairs,  be  it  never  so 


106    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MTND,  MORALS 

fundamental,  and  treat  it  as  isolated  from  all 
others.  But  the  attempt  to  define  Socialism  by  a 
purely  economic  formula  is  not  merely  logically 
invalid  and  unsupported  by  the  attitude,  if  not  by 
the  formal  words,  of  the  vast  number  of  those  who 
call  themselves  Socialists.  It  is  also  historically 
unjustifiable.  The  word,  from  its  earliest  use  by 
Owen,  Leroux,  Reybaud,  etc.,  in  the  thirties  and 
forties  of  the  last  century,  has  always  stood  for 
a  revolution,  along  certain  well-defined  lines,  in 
human  life  generally.  The  attempt  to  limit  it  to 
a  technical  economic  formula,  the  reductio  ad 
ahsurdum  of  which  we  find  in  Mr  Chesterton's 
version,  is,  as  I  have  said,  quite  late. 

This  attempt  received  one  of  its  earliest  expres- 
sions in  English  literature  in  Mr  Kirkup's  article 
on  Socialism  in  the  Encyclopcedia  Britannica 
(ninth  edition).  Mr  Kirkup  here  labours  to 
impress  upon  his  readers  a  definition  somewhat 
similar  to  Mr  Chesterton's  as  against  current 
notions  which  assumed  that  Socialism  had  a 
word  to  say  on  law,  morals,  marriage,  family, 
education,  etc.  His  example  has  since  been 
followed  by  a  large  number  of  exponents,  hostile 
and  friendly.  It  is  difficult  to  say  how,  in  view  of 
the  history  of  the  word,  the  exponents  in  question 
justified  this  restriction  of  its  meaning.  The 
"  materialist  doctrine  of  history  "  of  Marx  certainly 
emphasises  the  economic  basis  of  the  social  life  of 


DEFINITIONS   OF   SOCIALISM     107 

man  as  in  a  sense  the  cause  of  all  other  manifesta- 
tions of  that  life,  even  those  seemingly  most  remote, 
but  in  practice  even  the  strictest  adherents  of  the 
doctrine  in  question  assume  the  results  of  the 
economic  change  as  taking  place  along  definite 
lines,  alike  as  regards  man's  "  view  of  the  world," 
as  regards  the  family  relation,  and  as  regards 
political  issues,  and  do  not  hesitate  to  say  so  as 
occasion  arises.  It  is  well  known  that  they  are  in 
favour  of  freer  marriage  relations,  of  the  recognition 
by  society  of  the  conclusions  of  science  as  opposed 
to  theological  conceptions,  and  of  democratic 
republicanism  as  against  all  forms  of  monarchical 
or  oligarchic  rule. 

In  these  demands  they  undoubtedly  carry 
on  the  tradition  of  historical  Socialism,  and  the 
Marxian  party,  using  the  word  in  its  larger  mean- 
ing in  the  present  day,  is  practically  conterminous 
with  the  International  Socialist  movement.  Yet, 
this  notwithstanding,  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
the  Marxian  thesis  as  regards  the  philosophy  of 
history,  according  to  which  economic  forms  and 
relations  are  the  causes  in  the  long  run  of  all 
the  phenomena  of  man's  social  and  intellectual 
life,  when  interpreted  in  its  narrow  and  literal 
signification,  does  give  colour  to  the  view  that  the 
definition  of  Socialism  may  be  reduced  to  that  of 
a  purely  economic  change.  But  that  this  is  so 
more  in  appearance  than  in  reality  is  obvious,  if 


108    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

we  admit,  as  most  Marxians  do  admit,  that  these 
other  changes  are  involved  in  the  economic  change 
itself,  for  as  such  they  cannot  fail  to  be  regarded 
as  forming  part  and  parcel  of  the  changed  con- 
ditions of  the  new  society,  which  is  only  another 
way  of  saying  that  they  must  form  an  essential 
element  in  the  complete  ideal  of  Socialism. 

How  then  stands  it  in  the  matter  of  short 
definitions  of  Socialism  ?  Are  such  possible,  and, 
if  possible,  are  they  of  any  value  as  bases  to  be 
argued  from  ?  Plainly,  I  think  they  are  not. 
A  world-historic  movement  like  Socialism  is  too 
big  a  thing  to  be  fitted  into  the  four  corners  of  a 
one-sentence  formula.  All  such  movements  have 
a  central  principle,  but  round  this  principle  group 
themselves  a  variety  of  implications,  many  of  them, 
it  is  true,  indirect  and  not  always  deducible  from  it 
at  first  sight,  but  which  none  the  less  belong  to  it, 
and  though  formally  and  technically  they  may  be 
detached  from  it,  yet  always  reassert  themselves  in 
the  long  run.  Every  movement  has,  so  to  say,  its 
aura.  Where  you  isolate  the  central  principle 
from  its  implications,  logical,  historical,  or  both, 
you  have  lost  touch  with  the  concreteness  of  the 
ideal,  and  have  nothing  but  an  abstract  formula 
before  you.  Now  an  abstract  formula  may  be  a  very 
useful  thing  for  working  purposes,  but  for  those 
who  take  a  wider  view  it  is  only  interesting  in  con- 
nection with  the  larger   whole  of  which  it  is  the 


DEFINITIONS   OF   SOCIALISM     109 

framework.  A  skeleton  is  all  very  well,  but  its  chief 
interest  lies  in  the  indication  it  affords  of  the  nature 
of  the  concrete  animal  of  which  it  is  the  skeleton. 

As  a  rule,  the  vaguer  the  definition  of  Socialism, 
the  less  open  to  objection  it  is.  Thus  Socialism 
has  been  described  as  "a  whole  range  of  ten- 
dencies towards  the  reshaping  of  the  social  order 
at  the  dictation  of  certain  feelings  and  certain 
lines  of  thought,  which  develops  as  it  proceeds." 
This  is  admissible,  so  far  as  it  goes,  and  possibly 
Socialism  could  not  be  better  defined  in  the  same 
number  of  words,  but  the  criticism  cannot  be 
gainsaid  that  it  is  too  vague  for  positive  instruc- 
tion. If,  however,  we  are  content  to  renounce 
neat  definitions  for  brief  expositions,  we  can  arrive 
at  something  very  much  more  positive  and  definite, 
while  at  the  same  time  acceptable  to  the  vast 
majority  of  the  International  Socialist  party.  I 
do  not  propose  to  give  one  here,  as  I  have  already 
done  so  more  than  once  in  the  course  of  my  literary 
career.  Hegel  said  that  while  previous  thinkers 
had  sought  to  define  the  Absolute  in  a  phrase,  he 
found  that  he  could  only  do  so  in  the  exposition  of 
a  science.  If  it  is  not  quite  so  bad  as  this  with 
Socialism,  it  is  certain  that  not  even  the  semblance 
of  justice  or  accuracy  as  regards  definition  can  be 
attained  in  any  form  of  words  numerically  less  than 
that  of  an  average  leading  article  in  a  daily  news- 
paper. 


110    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

One  thing  is  more  often  than  not  lost  sight  of 
in  the  attempt  to  define  Socialism,  and  that  is  the 
distinction  between  what  the  present  writer  has 
termed  "  Socialism  in  the  making,"  and  "  Socialism 
as  a  realised  ideal  of  society."  In  the  first  period 
of  Socialism  there  must  undoubtedly  be  many 
anachronisms,  large  fragments  of  the  old  order 
of  Society  in  the  shape  of  institutions,  customs, 
and  ideas,  surviving.  That  such  will  be  the  case 
no  reasonable  person,  1  take  it,  doubts  at  the 
present  day.  No  one  nowadays  believes  in  a  new 
heaven  and  a  new  earth  arising  in  a  perfect  form 
overnight.  But  this  does  not  hinder  the  fact  that 
Socialism  as  a  realised  ideal,  as  no  mere  skeleton, 
but  a  thing  of  flesh  and  blood,  is  not  exhausted, 
even  in  the  most  complete  definition  of  its 
economic  side.  Shaw  and  others  used  to  be 
fond  of  emphasising  the  fact  of  the  impossibility 
of  forecasting  the  life  of  the  socialised  world.  This 
is  perfectly  just  as  against  the  attempt  to  describe 
the  details  of  such  life  as  was  done  by  the  old 
Utopists  in  one  way,  and  by  modern  popular 
romancists  in  another. 

But  admitting  this  does  not  mean  denying  the 
possibility  of  indicating  the  tendencies  which  will 
be  dominant  in  the  world  of  the  future  and  the 
main  lines  along  which  the  institutions  of  that 
world  will  work,  and  this  not  merely  in  economic 
matters,  but  throughout  the  whole  range  of  social 


DEFINITIONS   OF   SOCIALISM     111 

affairs.  For  example,  we  may  venture  to  assert 
that  the  aim  and  tendency  of  a  Socialist  society 
must  be  towards  complete  economic  equality 
throughout  the  whole  of  that  society.  We  know 
that  in  proportion  as  this  aim  is  realised,  the 
aim  of  Socialism  is  realised.  Again,  the  vast 
majority  of  Socialists  will  agree  that  the  greatest 
possible  extension  of  liberty,  individual  and  social, 
is  a  fundamental  principle  of  Socialism,  and  that 
the  tendency  of  the  society  of  the  future  would 
be  to  abolish  all  direct  coercion  of  the  individual. 
Hence,  for  example,  that,  pace  Mr  Ramsay 
Macdonald,  a  society  that  sought  to  coerce  its 
members  either  by  law  or  public  opinion  into 
(say)  an  observance  of  lifelong  monogamy  or 
lifelong  celibacy  would  not  be  possible  under 
Socialism.  Then  again,  as  regards  speculative 
opinion,  here  also  as  in  modes  of  private  life, 
Socialism  implies,  if  nothing  else,  the  most  absolute 
toleration.  No  form  of  coercion,  such  as  the  im- 
pregnation of  the  immature  minds  of  children  with 
dogma  by  the  directing  power  of  the  community, 
would  be  consistent  with  Socialism.  Hence  the 
demand  for  secular  education.  The  one  thing  of 
which  Socialism  is  intolerant  is  intolerance,  and 
there  its  intolerance  is  absolute. 

1  have  given  the  above  merely  as  instances  of 
questions  constituting  essential  principles  of  Social- 
ism, quite  apart  from  its  material  foundation,  to 


112    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

wit,  the  concentration  of  the  productive  wealth 
of  the  community  in  the  hands  of  the  community 
itself.  If  I  be  challenged  as  to  my  right  to  assert 
these  things  to  be  involved  in  the  definition  of 
Socialism,  I  answer  the  test  of  such  definition 
can  only  be  historical  and  actual  usage.  In  this 
and  in  other  cases  we  have  to  consider  the  con- 
notation the  word  has  generally  borne  hitherto,  and 
what  it  connotes  to  the  majority  of  those  who  are 
most  interested  in  its  definition  at  the  present  day. 
As  tested  by  this  standard,  any  definition  of  Social- 
ism isolating  its  economic  side  and  erecting  the 
latter  into  a  complete  definition  in  itself,  breaks 
down.  The  fact  that  sundry  litterateurs  and 
politicians  have  within  the  present  generation 
done  their  level  best  to  crush  it  into  such  an 
economic  formula  does  not  alter  the  question. 
And  this  remark  applies  not  only  to  obviously 
absurd  definitions  such  as  that  of  Mr  Chesterton 
(which  omits  a  universally  recognised  essential), 
but  even  to  the  very  best  and  broadest  formula 
of  the  economic  basis  per  se.  No !  the  word 
covers  more  than  a  mere  economic  transformation, 
as  does  the  movement,  and  the  test  of  what  it  does 
cover  can  only,  I  again  insist,  be  the  historical  and 
actual  implications  included  under  it,  tacitly  if  not 
avowedly,  by  the  bulk  of  those  who  are  best  qualified 
to  define  its  use,  namely,  Socialists  themselves. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  HEARTH,  THE  THRONE, 
AND  THE  ALTAR 

There  is  an  unmistakable  tendency  at  the  present 
time  on  the  part  of  many  of  the  champions  of 
Socialism  in  current  political  life,  especially  in  the 
rough  and  tumble  of  electioneering,  to  endeavour 
to  limit  the  definition  of  the  term  Socialism  to 
the  politico-economic  issue  in  the  narrower  sense, 
in  other  words,  apart  from  its  bearing  on  other 
departments  of  human  life.  The  opponents  of 
Socialism  among  the  reactionary  political  parties, 
on  the  other  hand,  are  just  as  eager  to  bring  into 
relief  the  extra-economic  implications  of  Socialism 
as  the  former  are  to  suppress  them  or  to  keep  them 
in  the  background.  From  a  vote-catching  point 
of  view  it  is  felt  by  Socialist  wire-pullers  of 
electioneering  to  be  disadvantageous  to  have 
doctrines  obnoxious  to  large  sections  of  the  middle 
classes  obtruded  upon  a  free  and  independent 
electorate. 

Now  there  are  three  main  questions   of  social 

113  8 


114    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

and  political  import  which  are,  pei^  se^  outside  the 
sphere  of  economic  relations,  yet  upon  which 
Socialism,  as  most  persons  conceive,  is  called  upon 
to  give  a  pronouncement,  and  respecting  which, 
as  most  logically-minded  Socialists  contend,  the 
general  tenor,  at  least,  of  that  pronouncement  can 
hardly  be  considered  as  doubtful.  These  three 
subjects  are  what  I  have  designated  in  the  title 
of  this  chapter  by  the  well-known  phrase,  "  The 
Throne,  the  Hearth,  and  the  Altar."  By  the  first 
of  these  designations,  "  Throne,"  I  understand  a 
given  national  state-system  into  which  one  has 
been  born,  in  contra-distinction  to  other  corre- 
sponding and  competing  national  state-systems 
into  which  it  so  happens  one  has  not  been  born. 
The  figure-head  of  such  state-system,  in  most 
existing  countries,  is  the  monarch,  or  sovereign, 
as  indicated  by  the  word  "  Throne  "  ;  but  the  form 
of  government  is  really  immaterial  in  this  con- 
nection, though  Socialism  as  such  presupposes 
Republicanism  as  its  only  true  political  form.  The 
term  "  Throne,"  in  short,  is  for  present  purposes 
taken  to  mean  the  sentiment  of  patriotism  expressed 
in  the  phrase,  "  my  country,  right  or  wrong!"  The 
term  "  Hearth  "  is  taken  in  the  sense  of  indicating 
the  domestic  relation  of  which,  as  at  present  con- 
stituted, the  institution  of  legalised  and  life-long 
monogamic  marriage  is  the  corner-stone.  The 
expression  "  Altar,"  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say, 


HEARTH,  THRONE,  AND  ALTAR  115 

covers  religious  belief  and  worship   in  the  widest 
acceptation  of  those  terms. 

Now  let  us  first  of  all  consider  the  general 
implications  of  Socialism,  i.e.  of  the  Socialistic 
idea,  before  dealing  with  these  three  subjects 
separately.  The  primary  demand  of  modern 
scientific  Socialism  is,  as  we  all  know,  an  economic 
one,  to  wit,  the  common  ownership,  control,  and 
management  of  the  land  and  the  means  of  pro- 
duction. This  is  the  material  basis  of  human 
life  as  re-constituted  by  Socialism.  But,  without 
here  entering,  at  length,  into  the  knotty  points 
involved  in  the  controversy  respecting  what  is 
termed  the  "  materialistic  theory  of  history "  of 
Marx  and  its  interpretation,  it  will  hardly  be  denied 
by  any  modern  student  of  history  that  a  deep  and 
far-reaching  revolution  cannot  take  place  in  the 
production  and  distribution  of  wealth,  or,  in 
other  words,  in  the  material  conditions  of  society, 
without  at  the  same  time  powerfully  affecting  its 
thought  and  its  mode  of  life  generally.  So  much 
I  think  will  be  conceded.  Then,  again,  the  term 
Socialism,  which  dates  from  the  early  decades 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  as  embodied  in  the 
great  Utopian  systems  (as  they  are  termed)  of 
Owen,  Saint  Simon,  and  Fourier  respectively, 
— the  term  Socialism,  I  say,  always  implied  the 
reconstruction  of  human  life  generally — a  recon- 
struction,   conceived    no    less    as    involving    the 


116    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

intellectual  and  moral,  than  the  material,  side  of 
life.  That  the  Socialistic  idea  in  its  modern  form 
in  the  same  way,  mutatis  muta7idis,  also  involves 
this,  and,  indeed,  that  these  other  aspects  of  life 
are,  in  the  long  run,  no  less  its  concern  than  the 
material  basis  which  is  its  primary  objective,  is 
shown  by  the  vain  attempts  of  time-serving 
politicians  to  narrow  it  down  to  the  pure  and 
simple  politico-economic  formula.  Notwithstand- 
ing the  protestations  of  these  time-serving  poli- 
ticians, neither  friend  nor  foe  seems  disposed  to 
accept  their  assertions  unreservedly  in  this  respect. 
It  is  well  enough  known  what  are  the  views,  at 
least  in  their  general  tendency,  of  the  majority  of 
Socialists  as  regards  the  questions  to  which  we  are 
referring. 

It  will  be  denied  by  few  that  Socialists  are  not 
patriots  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term.  It  is 
recognised  that  to  the  bulk  of  Socialists  Socialism 
implies  a  change  in  the  present  relations  between 
the  sexes  in  the  direction  of  greater  freedom  or, 
I  should  rather  say,  perhaps,  of  the  absence  of  the 
coercion,  legal  or  otherwise,  at  present  exercised 
by  society  over  the  individual  in  these  matters. 
Again,  as  regards  religion,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
whatever  that  the  enormous  majority  of  Socialists 
do  not  accept,  in  any  sense  whatever,  the  dogmas 
of  any  traditional  creed.  It  is  an  acknowledged 
fact  that  most  Socialists  are  atheists  or  agnostics, 


HEARTH,  THRONE,  AND  ALTAR  117 

or  secularists,  if  the  term  be  preferred.  I  am 
referring,  of  course,  to  Socialists,  scms  phrase,  not 
to  hybrids  who  may  choose  to  label  themselves 
Christian  Socialists,  whatever  that  may  mean. 
While  these  foregoing  statements,  I  think,  are  not 
to  be  gainsaid,  it  is  useless  blinking  the  fact  that 
the  Socialist  for  whom  vote-catching  is  the  one 
thing  needful  is  always  desirous  of  keeping  these 
points  of  view  in  the  background.  Some,  while 
admitting  them  to  be  in  the  last  resort  inseparable 
from  Socialism,  would  have  them  treated  as  an 
esoteric  or  secret  doctrine  not  to  be  obtruded  on 
those  not  yet  converted  to  the  central  economic 
principle.  Some  there  are,  however,  who  would 
maintain  that  there  is  no  necessary  connection  at 
all  between  them  and  Socialism.  Such  are  those 
who  would  confine  the  word  Socialism  within  the 
four  corners  of  a  purely  economic  definition.  In 
a  word,  they  challenge  the  views  of  the  majority  of 
Socialists  on  these  subjects,  as  not  being  necessarily 
deducible  from  the  central  principle  of  Socialism. 
This  brings  us  back  to  the  consideration  of  what 
constitutes  the  essence  of  the  Socialistic  principle. 
It  would  be,  of  course,  absurd  to  allege  that  the 
adoption  of  any,  or  all,  of  the  palliatives  on  the 
programme  of  the  Socialist  party  in  most  countries 
involved  the  acceptance  of  any  special  views  re- 
specting patriotism  or  anti-patriotism,  marriage  or 
free-love,  theology  or  secularism,  etc.     But  then^ 


118    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

on  the  other  hand,  most,  if  not  all,  of  these  im- 
mediate palliatives  of  the  present  system  of  society 
(housing  proposals,  feeding  school  children,  ex- 
tension of  old  age  pensions,  etc.,  etc.)  could  be, 
and  undoubtedly  are,  accepted  by  many  Radicals, 
who  would,  nevertheless,  not  consider  themselves 
Socialists  at  all.  It  may  be  readily  admitted  that 
for  the  purposes  of  any  given  election  these  ulterior 
things  are  quite  irrelevant,  and,  from  this  point 
of  view,  there  would  be  no  reason  why  the  most 
devout  Nonconformist  or  Churchman  might  not 
vote  for  a  Socialist  candidate.  But,  I  submit,  the 
matter  is  very  different  when  we  are  dealing,  not 
with  current  Socialistic  proposals,  but  with  Socialism 
as  a  coherent  ideal  of  human  life  and  society  and 
of  the  Socialist  party  considered  as  an  organisation 
whose  final  goal  is  the  realisation  of  this  ideal. 
Here  one  has  to  consider  the  matter  in  all  its 
bearings. 

Socialism,  it  is  said,  is  an  economic  doctrine. 
True,  but  it  is  an  economic  doctrine  inseparably 
bound  up  with  an  ideal  concerning  human  life 
and  development.  And  if  we  analyse  this  ideal 
we  find  it  to  involve,  in  the  last  resort,  the 
old  triad.  Liberty,  Equality,  and  Fraternity,  trans- 
lated into  the  conditions  of  modern  progress. 
The  modern  Socialist  recognises  that  only  through 
the  economic  change  he  postulates,  from  individual 
to  collective  ownership  of  the  means  of  production, 


HEARTH,  THRONE,  AND  ALTAR  119 

distribution,  and  exchange,  can  Liberty,  Equality, 
and  Fraternity  be  realised.  The  old  attempts  to 
realise  them  have  conspicuously  failed.  The 
liberty  aimed  at  by  Socialism  is  freedom  of  de- 
velopment for  the  individual  as  for  Society.  This 
liberty  the  Socialist  sees  to  be  impossible  under  a 
regime  of  private  property-holding  in  the  means  of 
production.  All  the  existing  trammels  on  freedom, 
alike  for  the  individual  and  for  Society,  the 
Socialist  finds  traceable,  in  the  last  resort,  to  the 
system  of  private  ownership  in  these  means  of 
production. 

The  institution  of  private  property,  which,  in 
earlier  stages  of  Society,  played  its  part  as  a 
guarantee  of  freedom  and  progress,  has,  in  these 
latter  days,  become  a  stumbling  block  and  a 
hindrance — in  a  word,  the  enemy  of  progress. 
But  although  this  economic  side  of  life  is  at  the 
centre,  so  to  say,  of  things  human,  and  although 
nothing  human  can  escape  its  influence,  yet  there 
are,  nevertheless,  departments  which  do  not  lie 
directly  and  immediately  under  its  domination. 
The  modifications  in  these  departments  necessarily 
affected  by  the  economic  change,  real  though  they 
be,  are  indirect  and  require  time  to  work  them- 
selves out.  The  departments  referred  to  are  the 
intellectual  and  ethical  sides  of  human  life.  Now, 
for  our  present  purpose,  these  departments  fall 
mainly  under  the  three  headings  of,  as  I  have  here 


120    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

termed  them,  "  Throne,  Hearth,  and  Altar  " — in  a 
word,  the  present  ideals  of  patriotism,  of  marriage, 
and  of  religion,  together  with  the  transformation 
or  modification  of  these  ideals  involved  by 
Socialism. 

Let  us,  first  of  all,  take  the  patriotic  idea  as 
at  present  understood.  This  means  that  a  duty 
exists  for  every  man  to  regard  his  country,  that  is, 
the  particular  state-system  into  which  he  has  been 
born,  together  with  the  soil  and  its  inhabitants, 
with  a  devotion  over  and  above  that  in  which 
he  regards  other  countries  and  their  inhabitants, 
or  humanity  at  large,  and,  as  a  consequence,  to  be 
prepared  to  sacrifice  everything,  including  life  itself, 
for  this  said  country.  Now,  the  Socialist  criticism 
of  this  sentiment  of  patriotism  I  take  to  be  is  as 
follows : — The  existing  state-systems  with  which 
the  sentiment  of  patriotism,  as  understood  to-day, 
is  concerned,  are  really  recent  creations.  In 
antiquity,  patriotism  had  sole  reference  to  a  very 
circumscribed  community,  namely,  the  city  which 
had  itself  grown  out  of  the  tribal  community. 
Abydos,  Thebes,  Babylon,  Jerusalem,  Sparta, 
Athens,  Rome,  were  cities  boasting  a  city- 
patriotism,  which  was  reflected  in  the  ancestral 
cults  which  constituted  their  religion.  There  was, 
at  this  stage,  no  centralised  power  embracing  huge 
populations  in  vast  extents  of  territory.  The  so- 
called  empires  of  the  ancient  world  were,  as  a  rule. 


HEARTH,  THRONE,  AND  ALTAR  121 

no  more  than  loose  confederacies,  the  bond  holding 
them  together  being  usually  forced  on  the  tribes 
and  cities  included  in  them,  by  right  of  conquest 
and  superior  might,  and  imposed,  not  for  the  sake 
of  the  internal  organisation  of  Society,  which  was 
under  local  and  tribal  jurisdiction,  but  solely  for 
the  sake  of  enforced  military  service  and  of  tribute. 
Such  confederacies  were  the  so-called  empires  of 
Assyria,  Babylonia,  Egypt,  Persia.  Round  these 
amorphous  heterogeneously  composed  aggregates 
no  serious  and  lasting  sentiment  of  patriotism 
either  did,  or  could,  gather.  This  sentiment,  as 
already  said,  obtained  exclusively,  as  regards  the 
civic  and  tribal  units  comprised  within  them. 

Turning  to  the  Middle  Ages,  we  find,  as  far 
as  this  matter  is  concerned,  substantially  a  similar 
condition  of  things.  The  unit  of  political  social 
life  in  the  Middle  Ages  was  the  manor  and  (especi- 
ally in  the  later  period  of  the  Middle  Ages)  the 
industrially  organised  township.  Italy,  Germany, 
France,  and  even  England  (although  the  remark 
applies  less  here  than  in  the  other  cases),  were 
little  more  than  assemblages  of  manors  and  town- 
ships. And  it  was  to  these,  rather  than  to  what 
we  now  term  the  nation,  that  the  sentiment  of 
patriotism  attached.  The  modern  nation-state 
grew  up  on  the  ruins  of  mediaeval  feudalism  con- 
currently with  the  rise  of  the  new  conditions  of 
industry  which  subsequently   developed   into  the 


122    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

modern  system  of  capitalism.  National  patriotism 
thus,  as  conceived  to-day,  first  attained  its  zenith 
under  the  ^gis  of  the  modern  capitalist  system. 
Now,  in  these  latter  days.  Socialists  find  this  senti- 
ment of  national  patriotism,  itself  a  product  of 
the  capitalistic  period,  is  being  exploited  wholly 
and  solely  in  the  interests  of  capitalistic  schemes 
of  aggrandisement,  expansion,  acquirement  of  new 
markets,  of  cheap  native  labour,  of  the  mineral 
wealth  of  undeveloped  countries,  etc.,  etc. 

From  this  short  historical  excursus  it  will  be 
readily  imagined  that  an  antipathy  should  exist 
between  Patriotism  and  Socialism.  This  is  the 
more  evident  when  we  consider  that  the  expansive 
exploits  of  modern  capitalism  under  the  aegis  of  the 
various  national  flags,  for  the  most  part  carried  on 
with  the  blood  and  sinew  of  the  proletariat,  not 
only  subserve  no  other  immediate  purpose  than 
that  of  making  rich  men  richer,  but  do  actually 
further  what  is  for  the  Socialist  a  very  sinister 
ulterior  purpose,  namely,  that  of  prolonging  the 
life  of  the  capitalist  system,  which  must  either 
continuously  enlarge  the  sphere  of  its  operations, 
or  perish,  as  a  system,  by  becoming  transformed 
into  Socialism.  Add  to  this  the  further  fact  that 
the  economic  tendency  is  towards  the  knitting 
together  in  an  indissoluble  union  of  the  whole 
world,  but  more  especially  of  the  nations  in  the 
van  of  progress,  i.e.  those  under  the  domination 


HEARTH,  THRONE,  AND  ALTAR  123 

of  the  capitalist  system — Europe,  America,  the 
European  colonies,  and  now,  Japan.  Modern 
commerce,  industry,  means  of  communication, 
science  and  art,  all  of  them  are  essentially  inter- 
national. As  the  local  centre  of  old,  the  manor  or 
township,  from  being  self-sufficing  in  its  wants  be- 
came dependent  on  the  province  and  then  on  the 
nation,  so  now  each  nation  is  ceasing  more  and 
more  to  be  self-sufficing — is  becoming  more  and 
more  merely  a  semi-dependent  section  of  the  whole 
civilised  world. 

But  although  this  affords  the  economic  clue  to 
the  Internationahsm  of  the  modern  Socialist  party, 
there  is,  also,  as  before  pointed  out,  an  ethical 
expression  of  this  Internationalism.  This  ethical 
expression  consists  in  the  instinct,  if  you  will,  that 
Internationalism  is  an  essential  element  in  the  re- 
alisation of  Liberty,  Equality,  and  Fraternity.  But 
here  comes  the  rub — Is  Socialism  not  merely  Inter- 
national, but  also  anti-national  ?  Is  the  antipathy 
between  Socialism  and  Patriotism  so  thorough- 
going as  to  make  of  the  logical  Socialist  an  anti- 
patriot  ?  This  is  the  question  for  some  time  past 
agitating  the  International  Socialist  Party.  On  the 
one  side,  it  is  alleged  that,  though  the  tendency  of 
Sociahsm  is  towards  the  ehmination,  not  merely 
of  national  jealousies,  but  also  of  national  barriers 
generally,  yet  the  Socialist,  as  a  practical  man,  has 
to  make  up  his  account  with  things  as  they  are. 


124    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

Now  national  state  -  systems  exist  and  colonial 
empires  based  upon  them.  Nay,  more  than  this, 
the  nation,  being  the  modern  political  unit,  having 
its  community  of  law,  tradition,  custom,  language, 
etc.,  etc.,  the  Socialist  party  itself  is  organised  on 
the  basis  of  nationality,  and,  therefore,  the  mainten- 
ance of  the  integrity  of  the  nation  against  aggres- 
sion is,  as  things  are  at  present,  as  much  incumbent 
on  Socialists  as  on  anyone  else. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  urged  that  while  con- 
ceding the  point  last  mentioned,  to  wit,  the  right 
of  any  existing  nation  to  independence  within 
its  own  frontiers  as  against  any  other  nation, 
yet  that  this  point  is,  to  the  proletariat  and 
to  the  Socialist,  a  somewhat  "academic"  one. 
The  existing  national  state-systems,  it  is  pointed 
out,  represent  class-interest  and  class-domination ; 
hence,  while  not  denying  the  right  of  one  of 
these  state-systems  to  defend  itself  against  an- 
other, viewing  the  matter  from  the  standpoint 
of  present  society,  it  is  nevertheless  contended 
that  even  such  defence,  justifiable  though  it  may 
be  from  the  foregoing  standpoint,  is  no  affair  of 
the  class-conscious  proletariat  or  of  the  Socialist. 
With  this  is  involved,  of  course,  the  burning  ques- 
tion of  anti-militarism  now  agitating  the  Inter- 
national Socialist  Party,  and  the  discussion  of  which 
played  such  an  important  part  in  the  proceedings 
at  Stuttgart  in  1907,  where  August  Bebel  took  one 


HEARTH,  THRONE,  AND  ALTAR  125 

side  and  Gustave  Herve  the  other.     Herve  is  the 
most   prominent    exponent   of    the   position   that 
the    logical   outcome   of    the    Internationalism    of 
modern  Socialist  movement  involves  the  adoption 
of  an  anti-national  and  anti-patriotic  attitude.     For 
Herve  and  his  party,  so  powerful  in  France,  patriot- 
ism, in  any  shape  or  form,  is  incompatible  with  the 
fundamental   ethical   postulate  of  Socialism.     On 
the  other  hand.  Rebel  and  others,  who  take  a  differ- 
ent view  as  regards  the  question  of  patriotism  and 
miUtary  service,  draw  a  sharp  distinction  between 
offensive  and  defensive  war,  a  war  of  aggression 
and  a  war  of  defence  against  invasion.     There  is  a 
wide-spreading  feeling,  however,  in  the  party  that 
this  distinction  is  in  the  present  day  dangerous  in 
tendency  and  largely  illusory.     I  allude  to  sections 
of  the  party  who  by  no  means  adopt  the  extreme 
views  of  Herv^  in  this  matter.     Karl  Kautzy,  for 
example,  in  a  recent  number  of  the  Neue  Zeit,  while 
justly  urging  that  the  crucial  point  is,  not  whether 
a  war  is  offensive  or  defensive  from  a  national  point 
of  view,  but  whether  it  would  subserve  the  interests 
of  the  proletariat  or  democracy  generally,  remarks 
that  "in  the  existing  political  situation  a  war  in 
which  a  proletarian  or  democratic  interest  would 
be   concerned   is    hardly   conceivable.      The    only 
danger  of  war  to-day,"  he  says,  "threatens  from 
the  side  of  Colonial  expansion,  and  to  this  the  pro- 
letariat is,  in  principle,  opposed."     In  other  words, 


126    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

modern  military  patriotism  is  hardly  likely  to  be 
called  into  requisition,  save  either  for  the  depriva- 
tion of  some  weaker  or  backward  people  of  its 
independence,  or  as  regards  a  thieves'  quarrel  as 
to  the  respective  share  of  two  or  more  capitalist 
states  in  the  plunder  of  this  people. 

The  above  is  crucially  illustrated,  among  recent 
events,  by  the  adventure  of  France  in  Morocco — 
not  to  speak  of  our  own  Boer  War  and  other 
Colonial  complications.  But  if  the  foregoing  be 
true — and  that  it  is  so  in  the  main  there  can  be,  I 
think,  no  doubt — it  follows  surely  that  the  funda- 
mental contention  of  Herv^  is,  to  the  logically 
minded  Socialist,  justified.  The  question  then  re- 
duces itself  to  one  of  means.  And  how  far  the 
general  military  strike  in  the  event  of  a  declaration 
of  war  as  proposed  by  Herve  in  the  case  of  France 
is  a  possible,  or,  at  least,  the  most  suitable,  weapon, 
remains,  of  course,  an  open  question,  and  one  which 
does  not  specially  concern  us  here.  My  main 
point  is,  that,  looking  at  the  matter  all  round, 
even  if  we  went  so  far  as  to  justify  participation  by 
Socialists  in  a  war  of  national  defence,  where  the 
independence  of  a  given  nationality  was  seriously 
threatened  by  an  external  Power — even  then,  as 
Kautzy  says,  this  contingency  is  practically  impos- 
sible to  arise  in  the  present  state  of  world-politics 
as  between  any  of  the  great  world-powers — in  short, 
it  is   hardly   conceivable    that    one   great    Power 


HEARTH,  THRONE,  AND  ALTAR  127 

should  be  able  to  crush  or  enslave  another  great 
Power  in  the  present  day.  This  we  have  seen 
crucially  illustrated  as  far  back  as  the  Franco- 
German  War  of  1870.  The  most  it  could  do 
would  be  to  steal  some  of  that  great  Power's 
over-sea  possessions,  a  proceeding  which,  in  the 
general  way,  need  not  seriously  perturb  the 
Socialists.  What  we  have  to  remember  is,  that, 
so  far  as  it  is  genuine,  the  International  character 
of  Socialism  is  no  mere  phrase.  The  Socialist  feels 
that  he  belongs  first  and  foremost  to  the  Inter- 
national Socialist  Party,  and,  as  such,  that  his 
Socialist  comrades  of  other  lands  stand  nearer  to 
him  than  his  non-Socialist  countrymen.  He  is  a 
Socialist  first  and  an  Englishman,  Frenchman, 
German,  afterwards.  As  a  consequence  it  seems 
to  me  futile  to  deny  that  Socialism  is,  alike  as 
regards  its  economic  basis,  its  historical  evolution, 
and  its  fundamental  ethical  postulates,  inconsistent 
with  patriotism,  according  to  any  definition  of  that 
word  current  at  the  present  time. 

Having  dealt  necessarily  in  a  cursory  manner 
with  what  I  conceive  to  be  the  relation  of  Socialism 
to  the  Throne,  understanding  by  this  the  idea 
of  country  or  nationality,  we  will  now  proceed 
shortly  to  discuss  its  relation  to  the  Hearth,  i.e. 
the  question  of  the  Family.  One  of  the  great 
outcries  against  Socialism  on  the  part  of  the 
reactionary   Press   is   that   it   would    destroy  the 


128    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

Family,  break  up  the  Home,  introduce  free-love, 
etc.  One  opponent  of  Socialism,  in  the  ardour  of 
his  indignation,  recently  expressed  his  horror  at  the 
fact  that  Socialism  would  destroy  the  institution 
of  marriage,  as  it  existed  throughout  Christendom 
to-day,  "  to  replace  it  by  something  even  worse  1 " 
Socialists,  I  am  sure,  will  all  hope  and  trust 
that  such  a  terrible  result  may  be  spared  us. 
However  this  may  be,  there  is  one  thing  that 
strikes  me  somewhat  painfully  in  the  agitation 
raised  by  reactionaries  anent  this  question,  and 
that  is,  the  cowardice  of  many  professing  Socialists 
in  their  attitude  towards  it.  I  do  not  wish  to 
particularise,  but  to  see  the  way  in  which  well- 
known  Socialists,  in  replying  to  challenges  on 
this  question,  are  literally  tumbling  over  each  other 
in  their  efforts  to  abase  themselves  before  the 
shrine  of  Mrs  Grundy,  not  hesitating  to  contradict 
themselves,  and  to  eat  their  own  words  the  while,  is, 
to  me,  personally,  not  a  pleasant  spectacle,  not  to 
use  a  stronger  expression. 

And  what  is  meant  by  all  this  maundering 
talk  about  the  idyllic  perfection  for  all  time  of 
the  enforced  marriage  relation  as  it  exists  at 
present,  irrespective  of  diversities  of  tempera- 
ment and  character  ?— what  is  meant  by  all  these 
protestations  of  an  undying  devotion  to  asceti- 
cism as  the  ideal  of  life  in  this  connection  ? — 
what,  I  say,  is  the  occasion  of  all  this  grovelling  ? 


HEARTH,  THRONE,  AND  ALTAR  129 

I  am  afraid  we  must  answer,  it  is  the  cant  of 
bourgeois  respectability,  in  itself,  on  the  one  side, 
but  more  especially  as  associated  with  the  inordin- 
ate desire  for  immediate  success  at  the  polls  on 
the  other.  Now  I  venture  to  think  that  all  the 
asseverations  of  unshakable  and  undying  adhesion 
to  the  current  conventional  views  on  the  question 
of  sexual  relations  are,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
logically  thought-out  Socialistic  doctrine,  hardly 
less  untenable  than  are  the  wild  and  one-sided 
assertions  of  the  reactionary  Press  to  the  effect 
that  Socialism  advocates  promiscuity  in  the  rela- 
tions of  the  sexes.  I  take  it  that  Socialism  has  its 
own  point  of  view  in  this  as  in  other  matters,  and 
that  this  point  of  view  is  radically  distinct  from, 
or  even  in  some  respects  opposed  to,  that  of  the 
bourgeois  morality  and  its  sanctions  in  this  matter. 
Let  us  look  this  question  squarely  in  the  face. 
Say  the  opponents  of  Socialism,  "  You  Socialists 
would  abolish  Marriage  and  destroy  the  Family  ! " 
Now  the  first  question  which  suggests  itself  here 
is  what  form  of  Marriage  and  what  form  of  the 
Family  ?  He  who  makes  the  assertion,  as  a  rule, 
pretty  obviously  thinks  that  the  only  possible  form 
of  the  Family  is  the  existing  compulsory  life-long 
monogamy,  as  by  law  established,  together  with 
the  children  resulting  therefrom,  if  there  are  any. 
But  I  need  scarcely  remind  the  educated  reader 
that  this  form  of  Marriage   and   the   Family,  as 

9 


130    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

established  amongst  us,  is  itself  the  result  of  a 
long  evolution,  for  the  various  stages  of  which  the 
works  of  INIaclennan,  Morgan,  Baehofen,  Engels, 
Gerard-Teulon,  Hobhouse,  Havelock  Ellis,  and 
others  may  be  consulted.  Suffice  it  here  to  say 
that  this  evolution,  beginning  in  the  far  distant 
past  of  early  man  (perhaps  with  promiscuity), 
has  passed  through  a  variety  of  phases,  various 
forms  of  group-marriage  (by  which  is  to  be  under- 
stood the  men  of  one  group  having  marital  rights 
over  the  women  of  another  group,  and  vice  versa) ; 
polygamy  in  its  various  forms,  culminating  in  the 
so-called  patriarchal  family,  through  diverse  stages 
of  transitory  marital  relation,  till  we  come  to  the, 
at  least  nominal,  life-long  monogamy  as  established 
by  law  throughout  Christendom  in  the  present  day 
— which  last  constitutes  for  the  modern  bourgeois, 
not  merely  the  final  term  of  an  evolutionary  series 
(beyond  which  further  evolution  is  impossible  and 
undesirable),  but  an  institution  obtaining  by  a  kind 
of  Divine  Right  for  all  peoples  and  all  times. 

That  the  form  of  marriage  and  the  family  relation 
in  any  given  society  is  determined  by  the  modes 
that  society  produces  and  distributes  its  wealth  is 
a  commonplace  to  students  of  anthropology  and 
the  early  history  of  institutions,  and  will,  I  think, 
be  denied  by  no  scientific  Socialist  in  the  present 
day.  This,  however,  by  the  way.  Now,  un- 
fortunately  for  the   opponent   of  Socialism    who 


HEARTH,  THRONE,  AND  ALTAR  131 

professes  to  regard  the  present  form  of  the  marriage 
relation  as  the  final  limit  of  perfectibility,  (as  has 
been  often  enough  pointed  out)  the  existing  family 
relations  have  already  been  destroyed  by  the  very 
conditions  of  their  existence  under  the  great 
machine  industry  of  Capitalism  for  the  bulk  of  the 
proletariat.  They  were  eminently  suited  for  the 
small  handicraft  industry  of  former  times,  in  which 
all  the  family  assisted  one  another.  But  with  each 
member  of  the  family  competing  with  each  other 
member  in  the  factory,  the  old  family  relation  has 
been  undermined.  This  at  one  end  of  the  social 
scale.  At  the  other,  amongst  the  higher  strata  of 
the  ruHng  classes  in  Europe  at  the  present  time, 
the  institution  of  the  morganatic  or  left-handed 
marriage  (not  to  speak  of  various  forms  of  non- 
legitimate  sexual  relationship)  is  in  direct  contra- 
vention of  the  monogamic  principle.  Such  are  the 
facts,  and  they  have  often  been  stated. 

In  short,  the  old  monogamic  family  relation  is 
already  undermined  in  more  than  one  direction. 
(I  do  not  know  whether  there  are  any  who  seriously 
contemplate  the  possibility  of  its  rehabilitation  on 
the  old  basis  either  with  Socialism  or  without 
Socialism.  If  there  be  such,  I  would  only  point 
out  to  them  that  experience  has  not  hitherto  been 
favourable  to  attempts  to  put  back  the  hands  of 
the  clock.)  The  historical  Theory  of  SociaHsm 
proclaims  the  more  or  less  indissoluble  connection 


132    PROBI.EMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

of  all  forms  of  human  life  with  the  economic  form. 
It  tells  us  that  the  forms  assumed  by  the  marital 
and  family  relations  throughout  history  are,  like 
other  social  forms,  at  least  largely,  if  not  entirely, 
dependent  upon  the  material,  the  economic  con- 
ditions of  the  life  of  a  society,  and  change  with 
these  conditions.  So  much  for  the  evolutionary 
side  of  the  question. 

We  come  now  to  the  important  practical  point 
whether  an  unconditional  acceptance  of  the  present 
basis  of  the  marital  relation,  with  all  its  implica- 
tions, in  a  word,  of  the  current  sexual  morality,  is 
consistent  with  the  fundamental  ethical  postulates 
of  Socialism.  We  have  already  signalised  the 
direct  aim  of  Socialism  as  the  realisation  of  the 
principles  of  Liberty,  Equality,  and  Fraternity. 
Now  with  Equality  and  Fraternity  this  particular 
question  has  perhaps  only  an  indirect  connection. 
But  with  Liberty  it  has  a  very  direct  connection 
indeed.  Let  us  consider  for  a  moment  what 
Liberty  means  for  Socialism.  Socialism,  in  spite 
of  the  abusive  assertions  of  its  enemies,  has  for  its 
end,  I  say,  the  realisation  of  human  liberty.  It  is 
true  the  liberty  it  seeks  to  realise  is  a  real  liberty 
and  not  a  sham  liberty,  a  concrete  liberty  and  not 
a  merely  formal  and  abstract  liberty.  Hence  in 
the  attempt  to  achieve  the  real  thing  it  is  often 
necessary  to  destroy  the  sham.  In  championing 
true  liberty,  Socialism  is  prepared  to  demonstrate 


HEARTH,  THRONE,  AND  ALTAR  133 

the  false  liberty  {e.g.  the  sham  free  contract  between 
capitalist  and  workman  demanded  by  the  Manchester 
school)  to  be  incompatible  with  liberty,  in  fact,  the 
negation  of  liberty  (such  liberty  being,  in  fact,  the 
source  and  foundation  of  modern  wage-slavery). 
Socialism  can  further  show  that  real  human  liberty, 
for  each  and  all,  can  only  be  secured  by  the 
economic  conditions  of  human  life  being  in  the 
possession  and  under  the  regulation  of  the  whole 
community.  Any  apparent  sacrifice  of  liberty  which 
this  may  entail  on  the  part  of  some,  Socialism  can 
prove  is  the  sacrifice  of  a  merely  empty  and  formal 
liberty  in  favour  of  a  real  liberty  for  each  and  all 
alike. 

The  allegations  of  the  enemies  of  Socialism  to 
the  effect  that  Socialism  implies  the  violent  ruin 
of  the  heart  and  the  destruction  of  all  existing 
domestic  relations  (combined  with  the  forcible 
introduction  of  something  they  are  pleased  to  call 
"free-love"),  is,  of  course,  a  false  and  grotesque 
travesty  respecting  which  an  intelligent  reader 
need  not  concern  himself.  Socialism,  I  repeat, 
stands  for  liberty.  It  means  the  emancipation 
of  mankind  from  all  forms  of  slavery.  In  its 
political  and  economic  emancipation  is  included 
the  emancipation  from  all  other  forms  of  slavery. 
Socialism,  it  has  been  said  by  Engels,  implies  the 
substitution  of  the  administration  of  things  for 
the  direct  coercion  of  persons.     Now  I  do  not  see 


134    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

that  we  can  draw  the  Une  here  at  the  domestic  rela- 
tion. SociaHsm,  I  contend,  while  in  no  way  hostile 
in  principle  to  the  strictest  life-long  monogamy,  is 
also  not  necessarily  hostile  to  forms  of  the  sexual  or 
family  relation  deviating  from  the  present  theoreti- 
cal standard  in  this  matter.  What  I  do  say  is  in- 
compatible with  Socialism,  is  the  coercion  of  men 
and  women  in  their  private  life.  T  do  say  that  the 
principle  of  toleration  here,  as  elsewhere,  in  private 
or  self-regarding  matters,  is  absolute  with  Socialism. 
Those  who  think  otherwise  on  this  question  simply 
wish  to  maintain  a  system  of  tyranny  over  their 
neighbour.  Mr  Ramsay  Macdonald,  in  his  preface 
to  the  translation  of  Enrico  Ferri's  book,  Socialism 
and  Science, — in  which  Professor  Ferri  criticises  the 
present  institution  of  marriage, — while  admitting 
the  impossibility  of  determining  the  precise  form 
the  family  relation  is  likely  to  take  under  Socialism, 
nevertheless  seeks  to  conciliate  the  orthodox  view 
generally  by  assuming  the  possibility  of  a  Socialist 
administration  "frowning"  upon  any  other  form 
of  the  marital  relation  than  the  conventional  one. 
Now  if  by  "frowning"  Mr  Macdonald  means  to 
imply,  as  I  suppose  he  does,  some  form  of  legal  or 
moral  coercion,  then,  I  maintain,  such  an  adminis- 
tration would  be,  in  spirit,  as  reactionary  and  as 
anti-Socialistic  as  the  Russian  autocracy  itself. 
Any  society  which  refuses  elementary  personal 
liberty,  no  matter  on  what  point,  to  its  members, 


HEARTH,  THRONE,  AND  ALTAR  135 

is,  I  maintain,  doomed  to  perish  sooner  rather  than 
later. 

I   do   not    hesitate  to   say   that    any   attempt, 
whether  by  direct  coercion  in  form  of  law  or  by 
indirect  coercion  in  the  form  of  pubhc  opinion,  to 
compel  two  persons  to  remain  together  who  wish 
to  separate  or,  having  separated,  to  seek  to  deprive 
them  of  the  exercise  of  their  personal  liberty  in 
the  formation  of  new  ties,  is  an  act  of  tyrannical 
oppression,   radically   incompatible  with    Socialist 
principle.     I  contend  that  toleration  in  this  matter 
is  of  the  essence  of  Sociahsm.    The  contrary  simply 
amounts   to   coercion    exercised    in   favour    of    a 
p:irticular  opinion.      For  the  persons  who  desire 
this  pretend  to  think,  and  they  may  be  right,  that 
life -long   monogamy  is  the  ideal  sexual  relation. 
They  ignore    the    somewhat   numerous   cases   in 
which  to  the  unsophisticated  person  its  ideal  nature 
may  seem  somewhat  to  be  lacking.     They  ignore 
difference  of  character.     But,  whether  rightly  or 
wrongly,  having  come  to  the  conclusion  that  it  is 
ideal  for  all  temperaments,  they  are  not  content  to 
rest  the  acceptance  of  this  ideal  on  its  intrinsic 
excellence,   but    they   seek   to   convert  it  into   a 
Procrustean  bed  upon  which  to  stretch  unwilUng 
persons,  i.e.  persons  who,  upon  practical  or  other 
grounds,  think   differently.     This  is  certainly  un- 
Socialistic.     For,  I  repeat,  I  cannot  but  maintain 
that  while  Socialism  in  no  wise  dogmatises  on  the 


1 36    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

subject   of  the   marriage   relation,    it   does   imply 
complete  toleration  in  theory  and  practice. 

The  regulative  function  of  society  in  this  matter 
should  properly  begin,  not  with  cohabitation  be- 
tween man  and  woman,  which  is  a  personal  matter 
considered  in  itself,  but  with  the  appearance  on  the 
scene  of  offspring.  We  must  learn  to  separate  the 
two  things.  They  are  often  in  practice  dissociated. 
It  is  well  known  that  about  a  third  of  the  marriages 
contracted  in  this  country  are  childless.  Now 
while  society  in  its  corporate  capacity  has  no  right, 
as  I  contend,  either  by  law  or  public  opinion,  to 
interfere  with  the  sexual  liberty  of  the  individual 
per  se,  it  has  an  undoubted  right  to  have  a  word  to 
say  on  the  question  of  children — nay,  it  has  a  duty 
to  perform  in  seeing  that  its  future  citizens  are  well 
brought  up  and  properly  cared  for.  This,  however, 
is  a  wide  and  important  question.  My  point  lies 
in  emphasising  the  distinction  between  mere  co- 
habitation, which  should  be  a  matter  of  private 
agreement,  and  the  question  of  offspring.  It  is 
with  the  latter  alone  that  a  society  based  upon 
rational  principles  has  the  right  to  concern  itself,  in 
the  sense  of  practical  interference  with  individual 
liberty.  The  former  is  a  matter  of  opinion  and 
private  taste.  To  put  my  position  in  a  few  words. 
Marriage  under  Socialism  is  a  pure  and  free  agree- 
ment of  cohabitation  between  two  persons,  with 
which,  as  such,  the  State  or  community  has  no 


HEARTH,  THRONE,  AND  ALTAR  137 

more  direct  concern  than  with  any  other  private 
agreement.  Not  even  the  most  liberal  divorce  laws 
would  amount  to  the  same  as  this,  since  all  systems 
of  divorce  presuppose  the  right  of  interference  by 
the  State  in  a  private  and  personal  arrangement. 
So  much  on  the  question  of  the  relation  of  Social- 
ism to  the  Hearth.  We  now  pass  on  to  its  relation 
to  the  Altar,  understanding  thereby  its  attitude 
towards  Christianity  and,  for  that  matter,  any 
other  traditional  dogmatic  creed. 

Modern,  or  scientific.  Socialism,  claims  to  be  a 
doctrine  based  on  the  economic  analysis  of  modern 
capitalist  production  and  on  the  facts  of  historic 
evolution.  It  has  for  its  ideal  the  realisation  of, 
as  nearly  as  the  nature  of  things  permit,  a  perfect 
society  here  below  and  not  a  heaven  for  the  indi- 
vidual soul  up  above.  Now,  a  theory  which  bases 
itself  on  reasoned  conclusions,  on  science  and  law, 
and  is  concerned  with  the  relation  of  the  individual 
to  his  fellow-men  and  to  society,  can  hardly  be 
altogether  compatible  with  another  theory  claiming 
to  be  a  divine  revelation  and  concerning  itself 
mainly,  if  not  exclusively,  with  the  relation  of  the 
individual  soul  to  an  alleged  Supreme  Author  of 
the  Universe. 

That  there  is  a  certain  opposition  between 
the  two  theories,  alike  in  logic  and  in  fact,  seems 
to  many  of  us  self-evident.  The  man  who  bases 
his   view   of  things   on   the  uniformity  of  nature 


138    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

and   the   law  of  evolution,  and   whose   aims   and 
hopes  are  centred  on  the  mundane  affairs  of  human 
society  here  below,  if  he  be  possessed  of  a  logical 
instinct,  can  hardly  with  sincerity  accept  a  theory 
for  which  mundane  affairs  are  of  necessity  of  very 
secondary  importance,  since  the  one  thing  needful 
is  that  each   individual   soul   should   look   to   the 
squaring-up  of  its  accounts  with  the  Divinity  who 
is  its  Maker.     As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  observe  that 
it   is  almost   invariably  the  case  that  a  man  who 
interests  himself  very  seriously  in  the  affairs  of  his 
own  soul  is  not  very  keen  as  to  the  mundane  issues 
of  social  progress  ;  while,  conversely,  a  man  who  is 
keen  on  political  and  social  issues   does  not  find 
much  time  for  the  private  affairs  of  his  own  soul. 
I    have  often  observed  with  that  curious  hybrid, 
the  Christian  Socialist,  that,  beginning  as  such,  he 
almost  invariably  either   becomes   an  out-and-out 
Socialist,  when  his  Christianity  disappears,  or  be- 
comes  attenuated    to    little    more  than    a   name, 
or    he   becomes    an   earnest   Christian,   when   his 
Socialism     vanishes     or     evaporates    into    a    few 
phrases. 

What  we  see  at  the  present  day  as  regards 
this  question  of  religion  or,  more  properly,  of 
theology,  among  the  masses  of  this  country,  is, 
that  they  are  completely  indifferent  in  the  matter. 
There  is  a  general  feeling,  implicit  or  explicit, 
among  them  that  religion,  in  the  sense  of  theology, 


HEARTH,  THRONE,  AND  ALTAR  139 

is  something  not  so  much  formally  discarded,  as 
outgrown  and  left  behind.  It  is  under  these 
conditions  that  the  religion  of  Socialism,  the  true 
religion  of  humanity,  makes  appeal  to  them.  The 
class-conscious  Sociahst  workman  feels,  as  Lassalle 
put  it,  that  he  is  raising  the  ideal  of  his  class  to  be 
the  ideal  of  his  age,  that  he  is  working  through  his 
classhood  for  humanity.  I  do  not  think,  then,  that 
Sociahsm  can  be  said  to  be  other  than  very  de- 
finitely non-Christian  and  non-Theistic. 

But  if  this  be  true,  I  cannot  agree  that  it  is 
possible  for  Socialism  to  maintain  an  attitude  of 
sheer  indifference,  as  some  would  have  it,  to 
current  religions,  entrenching  itself  within  the 
water-tight  compartments  of  its  central  economic 
formula.  The  current  creeds  may  be  'hard  stricken, 
but  they  are  not  as  yet  dead.  They  still  have  an 
influence  with  not  inconsiderable  sections  of  the 
population,  and  that  influence  is,  from  a  SociaHstic 
point  of  view,  almost  invariably  for  mischief. 
Hence  I  cannot  regard  the  war  against  clericalism 
and  dogma,  under  certain  circumstances  at  least, 
as  not  a  necessary  side  of  Sociahst  propaganda. 
Still  less  from  the  point  of  view  of  consistency  and 
straightforwardness  can  I  reconcile  myself  to  the 
assertion  so  often  repeated  for  electioneering  pur- 
poses, that  Sociahsm  is  not  opposed  to  any  theo- 
logical creed.  Of  course  there  are  two  things 
to   be   distinguished  here.     Sociahsm  is,  correctly 


140    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

speaking,  a  scientific  doctrine  and  ethical  ideal  of 
social  life  ;  but  Socialism  is  also,  though  incorrectly, 
identified  with  programmes  of  certain  immediate 
reforms  to  be  carried  out  if  possible  in  the  next 
Parliament.  As  1  have  before  said,  a  man  may 
very  well  approve  of  and  vote  for  measures,  a  legal 
eight  hours'  day,  the  feeding  of  children  in  public 
schools,  a  progressive  income  tax,  old  age  pensions, 
etc.,  etc.,  while  remaining  a  conscientious  Church- 
man or  Nonconformist.  But,  then,  these  things, 
though  advocated  by  Socialists  as  stepping-stones 
and  palliatives,  are  not  Socialism  and  have  no 
pretensions  to  being  so.  They  are  merely  Social- 
istic legislation.  For  those  who  accept  Socialism 
itself  as  a  doctrine  and  an  ideal  it  is  scarcely 
possible,  I  think,  to  conscientiously  describe  them- 
selves as  Christians  or  even  Theists,  at  least  in  any 
sense  of  those  words  legitimated  by  either  popular 
or  historical  usage.  They  connote  implicitly,  if  not 
explicitly,  a  different  order  of  ideas  from  that  to 
which  the  understanding  Socialist  has  subscribed. 

What,  then,  shall  we  say  of  the  cry  now  being 
dinned  into  our  ears  by  reactionary  politicians 
on  the  platform  and  in  the  Press  anent  Socialism 
being  identified  with  Atheism  ?  Do  these  persons 
pretend  to  believe  that  Socialists  aim  at  a  drastic 
inquisition  into  private  beliefs  and  sentiments,  or 
even  at  a  rigorous  suppression  of  all  forms  of  public 
worship  ?     To  hear  them  and  read  them  one  would 


HEARTH,  THRONE,  AND  ALTAR  141 

think  they  did  ;  but  they  are  too  clever  for  this. 
What  they  really  profess  to  be  indignant  at,  when 
closely  viewed,  is  seen  to  be  the  threatened  aboli- 
tion by  Socialism  of  the  tyrannical  action  of  dogma, 
cultus,  and  tradition,  upon  the  thoughts  and  actions 
of  men.  It  is  this  complete  freeing  of  the  human 
mind  from  the  bondage  of  authority  in  these  matters, 
the  complete  secularisation  of  human  life  in  this 
sense,  that  they  dread. 

The  scare  and  prejudice  sought  to  be  got  up 
by  reactionary  journals  on  the  subject  of  Socialism 
and  Atheism  is,  as  we  all  know,  started  with 
the  more  immediate  object  of  detaching  the  votes 
of  certain  persons,  Nonconformist  and  others, 
from  the  Socialist  candidate  at  elections.  Now, 
the  psychological  condition  of  these  electors  who 
would  otherwise  vote  for  the  Socialist,  but  who 
are  deterred  from  doing  so  by  the  cry  of  Atheism, 
is  impossible  to  explain  on  any  other  hypothesis 
than  either  the  dread  of  intellectual  freedom  afore- 
said, or  abject  idiocy  on  the  part  of  the  said  elector. 
The  Nonconformist  voter,  if  he  thought  that  the 
return  of  Socialists  to  Parliament  would  tend 
towards  the  forceable  suppression  of  the  Christian 
faith,  might  be  perfectly  justified  in  refusing  to 
vote  for  them.  But  he  knows  perfectly  well 
that  all  that  the  Socialist  proposes  in  this  matter 
is  to  place  the  Christian  religion  on  the  level 
of  other  religions,  of  science,  and  of  non- Christian 


142    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

theories  generally.  Admitting,  then,  that  an 
intimate  connection  between  Atheism  and  Social- 
ism were  established  from  a  theoretical  point  of 
view,  what  is  there  in  this  to  prevent  a  Non- 
conformist or  other  Christian  from  recording  his 
vote  for  a  candidate  with  whose  immediate  practical 
programme,  which  is,  after  all,  the  main  point  at 
issue,  he  agrees  ?  ( I  can  understand,  perhaps,  his 
hesitating  to  definitely  avow  himself  a  Socialist,  or 
to  formally  join  a  Socialist  organisation.  But  if  he 
really  has  faith  in  the  merits  of  his  creed  to  con- 
quer by  its  own  intrinsic  qualities  in  the  absence 
of  direct  persecution  or  oppression,  he  has  nothing 
to  fear.)  However  this  may  be,  the  practical  atti- 
tude of  Socialism  in  this  matter  is  perfectly  plain. 
Whether  Socialism  be  identifiable  with  Atheism  or 
not.  Socialism  is  undoubtedly  identified  with  Free 
Thought  in  the  truest  sense  of  the  word.  What- 
ever Christians  may  be,  Socialists  are  confident  in 
the  triumph  of  the  truth  through  free  discussion. 
Their  programme  must  therefore  embrace  the 
complete  freeing  of  human  life  from  the  fetters 
of  traditional  dogma.  And  what  does  this  mean 
other  than  the  complete  secularisation  of  the  poli- 
tical and  social  life  of  the  community  ? 

As  I  have  already  indicated,  I  think,  then,  that 
there  is  a  theoretical  opposition  between  Socialism 
and  Christianity.  It  will  scarcely  be  denied  that 
most    Socialists    are    non-Christians,    where    not 


HEARTH,  THRONE,  AND  ALTAR  143 

militant  anti-Christians.  Space  will  not  allow  of 
anything  approaching  a  full  treatment  of  this  in- 
teresting question  of  the  relations  of  Socialism, 
considered  as  an  economic  doctrine  and  theory  of 
life,  with  a  definite  speculative  theory  or  a  phil- 
osophic view  of  the  universe.  Enough  has  been 
said,  I  think,  however,  to  show  that  here  also  it 
is  impossible,  except  for  election  purposes,  to  sin- 
cerely treat  Socialism  as  absolutely  disconnected 
even  with  these  purely  speculative  interests. 

We  have  now  considered,  successively,  the  to-day 
much  vexed  question  of  the  relations  of  Socialism 
in  its  narrower  sense  as  a  politico-economic  doctrine 
with  Socialism  in  its  broader  sense,  as  including 
the  issues  of  patriotism  and  internationalism,  of 
marriage  and  the  family,  and  of  religion,  as  currently 
understood.  The  instinct  alike  of  friend  and  foe, 
of  Socialists  themselves,  and  of  the  opponents  of 
Socialism,  has,  with  a  certain  rough  accuracy, 
diagnosed  the  tendencies  of  Socialism  in  its  rela- 
tion to  these  questions.  Even  Socialists  whose 
whole  attention  since  joining  the  movement  has 
been  occupied  with  the  central  economic  issue  feel 
instinctively,  if  I  may  say  so,  out  of  harmony  with 
the  orthodox  current  views  of  these  other  matters. 
The  Socialist  who  takes  a  wider  view,  the  Socialist 
thinker,  sees  the  grounds  of  this  instinctively  felt 
incompatibility  to  exist  in  the  nature  of  things. 

Now  a  few  words  in  conclusion  as  to  the  morality, 


144    PR015LEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

and  advisability  for  electoral  purposes,  of  masking 
the  true  state  of  the  case.  I  say  the  true  state  of 
the  case  advisedly,  for,  although  I  know  that  some 
sort  of  technical  show  of  argument  may,  by  holding 
to  the  letter  and  disregarding  the  spirit,  be  made 
out  for  confining  the  term  Socialism  to  its  purely 
economic  definition,  yet  on  a  broad  view  of  things 
(and  in  practice  the  broad  view  is  bound  to  have 
to  be  taken  account  of  in  the  long  run)  all  such 
artificial  argumentation  breaks  down.  All  re- 
pudiations and  all  asseverations  to  the  contrary, 
Socialism  remains,  among  friend  and  foe  alike, 
associated  with  the  views  repudiated. 

Now,  I  ask,  is  it  not  better  even  for  the  Socialist 
candidate,  in  the  long  run,  to  grasp  the  nettle 
rather  than  to  shirk  touching  it,  and  while,  of 
course,  exposing  with  a  scathing  hand  the  lying 
and  calumnious  distortions  of  the  enemy,  to 
acknowledge  that  in  the  last  resort  Socialism 
as  a  theory  of  social  life  is  not  compatible  with 
the  current  bourgeois  ideas  on  these  subjects 
in  defence  of  which  the  reactionist  professes  such 
zeal  ?  After  all,  votes,  important  though  they 
be,  are  not  the  only  thing  in  social  progress. 
Better,  I  say,  to  lose  a  few  votes  for  the  moment, 
for  it  will  only  be  for  the  moment,  rather  than 
compromise  with  principle  and  set  an  example 
of  prevarication.  Personally,  I  must  say  I  have  too 
much  faith  in  the  future  of  Socialism  to  regard  such 


HEARTH,  THRONE,  AND  ALTAR  145 

arts  as  these  as  necessary  or  desirable.  Socialism 
is  destined  to  conquer  and,  in  its  conquest,  it  will 
assuredly  supersede  the  Throne,  the  Hearth,  and 
the  Altar  in  the  forms  in  which  they  have  existed 
in  history  and  survive  at  the  present  time.  It  will 
assuredly  make  an  end  of  the  narrow  views  on 
these  subjects  still  largely  obtaining,  as  of  the 
institutions  themselves  as  at  present  existing ;  and 
in  their  place  will  arise  other  social  forms  and  other 
conceptions  more  consistent  with  the  realisation  of 
that  Freedom,  Justice,  and  Brotherhood  which  is, 
after  all,  the  ethical  standard  that  Socialism  unfolds 
before  the  eyes  of  men,  and  by  virtue  of  which  it 
makes  appeal  to  their  hearts. 


10 


CHAPTER   VI 

THE   PROBLEM   OF   SOCIALIST   FUNDAMENTALS 

The  common  theory  that  Sociahsm  means  no  more 
than  a  proposition  in  economics  has  been  already 
criticised  in  the  two  preceding  chapters  of  the 
present  volume.  I  would  not  merely  deny  that  its 
definition  is  exhausted  in  the  well-known  economic 
formula  concerning  the  possession  and  exploitation 
of  the  means  of  production,  redistribution,  and 
exchange  by  and  for  the  whole  community,  but 
I  would  go  further  and  affirm  that  this  very 
principle  itself,  constituting  the  central  demand 
of  Socialism,  is  based  on  certain  ethical  postulates, 
from  which  it  derives  its  only  possible  ultimate 
sanction.  These  ethical  postulates  are  no  other 
than  the  Revolutionary  Trinity — Liberty,  Equality, 
and  Fraternity.  The  aim  and  sanction  of  the 
economic  formula  is,  I  contend,  the  effective  realisa- 
tion of  these  principles  as  essential  to  the  purposes 
of  human  life,  individual  and  social.  If  this  be  so, 
it  follows  that  they,  together  with  the  principle  of 
justice  which  is  involved  in  them,  constitute  the 

146 


SOCIALIST   FUNDAMENTALS      147 

pillars  alike  of  Socialist  theory  and  polity,  without 
which  Socialism  ceases  to  be  Socialism. 

It  behoves  us  to  examine  more  closely  the  con- 
sequences that  ensue  from  a  recognition  of  the 
aforesaid  ethical  postulates  as  essential  to  Socialism, 
devoting  special  attention  to  the  first  of  them — to 
wit,  Liberty.  Now,  Liberty  may  be  socio-economic, 
or  it  may  be  pohtical,  or  it  may  be  personal. 

(1)  Socio-economic  Liberty  may  be  defined  as  the 
right  of  Society  in  its  corporate  capacity  to  freely 
regulate  all  matters  directly  concerning  the  common- 
weal without  obstruction  from  other  interests, 
vested  or  otherwise.  It  involves  the  right  of  a 
democratic  state  to  organise  production,  redistribu- 
tion, and  exchange,  to  regulate  the  right  of  property- 
holding  in  the  best  interests  of  the  community,  etc. 
But  it  does  not  include  the  right  of  acting  oppres- 
sively to  individuals  as  such  ;  for  example,  to  single 
out  individuals  of  a  class  for  the  operation  of 
measures  which  do  not  apply  to  the  class  as  a 
whole,  for  this  would  involve  the  violation  of 
another  ethical  postulate,  that  of  Equality.  The 
individuahsm  of  the  Manchester  school  refuses  to 
recognise  this  form  of  Liberty  at  all,  on  the  ground 
that  it  conflicts  with  our  third  form  of  Liberty, 
namely,  personal  Liberty.  But  of  this  more 
directly. 

(2)  Political  Liberty  may  be  defined  as  the  right 
of  every  individual  to  have  a  voice  in  the  manage- 


148    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

merit  and  criticism  of  the  affairs  of  the  community 
directly  or  indirectly,  either  by  voting,  or  by 
speaking  and  writing,  or  by  both.  Freedom  of 
discussion  and  of  demonstration  at  suitable  times 
and  places  is  one  of  the  first  conditions  of  political 
I^iberty,  which  is,  in  the  last  resort,  the  main  safe- 
guard of  the  other  forms  of  Liberty. 

(3)  Personal  Liberty  may  be  defined  as  the 
right  to  freedom  of  thought  and  action  on  the 
part  of  the  individual,  without  let  or  hindrance, 
moral  or  material,  on  the  part  of  Society,  in 
all  "  self-regarding  matters,"  to  use  Mill's  expres- 
sion, i.e.  in  all  matters  that  only  directly  affect 
himself  and  do  not  directly  touch  the  community 
as  a  whole,  or  other  individuals,  save,  of  course,  by 
their  own  personal  free  will  and  consent.  It  is 
necessary  to  emphasise  that,  in  order  to  take  a 
matter  outside  the  sphere  of  self-regarding  action, 
it  must  be  shown  that  the  matter  in  question 
must  directly  affect  the  community.  It  is  not 
enough  to  show  that  the  act  in  question  would 
affect  the  community  indirectly,  still  less  that 
it  only  conceivably  might  affect  it.  This  is 
essential,  since  otherwise  it  is  not  difficult,  with 
the  aid  of  a  little  sophistry,  to  show  that  every 
course  of  thought,  expression,  or  action  may 
possibly  affect  the  community,  at  least  mdirectly, 
and  thus  a  door  will  be  left  open  for  the  unlimited 
oppression  of  the  individual  in  his  private  life  and 


SOCIALIST   FUNDAMENTALS      149 

the  total  destruction  of  personal  freedom  of  conduct 
and  opinion. 

Having  thus  defined  the  three  chief  forms  of 
Liberty,  which  means,  after  all,  the  primary  con- 
dition of  self-development  alike  for  Society  and 
the  Individual,  and  hence  is  the  condition  of  evolu- 
tionary process,  let  us  see  how  these  three  forms 
work  out  in  their  practical  application.  Socio- 
economic Liberty,  the  right  of  the  community  to 
freedom  of  action  as  to  its  economic  conditions, 
is  obstructed  at  every  turn  in  our  existing  social 
organisation  by  the  property  interests  of  individuals 
and  classes.  This  is  abundantly  clear  whenever 
any  attempt  at  Socialistic  legislation,  however 
mild  in  character,  is  made  within  the  framework 
of  the  existing  State.  It  is  then  seen  that  every 
proposal  through  which  the  bulk  of  the  community 
should  be  enabled  to  come  by  its  own,  in  however 
slight  a  measure,  encounters  an  impregnable  stone 
wall  of  class  interests.  Hence  the  economic  sub- 
jection of  the  proletariat  and  hence  the  impossibility 
of  socio-economic  Liberty  so  long  as  the  capitalistic 
State  exists,  which  means,  so  long  as  the  land  and 
the  means  of  production  remain  private  property. 

Turning  to  the  question  of  political  Liberty,  this 
implies  the  greatest  possible  influence  of  all  the 
members  of  a  given  society  in  the  regulation  and 
management  of  that  society.  This  is  what  is  known 
as   Democracy.      But,   as    Friedrich    Engels    has 


150    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

pointed  out,  even  Democracy,  like  every  other 
form  of  government,  represents  the  possible  or 
actual  coercion  of  human  beings  within  its  pale. 
Socialism,  on  the  contrary,  has  for  its  end  the 
substitution  of  the  adjuinistration  of  tJmigs  for  the 
govei'Tivient  of  persons.  Such  being  the  case, 
Democracy  itself  can  only  be  regarded  as  a  transi- 
tional phase  tending  to  the  true  liberty  of  the 
ultimate  and  ideal  society  of  Socialism.  From 
this  it  follows  that  the  weapons  of  Democracy  are 
not  ends  in  themselves,  but  merely  means  to  an 
ulterior  end.  There  is  nothing  intrinsically  sacro- 
sanct in  these  means.  For  example,  take  the 
palladium  of  Democracy,  the  determination  of  all 
questions  by  a  count  of  heads  majority  of  the 
population  !  Now,  as  I  have  elsewhere  pointed  out, 
this  method,  whether  it  take  the  form  of  direct 
decision  (initiative  and  referendum),  or  of  the 
election  of  representatives,  is  simply  the  one  that 
experience  has  discovered  to  be  the  least  objec- 
tionable and  the  most  effective  on  the  whole  in 
the  interests  of  the  Commonweal.  This  does 
not  say  that  it  is  perfect  or  that  under  given  con- 
ditions other  means  intrinsically  more  objectionable 
might  not  be  more  effective. 

There  is  certainly  no  magic  in  the  verdict  of  a 
majority,  and  public  opinion,  as  it  is  called,  is  often 
a  manufactured  product  of  class  interests,  and,  at 
the  best,  only  too  frequently  of  a  prejudice,  tradi- 


SOCIALIST   FUNDAMENTALS      151 

tional  or  acquired,  or  of  a  one-sided  sentimentalism. 
We  may  often  be  inclined  to  think  that  an  honest, 
far-seeing,  and  disinterested  "master  of  thirty- 
legions"  might  with  advantage  at  times  put  his 
heel  on  the  neck  of  public  opinion.  But  the  in- 
trinsic improbability  of  the  occurrence,  and  still 
more  of  the  ?Tcurrence  of  a  combination  of  wisdom 
and  honesty  in  your  "  master  of  thirty  legions,"  is 
quite  enough  to  give  pause  to  anyone  who  is  in- 
clined to  take  this  view,  and  to  convince  him  that 
Democracy,  with  all  its  drawbacks,  represents  the 
least  of  evils  in  this  connection.  As  such  every 
Socialist  must  accept  in  general  the  conditions  of 
Democracy,  including  universal  manhood  suffi-age 
and  the  decision  of  the  majority.^ 

As  regards  the  third  form  of  Liberty,  personal 
Liberty,  there  is  much  confusion  of  thought,  even 

1  I  have  elsewhere  given  my  reasons  for  not  regarding  woman 
suffrage,  whether  it  be  right  or  wrong  in  itself,  as  many  do,  in 
the  light  of  a  necessary  corollary  to  the  principles  of  Democracy. 
The  tei-m  Democracy,  in  accordance  with  sociological  fact^  has 
always  meant  the  manhood  of  the  community.  Its  extensions 
have  always  referred  to  the  overthrow  of  class  or  of  race 
barriers,  never  to  the  obliteration  of  organic  biological  distinc- 
tions. Now,  in  woman  suffrage  you  have  a  new  factor  intro- 
duced not  sociological  in  its  nature,  as  with  class  or  with  race, 
but  ])iological.  This  consideration,  as  I  contend,  quite  apart 
from  its  desirability  or  the  reverse,  cuts  away  the  logical  ground 
for  its  being  accepted  merely  as  being  the  necessary  logical 
consequence  of  an  acceptance  of  the  piinciple  of  Democracy 
as  such.  In  other  words,  it  is  not  necessarily  implied  in  the 
definition  of  Democracy,  notwithstanding  that  its  advisability 
may  be  arguable  on  other  grounds. 


152    PROBLEMSOFMEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

among  persons  calling  themselves  Socialists,  as  to 
the  attitude  of  Socialism  concerning  it.     Because 
the  organ  of  a  Socialist  community — whether  we 
call  it  State  or  not — would  in  the  real  interests  of 
Liberty  be  compelled  to  organise  the  process  of 
production,  etc.,  and  in  doing  so  to  regulate  the 
conditions  of  labour  for  the  individual,  there  is  an 
idea  in  some  people's  minds  that  the  great  char- 
acteristic would  be  the  coercion  of  the  individual 
all  round.     Nothing  could  be  more  absurd.     The 
whole  Socialist  movement,  either  expUcitly  or  im- 
plicitly, points  the  contrary  way,  points,  that  is,  to 
a  minimum  coercion  of  the  individual  in  all  rela- 
tions of  life,  while  in  all  purely  personal  actions, 
that  is,   actions  not  directly  concerning  the  cor- 
porate life  of  the  community  or  the  corresponding 
liberty  of  other  individuals,  the  liberty  it  accords 
him  is  complete.     It  is  only  necessary  to  glance 
at  the  writings  of  the  recognised  representatives 
of    Socialist    thought    or    to    the    resolutions    of 
Socialist  congresses   to   be   assured   that   personal 
freedom  in  the  most  complete   sense  compatible 
with  social  existence  at  all  belongs  to  the  essence 
of  Socialism. 

Let  us  take  the  well-known  pronouncement  that 
"religion  is  a  private  matter."  This  pronounce- 
ment, though  often  abused  by  being  strained  out 
of  its  real  meaning,  is  in  itself  simply  the  affirma- 
tion of  the  most  complete  toleration  of  the  indi- 


SOCIALIST   FUNDAMENTALS      153 

vidual  in  matters  of  opinion.  It  bars  the  way  to 
the  imposition,  by  the  moral  or  material  pressure 
of  Society,  of  any  form  of  dogma  or  article  of 
speculative  belief  on  the  individual  conscience. 
Socialism  proclaims  absolute  freedom  in  matters 
of  opinion.  Now,  opinions  on  speculative  matters 
vary  from  the  agnosticism  of  scientific  thought  to 
the  theosophy  of  mystical  imagination.  But  this 
individual  freedom  of  opinion  has  of  course  its 
obverse  side.  The  Socialist  Commonwealth  would 
have  to  guard  the  principle  of  personal  freedom  of 
opinion,  and  hence  would  have  to  be  severely 
intolerant  of  any  particular  religious  sect  whose 
dogmas  involved  the  attempt  to  impose  its  creed 
by  any  form  of  coercion,  direct  or  indirect,  on 
Society  at  large  or  on  unwilling  individuals. 
Socialist  Society,  in  its  collective  capacity,  can 
only  recognise  ascertained  scientific  fact  together 
with  the  inferences  necessarily  ensuing  from  such 
fact.  This  is  the  meaning  of  the  uniform  demand 
for  secular  education  by  all  Socialists  as  a  first 
condition  of  educational  progress. 

A  logical  consequence  of  this  principle  of  absolute 
toleration  in  matters  of  personal  opinion  follows 
on  the  much  discussed  question  of  sexual  relations. 
Here  again  views  as  to  the  best  form  of  sexual 
and  family  relations  vary.  In  a  word,  they  are, 
like  religion  in  the  present  day,  largely  a  matter 
of  opinion,  and  as  such  ought  to  rank  equally  with 


154,    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

religion  us  "  a  private  matter  "  alike  in  theory  and 
practice.  I  am  not  forgetful  that  there  is  a  point 
where  the  question  of  marriage  or  cohabitation 
ceases  to  be  a  matter  of  the  carrying  out  of  mere 
individual  opinion  or  taste,  and  that  is  in  so  far 
as  the  question  of  children  enters  into  it.  Here, 
of  course,  we  strike  a  very  important  social  relation, 
and  here  undoubtedly  the  corporate  power  of 
Society  has  a  direct  right  of  intervention.  But 
let  us  not  mix  up  two  things — the  right  and  duty 
of  the  corporate  power  of  Society  to  see  to  the 
proper  maintenance,  regulation,  and  upbringing  of 
children,  and  its  right  to  coerce  individuals  either 
by  moral  or  material  pressure  in  their  private 
relationships.  The  law  and  morality  alike  of  our 
present  Society  confounds  the  two  things  in  an 
illogical  and  well-nigh  inextricable  tangle — it  ties 
them  up  in  a  truly  irrational  knot.  The  practical 
problem  of  Social  Democracy  in  this  regard  is  to 
effectively  disentangle  this  knot  in  carefully  dis- 
tinguishing between  the  legal  and  moral  question 
— the  duty  towards  offspring  and  that  of  the  sexual 
relation  per  se,  which  in  its  changes  and  per- 
manencies is  purely  a  matter  of  individual  taste 
and  preference.  It  can  never  be  too  much  insisted 
upon  that  the  question  of  personal  liberty  in  matters 
not  directly  affecting  Society  in  its  corporate 
capacity,  matters  of  individual  opinion  and  taste, 
needs  strictly  maintaining  as  an  integral  principle 


SOCIALIST   FUNDAMENTALS      155 

of  Socialism.  It  must  be  recognised  beyond  gain- 
saying that  Society  in  its  corporate  capacity  as 
regards  coercion,  moral  or  material,  has,  in  such 
matters,  no  locus  stmidi. 

It  is  cheap  and  convenient  to  pander  to  vulgar 
prejudice  by  offering  up  the  principle  of  personal 
freedom  as  a  whole  burnt-offering  to  the  bourgeois 
Philistine,  as  has  been  done  on  one  occasion  by 
Mr  Ramsay  JNIacdonald  when  he  sought  to  soothe 
the  feelings  of  the  aforesaid  Philistine  with  the 
reflection  that  the  Socialist  Society  of  the  future 
might  possibly  institute  a  Draconian  system  of 
life-long  monogamy  for  fear  lest  the  "stability" 
of  the  social  fabric  should  suffer  from  the  admission 
of  any  measure  of  personal  liberty  in  sexual  matters, 
such  being  "too  subversive."  '  Perhaps  in  Mr 
Macdonald's  view  his  future  Society  might  regard 
other  forms  of  human  freedom  as  dangerous  to  its 
"  stability,"  or  as  "  too  subversive,"  and  reintroduce 
slavery,  serfdom,  etc.,  or,  on  the  grounds  that 
humane  methods  of  criminal  law  and  administration 
also  threaten  this  precious  "  stability,"  might  pro- 
ceed to  re-establish  the  rack  and  other  concomitants 
of  the  criminal  court  of  a  bygone  era  1  We  ven- 
ture to  assert  that  few  Socialists  outside  JNIr  Ramsay 
Macdonald  would  admit  the  excuse  of  a  practice 
being  "  too  subversive  "  as  an  adequate  ground  for 
surrendering  the  basal  Socialist  principle  of  personal 
liberty.     Those  who  have  once  grasped  the  true 


156    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

inwardness  of  Socialism  would  undoubtedly  be  of 
opinion  that  a  Society  that  could  not  stand  this 
strain  was  unworthy  to  exist  at  all,  and  that  the 
sooner  it  perished  the  better.  In  fact,  the  future 
Society  of  Mr  Ramsay  Macdonald  that  would  not 
scruple  to  dragoon  its  members  in  the  way  he 
suggests  I  am  convinced,  as  I  have  before  said, 
would  be  hardly  less  detestable  to  the  majority  of 
thinking  Socialists  than  the  Russian  autocracy  itself. 
However,  we  do  not  deny  that  Mr  Macdonald's 
suggestion  might  possibly  serve  the  purpose  of 
attracting  a  few  non- Socialist  votes  from  the 
amiable  and  self-righteous  middle-class  Philistine 
who  enjoys  seeing  his  fellow  humans  bullied. 

We  need  not  linger  long  over  the  two  other 
ethical  postulates  included  in  the  old  Revolutionary 
Trinity,  since  they  are  largely  involved  in  the 
first  one  we  have  just  been  considering,  namely, 
"  Liberty."  Equality,  understanding  by  the  term 
social  and  economic  Equality,  is  a  condition  of  the 
universality  of  real  Liberty,  and  Equality  in  any 
other  sense  is  a  chimera.  Differences  of  tempera- 
ment, of  ability,  and  of  character  generally,  must 
exist,  but  these  are  not  incompatible  with  the  most 
complete  political  and  economic  Equality.  This 
Equality,  based  as  it  is  on  equal  economic  advan- 
tage and  equal  economic  opportunity,  is  the  Equality 
demanded  by  Socialism.  This  Equality,  it  need 
scarcely  be  said,  in  no  way  implies  any  dead  level 


SOCIALIST   FUNDAMENTALS      157 

of  mediocrity,  such  as  haunts  the  imaginations  of 
so  many  critics  of  SociaHsm.  On  the  contrary, 
as  I  have  elsewhere  shown,  it  is  the  system  of 
CapitaHsm  which  produces,  and  must  necessarily 
produce,  the  dead  level  spoken  of,  a  state  of  things 
which  would  be  completely  changed  by  Socialism. 
If  to  real  Equality,  Liberty  in  the  three  forms  we 
have  above  discussed  is  necessary,  it  is  no  less  true 
that  to  the  full  fruition  of  all  forms  of  Liberty, 
Equality  in  the  sense  we  have  just  indicated  is 
equally  essential.  You  cannot  fully  realise  the 
one  without  the  other. 

The  same  remark  applies  to  our  third  Revolu- 
tionary postulate,  namely,  that  of  Fraternity.^ 
Without  Liberty  and  Equality  in  the  senses  given, 
real  Fraternity  is  impossible.  Social  and  Economic 
Equality  is  the  groundwork  and  material  basis  of 
that  social  spirit  of  Fraternity  which  will  knit 
together  Socialist  society  in  a  manner  inconceivable 
to  us  of  the  Individualist  Bourgeois  Society  of 
to-day.      We   already   see   adumbrations    of  this 

^  The  notion  that  Fraternity  necessarily  means  mutual  em- 
bracing of  everyone  with  everyone  else  isj  of  course^  absurd. 
Even  the  Fraternity  of  an  actual  blood  relationship  does  not 
necessarily  imply  this.  Likes  and  dislikes  between  individuals 
must  always  exist  even  in  the  closest  communities.  What  it 
does  mean  is  "  one  for  all  and  all  for  one,"  the  spirit  of  common 
interest^  of  mutual  standing  in  with  one  another  as  a  body,  quite 
irrespective  of  individual  likes  or  dislikes.  A  man  may  be 
prepared  to  sacrifice  himself  for  a  brother's  just  claims  as  a 
member  of  the  social  whole,  be  it  family  or  society,  quite 
apart  from  his  special  regard  for  that  particular  brother. 


158    PROBLEJNIS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

spirit  of  Fraternity  in  the  existing  organised 
working  class  in  the  matter  of  strikes.  It  is  indeed 
very  strongly  exemplified  in  what  is  known  as  the 
"sympathetic  strike."  Beginning  with  the  members 
of  the  International  Social  Democratic  party,  it 
will  form  the  ethical  milieu  under  which  the  final 
transition  from  the  mere  Political  Society  (civitas) 
of  to-day  to  the  true  Social  Society  (societas),  in 
which — once  more  to  quote  Friedrich  Engels — 
the  government  of  persons  shall  have  finally  given 
place  to  the  administration  of  things^  will  be  ulti- 
mately accomplished  and  Socialism  completely  and 
definitely  realised. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE    PROBLEM    OF   MISUNDERSTOOD    SOCIALISM 
A  Reply  to  Dr  Beattie  Ceozibr 

Modern  Socialism,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word, 
dates  as  a  theory  from  the  Communist  manifesto, 
written  by  Karl  Marx  and  Friedrich  Engels  in 
1847,  and  is  the  outcome  of  the  principles  laid 
down  in  that  document  and  developed  in  scientific 
form  and  in  the  detail  of  a  full  and  close  analysis 
in  the  subsequent  works  of  its  authors,  but,  above 
all,  in  the  magnum  opus  of  Marx,  Das  Kapital,  the 
first  volume  of  which,  laying  down  the  basis  of 
the  Marxian  economy,  was  published  in  1867. 
The  above  statement  as  to  the  fathership  of  Marx, 
with  respect  to  modern  Socialism,  so  far  as  main 
principles  are  concerned,  I  maintain  is  true  with- 
out any  reserve  whatever.  I  am  fully  aware  that 
there  are  not  wanting  English  "  Socialists "  who 
are  very  anxious  to  disclaim  all  connection  with 
the  great  founder  of  modern  Socialism,  and  who 
are  apt,  when  it  is  said  of  anyone  of  them,  "  thou 
too  art  of  his  disciples,"  to  begin,  I  will  not  say 

159 


160    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

precisely  to  "  curse  and  to  swear,"  but  certainly  to 
protest  very  vehemently  "  I  know  not  the  man  I " 

Of  such  as  these  a  recent  critic  of  Socialism  in  the 
Spectato?'  was  thinking,  I  suppose,  when  he  alleged 
that  time  was  when  a  criticism  of  the  economic 
principles  of  Socialism  was  virtually  synonymous 
with  the  criticism  of  Marx's  Kapital,  but  now  that 
this  basis  is  repudiated  by  so  many  it  was  difficult 
for  the  critic  to  know  the  precise  nature  of  the 
doctrine  he  was  dealing  with.  The  critic  may 
reassure  himself  in  respect  of  what  constitutes  the 
theoretical  basis  of  present-day  Socialism.  If  he 
will  analyse  the  speeches  and  writings  of  those 
true  British  Socialists  who  boast  that  they  have 
never  read  Marx,  he  will  find  that  all  those  ideas 
which  differentiate  them  as  Socialists  from  the 
ordinary  Radical  Democrat  come,  directly  or  in- 
directly, out  of  Marx.  In  fact,  generally  speaking, 
we  may  define  the  Socialism  of  certain  members 
of  Parliament  and  popular  writers,  for  whom  Marx 
is  a  "  back  number,"  as  a  species  of  bastard  Marxism. 
The  logical  consequences  and  real  bearing  of  the 
main  Marxian  theses  are  ignored,  while  a  determined 
effort  is  made  to  reconcile  them  with  all  manner 
of  bourgeois  prejudices.  As  practical  men,  members 
of  Parliament  and  popular  writers,  having  seats  and 
circulations  to  be  considered — seats  sometimes  in 
constituencies  in  which  a  Nonconformist  element 
in  the  electorate  may  readily  turn  the  scale,  and 


MISUNDERSTOOD   SOCIALISM     161 

circulations  in  respectable  suburbs  which  are  not 
to  be  despised — they  hold  that  the  wind  must  be 
tempered  to  the  prejudices  of  these  shorn  lambs. 
Provincial  Nonconformists  sometimes  have  their 
own  opinions  on  the  subject  of  German  Jews  and 
of  doctrines  derived  from  them,  while  subscribers  to 
local  libraries  are  apt  to  be  strict  disciplinarians  as 
to  the  views  held  by  authors  whose  books  are  to  be 
read  in  their  family  circle.     Hinc  illce  lacrimce. 

If  he  will  forgive  me  for  saying  so,  Dr  Crozier's 
whole  criticism  of  Marx  is  throughout  based  on 
what  logicians  term  an  ignoratio  elenchi.  He  sets 
up  a  terrible  bogey  purely  of  his  own  construction 
and  device  which  he  would  have  us  take  to  re- 
present Marx,  and  which  he  straightway  proceeds 
to  hew  in  pieces  with  manifold  objurgation,  in 
approved  style.  We  expected  in  his  last  produc- 
tion, which  claims  to  be  a  direct  challenge  to  Marx 
himself,  that  Dr  Crozier  would  deal  systematically 
with  the  main  positions  of  the  treatise  on  Capital* 
rather  than  continue  to  harp  upon  the  one  or  two 
deductions  of  his  own  which  he  fastens  on  to  Marx 
in  the  course  of  the  articles  dealing  with  his 
English  opponents.  In  this  we  have  certainly 
been  disappointed.  Dr  Crozier,  I  suppose,  might 
urge  as  an  excuse  for  repeating  himself,  that  neither 
Mr  Blatchford  nor  Mr  Snowden,  proud  in  their 
ignorance  of  Marx's  works,  were  in  a  position,  or 
were  concerned,  to  deal  with  the  subject  from  the 

11 


1G2    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

Marxian  point  of  view.  This  being  so,  it  only- 
remains  for  the  present  writer  to  point  out  in 
detail  the  misapprehensions  under  which  Dr  Crozier 
is  labouring  on  the  subject  of  Marx's  teaching,  and 
to  endeavour  to  indicate  the  fallacy  underlying  his 
chief  counter-proposition. 

Marx  shows  that  value,  as  the  fundamental 
economic  element  running  through  all  produced 
and  exchangeable  articles  of  use,  is  the  human 
labour  which  has  gone  to  their  production.  This 
is,  of  course,  a  doctrine  Marx  has  taken  over  from 
the  old  classical  British  economy.  In  consequence 
of  the  part  it  plays  in  Marx's  system,  this  simple 
and  obvious  truth,  recognised  by  Adam  Smith, 
Ricardo,  and  all  the  older  theorists,  has  come  to  be 
viewed  with  abhorrence  by  the  modern  bourgeois 
economist,  who  is  never  tired  of  decrying  it  as  out 
of  date.  Now,  this  principle  of  value  being  em- 
bodied labour,  Marx  applies  as  the  touchstone  in 
his  analysis  of  the  modern  Capitalist  system  of 
production.  He  points  out  that  the  value  of 
wealth  produced  under  the  conditions  of  the  great 
machine-industry  of  modern  times,  with  all  the 
complexity  of  its  processes,  is  au  fond  nothing  but 
the  "  congealed  human  labour "  expressed  in  it 
The  complexity  of  the  economic  forms  may  often 
hide  this  fact  from  view,  but,  as  Marx  contends, 
it  remains  a  fact  nevertheless.  But  now  steps  in 
our   critic.     "  No,"   says   Dr   Beattie   Crozier,  "  it 


MISUNDERSTOOD   SOCIALISM     163 

is  not  labour,  it  is  not  the  workman  who  produces 
the  wealth  around  us  with  its  value ;  it  is  the 
powers  of  nature  embodied  in  the  machines  ;  these 
are  the  real  originators  of  all  our  wealth."  How 
the  machines  could  produce  wealth  by  themselves 
without  the  application  of  human  labour  to  them, 
or  how  the  machines  themselves  could  come  into 
existence  save  as  the  product  of  human  labour  as 
applied  to  the  iron,  wood,  stone,  in  a  word,  to  the 
raw  materials  of  nature,  Dr  Crozier  does  not  tell 
us.  But,  after  all,  it  is  not  so  much  the  machines 
themselves  that  interest  our  learned  critic  as  the  in- 
ventors of  the  machines,  and  thereby  hangs  a  tale. 

Dr  Beattie  Crozier  bases  his  criticism  on  Marx 
on  the  theory  that  the  latter  was  chiefly  con- 
cerned in  his  analysis  with  the  question  of  "  strict 
economic  justice "  in  the  division  of  the  surplus 
product,  over  and  above  what  was  necessary 
to  the  maintenance  of  the  labourer,  a  division,  as 
Dr  Crozier  informs  us,  "  whereby  each  man  gets 
the  fruits  of  his  labour,  neither  more  nor  less." 
Hence  we  are  told  "  it  became  necessary  as  a  pre- 
liminary for  him  to  inquire  as  to  precisely  what 
men  or  body  of  men  it  was  to  whom  this  surplus 
was  due,  and  without  whose  special  exertions  it 
could  not  have  come  into  being  at  all."  Here, 
therefore,  according  to  Dr  Crozier,  we  have  the 
kernel  of  the  Marxian  system.  Marx,  of  course, 
insists   that  the  whole   of  wealth   production,  the 


164    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

whole  of  economic  value  (and  surplus  value),  is 
the  creation  of  labour,  or,  to  put  the  matter  con- 
cretely, of  the  workman  operating  on  the  products  of 
nature.  But  herein,  says  Dr  Crozier,  Marx  was  a 
subtle  deceiver.  The  real  creator,  if  not  of  all  value, 
at  least  of  the  surplus  value,  the  surplus  product, 
over  and  above  the  labourer's  means  of  subsistence, 
now  appropriated  by  the  Capitalist,  is  neither  the 
labourer  nor  the  Capitalist,  but  the  inventor. 

Now,  before  going  any  further,  it  may  interest 
Dr  Crozier  to  learn  that  his  statement  of  Marx's 
position  would  be  accepted  by  no  Marxian  and 
would  be  certainly  unrecognisable  by  Marx  him- 
self. The  author  of  Das  Kapital  was  led  to  his 
Socialist  conclusions  as  the  logical  outcome  of  his 
analysis  of  Capitalist  production,  and  was  certainly 
actuated  by  no  intention  either  beforehand  or 
afterwards,  of  discovering  "  strict  economic  justice  " 
in  the  division  of  the  surplus  whereby  each  man 
gets  the  fruits  of  his  labour,  "neither  more  nor 
less."  I  defy  Dr  Crozier  to  produce  any  passage 
in  Marx  which  would  justify  the  caricature  of 
Marx's  position  contained  in  the  words  above 
quoted.  It  is  a  gloss  put  upon  Marx  by  Dr 
Crozier.  The  idea  of  "  strict  economic  justice,"  in 
Dr  Crozier's  sense,  certainly  never  entered  Marx's 
mind,  while  as  to  "  each  man  "  getting  "  the  fruits 
of  his  labour,  neither  more  nor  less,"  it  requires 
but  a  very  little  consideration  of  the  conditions  of 


MISUNDERSTOOD   SOCIALISM     165 

modern  industry  to  enable  anyone  to  see  such  a 
scheme  to  be  preposterously  chimerical.  In  the 
complicated  processes  of  modern  production,  the 
impossibility  of  assigning  the  precise  amount  of 
labour  put  by  any  given  workman  into  the  finished 
product  is  obvious.  If  Dr  Beattie  Crozier  was 
really  under  the  delusion  that  Marx  was  capable  of 
propounding  such  nonsense  as  this,  there  may  have 
been  some  excuse  for  his  thinking  him  a  Utopian 
Schemer  whom  he  could  "  dispose  of  as  a  serious 
economist,"  and  for  his  talk  about  getting  "  Marx 
and  his  followers  under  hatches."  In  fact,  Dr 
Crozier's  latest  utterances  look  as  though  he  were 
anxious  to  confirm  Hyndman's  opinion  as  quoted 
by  him,  as  to  his  understanding  of  Marx.  Take 
for  example  the  statement  that  Das  Kapital  is  a 
book  not  distinguished  for  its  profundity,  but  that 
"  on  the  contrary,  as  we  shall  see,  it  is  a  most 
simple  and  childlike  piece  of  work."  Now,  none  of 
Marx's  previous  detractors  of  any  mark  in  political 
economy,  that  I  am  aware  of,  have  denied  either 
depth  or  acumen  to  Das  Kapital,  or  have  claimed 
to  make  their  readers  see  that  it  is  "a  most  simple 
and  childlike  piece  of  work."  What  we  do  see,  of 
course,  in  Dr  Crozier's  case,  is  that,  for  some  reason 
or  other,  he  has  completely  missed  all  the  bearings 
alike  of  Marx's  method  and  conclusions.  If  Dr 
Crozier  asks  me  to  make  good  the  above  contention 
by  extracts  from  Marx's  writings,  I  must  respectfully 


166    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

decline  to  take  up  the  position  of  proving  a  negative. 
On  the  contrary,  I  must,  in  my  turn,  call  upon  Dr 
Crozier  to  justify  his  interpretation  of  Marx  by  the 
i2')sissima  verba  of  Marx  himself. 

What,  then,  it  may  be  asked,  was  the  real  gist 
and  intention  of  the  labours  of  Karl  Marx  ?  The 
answer  is,  Marx  took  not  things  as  they  might  be, 
or  things  as  they  ought  to  be,  but  things  as  they 
were — the  Capitalist  system,  in  which  we  live  and 
move  and  have  our  being — as  the  subject  of  his 
investigation  and  analysis.  He  did  not  start  with, 
or  call  to  his  aid,  any  abstract  "  economic  man." 
What  he  sought  to  inquire  was  the  meaning  of, 
and  implications  involved  in,  the  present  conditions 
of  production  and  distribution  which  we  term  the 
Capitalist  system.  The  course  of  his  analysis  brings 
out  at  once  its  historical  bearings,  its  roots  in  the 
past  of  the  evolution  of  human  society  and  the  ten- 
dencies latent  within  it  as  regard  the  future  of  that 
evolution.^  This  tendency,  he  finds,  points  inevit- 
ably to  the  Communist  ownership  of  the  means  of 
production,  distribution,  and  exchange,  as  the  next 
salient  stage  in  the  economic  development  of  society. 

But   for   Marx    the   economic   side    of    human 

^  It  may  be  as  well  to  point  out  here  that  the  purely  bogus 
opposition,  so  popular  with  a  certain  order  of  politicians  to-day, 
between  evolution  and  revolution^  does  not  exist  for  Marx  or  his 
followers.  They  recognise  that  every  revolution  forms  a  part, 
usually  the  consummation,  of  an  evolution,  and  that  every 
evolutionary  process  contains  within  itself  revolutionary  momenta. 


MISUNDERSTOOD   SOCIALISM     167 

affairs  is  that  side  which  determines  all  the  rest. 
A  fundamental  economic  change  involves  sooner 
or  later  a  corresponding  change  in  all  the  other 
departments  of  human  life  —  political,  religious, 
juridical,  ethical,  artistic.  It  may  be  that  Marx 
himself,  and  I  certainly  think  that  such  is  the 
case  with  some  of  his  followers,  has  unduly 
exaggerated  the  direct  causal  efficacy,  great  as  it 
undoubtedly  is,  of  the  economic  factor  in  some 
aspects  of  human  evolution.  With  this  question  I 
have  dealt  elsewhere,  but  whether  the  above  holds 
good  or  not,  the  point  is  more  academic  than 
practical.  For  the  truth,  established  by  Marx — a 
truth  all  but  unrecognised  before  his  time — of  the 
stupendous  import  of  economic  development  on 
human  development  generally,  whether,  as  with 
some  Marxians,  we  treat  the  economic  development 
as  the  sole  cause  of  the  rest,  or  whether  we  regard 
the  economic  factor  and  the  intellectual  factor  as 
co-efficients  in  a  common  result  {i.e.,  as  reciprocally 
determining  and  determined  by  each  other),  is  in 
any  case  undeniable.  Now  of  criticism  of  Marx's 
method  or  of  any  scientific  treatment  of  the  results 
of  his  analysis,  I  can  find  no  trace  in  Dr  Crozier's 
animadversions.  Instead  of  this  he  sets  up  an 
Aunt  Sally  of  his  own,  consisting  of  fragments  of 
Utopian  dogma,  which  he  proceeds  to  demolish. 

The  great  piece  de  resistance  of  Dr  Crozier,  and 
also,   I   believe,  of  Mr  Mallock,  in  the  attack  on 


168    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

JNIarx,  namely,  the  trotting  out  of  the  "  inventor," 
can  surely  not  be  meant  to  be  taken  quite  seriously  ? 
In  the  first  place,  the  ideas  of  the  inventor  do  not 
as  such  enter  into  the  sphere  of  economics.  Marx 
found  in  the  great  industry,  as  established,  the  three 
factors  —  the  Workman,  the  Capitalist,  and  the 
Machine.  He  did  not  find  Dr  Crozier's  pet,  the 
inventor,  "  fooling  round  "  (as  the  Americans  w^ould 
say),  and,  therefore,  not  being  there  he  was  not  in 
a  position  to  get  him  "  huddled  away,"  as  alleged 
by  the  learned  doctor.  Marx  explains  that  in  the 
process  of  Capitalist  production  the  workman  is 
necessarily  docked  of  a  portion  of  the  product  of 
his  labour,  a  portion  which  may  be  determined 
with  fair  accuracy,  in  the  long  run,  in  the  different 
phases  of  Capitalist  production,  although  it  would 
be  impossible  to  assess  the  amount  of  surplus  value 
of  which  any  given  individual  workman  had  been 
deprived.  In  estimating  the  rate  of  the  exploita- 
tion of  labour  by  capital  we  start  from  economic 
value  as  defined  by  Marx  and  the  older  economists, 
namely,  embodied  average  labour,  simple  or  com- 
pound, as  measured  on  a  time  basis.  Hence  the 
value  of  the  Machine  for  Marx's  purpose  is  neither 
the  use-value  nor  the  exchange-value,  but  the 
economic-value  as  defined  by  Marx  in  the  sense  I 
have  just  given.  Such  is  my  answer  to  Dr 
Crozier's  challenge  as  regards  this  point. 

Let   us   now   come   back  to  Marx,  not  as  the 


MISUNDERSTOOD   SOCIALISM     169 

analyst  of  Capitalist  production,  in  other  words, 
not  in  his  capacity  as  scientific  exponent  of 
economic  truths,  but  to  Marx,  the  human  agitator 
for  the  rights  of  the  working  classes,  to  Marx  in 
his  capacity  as  man  with  ethical  impulses  and 
socio-political  aspirations.  As  I  have  already 
pointed  out,  sheer  scientific  analysis  of  the  con- 
ditions of  Capitalist  production  had  led  Marx  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  present  system  of  society 
must  inevitably  become  transformed  into  Socialism. 
This,  however,  per  se,  is  a  purely  theoretical  de- 
duction. It  has,  in  itself,  no  immediate  ethical  or 
other  practical  bearing.  But  Marx  was  more  than 
a  mere  theorist,  he  was  also  a  Social  Revolutionist 
with  human  sympathies.  He  desired  the  realisa- 
tion of  that  future  human  society  which  scientific 
analysis  showed  him  was  already  gestating  within 
the  womb  of  modern  Capitalist  society,  and  he 
desired  its  realisation  as  speedily  as  possible.  His 
economic  and  historical  studies  had  shown  him  the 
Proletariat  as  the  heir  of  the  ages  in  his  connec- 
tion, and  as  the  class  in  and  through  which  the 
great  change  should  be  effected.  They  taught 
him  further  that  the  entry  upon  the  scene  of  the 
Proletariat,  as  the  dominant  class,  must  mean  the 
crucial  step  towards  the  abolition  of  a  society 
based  on  classes  altogether.  Now  here  undoubtedly, 
on  the  practical  side  of  Marx's  activity,  the  ethical 
moment,  the  idea  of  justice  towards  a  class  which 


170    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIN  D,  MORALS 

since  entering  the  arena  of  history  has  been  op- 
pressed and  disinherited,  did  assuredly  play  a  strong 
role. 

That  the  producers  of  wealth  have  always  been 
those  who  have  been  the  least  enjoyers  of  wealth 
is  an  undoubted  fact.  This  fact,  under  the  con- 
ditions of  modern  Capitalist  production,  is  daily 
and  hourly  staring  the  whole  world  in  the  face. 
But  that  portion  of  the  world  for  which  writers 
like  Dr  Crozier  and  Mr  Mallock  have  taken  to 
themselves  a  special  brief,  the  portion  which  has 
the  good  fortune  to  belong  to  the  propertied  classes, 
is  very  unwilling  to  recognise  in  its  true  bearings 
this  same  fact.  Hence  its  advocates  are  compelled 
to  have  resort  to  subterfuges.  Across  the  great 
patent  fact  of  injustice  inflicted  on  the  working 
classes  by  the  present  system  of  society  it  is  accord- 
ingly sought  to  draw  a  red-herring  in  the  shape  of 
an  imaginary  counter-victim,  to  wit,  the  Inventor. 
Now  this  poor  fellow,  it  is  contended,  ought  to  have 
the  whole  increment  of  wealth  produced  by  the 
machine-industry  over  earlier  methods  of  produc- 
tion to  his  own  cheek.  It  is  not  the  working-man 
who  slaves  at  laborious  toil  his  eight,  nine,  or  ten 
hours  a  day  who  is  unjustly  treated  by  the  present 
system  !  Oh  dear,  no  !  It  is  a  man  who,  probably 
by  the  mere  easy  and  agreeable  exercise  of  natural 
gifts  with  which  he  has  chanced  to  be  endowed  by 
"  nature,"  in  the  shape  of  ancestors,  who  themselves 


MISUNDERSTOOD   SOCIALISM     171 

have  had  to  thank  untold  generations  of  men  for 
the  faculties  they  possessed  and  for  the  whole  social 
environment  which  has  made  them  what  they  were 
— he  it  is,  forsooth,  whose  lot  ought  to  be  bewailed, 
and  not  that  of  the  workman  who,  by  his  toil,  gives 
effect  to  inventions  which  but  for  him  would  be 
dead  devices  !  Dr  Crozier  himself  admits,  indeed, 
the  Socialist  contention  that  "hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  minor  workers  have  been  engaged  in 
building  up  the  successive  steps  to  every  great 
scientific  discovery  and  invention,  before  the  single 
discoverer  with  whose  name  the  great  invention  is 
identified  has  planted  his  flagstaff  on  the  summit." 
And  how  is  Dr  Crozier  going  to  find  these  out, 
be  they  few  or  many  ?  No  invention  is  isolated. 
It  is  inextricably  bound  up  with  innumerable  other 
inventions  and  with  the  general  scientific  know- 
ledge of  its  time.  All  this  does  not,  of  course, 
alter  the  fact  that,  as  things  are  in  present  society, 
the  actual  inventor  of  any  industrial  process  has  a 
greater  claim  in  its  results  than  the  mere  man  of 
money,  the  Capitalist,  who  exploits  his  invention. 
But  this  is  as  far  as  I,  or  probably  any  other 
Socialist,  would  be  prepared  to  go.  The  idea  of 
the  machine  as  elaborated  by  its  inventor  would 
be  as  useless  to  him  (the  inventor)  as  the  machine 
itself  would  be  to  the  Capitalist,  without  the  labour 
of  the  workman.  Socialists  can  see  no  justice, 
economic  or  other,  in  the  man  who  has  had   the 


172    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

good  fortune,  without  any  exertion  of  his  own,  to 
find  himself  in  the  possession  of  great  natural  gifts, 
being  allowed  in  addition  to  absorb,  as  an  indivi- 
dual, a  disproportionate  share  of  the  world's  wealth. 
Dr  Crozier  affects  to  sneer  at  anything  so  im- 
material as  "honour"  being  a  sufficient  stimulus 
or  reward  to  any  man  for  exercising  natural 
faculties  which  it  would  be  probably  a  depriva- 
tion to  him  not  to  exercise.  And  yet  he  can 
hardly  deny,  one  would  think,  that  of  all  the 
great  inventions  of  the  last  century  there  is  hardly 
one  in  which  ambition  and  honour  did  not  play  a 
far  larger  part  with  the  inventor  than  any  hope  of 
mere  material  gain.  It  would  be  interesting,  by 
the  way,  to  know  precisely  how  Dr  Crozier  pro- 
poses to  indemnify  his  precious  "inventor"  after 
all  is  done.  I  suppose  a  perpetual  patent,  trans- 
missible to  "heirs  and  assigns,"  etc.,  is  what  he 
has  in  view.  If  so,  would  he  make  such  a  patent 
law  retro-active  ?  Would  hypothetical  claims  to 
patent  rights  in  the  plough-share  or  the  loom  be 
admissible  for  examination  ?  Or,  again,  does  Dr 
Crozier's  large  heart  open  out  equally  to  the 
artist,  the  composer,  and  the  author  ?  Would  he 
grant  a  perpetual  literary  copyright,  for  example, 
likewise  with  retro-active  effisct  ?  In  that  case  we 
may  expect  some  interesting  points  to  arise  when 
the  population  of  Whitechapel  lays  siege  to  the 
High  Court  with  its  claims  on  the  copyright  of 


MISUNDERSTOOD   SOCIALISM     173 

the  Old  Testament.  No,  no,  Dr  Crozier,  in  vain 
is  the  snare  laid  in  sight  of  the  bird  ?  Your  plea 
for  the  "inventor"  is  too  thin.  We  can  all  see 
through  this  pathetic  figure.  We  can  all  appreciate 
the  fact  that  his  theatrical  entrance  upon  the  scene 
of  controversy  is  an  ingeniously  conceived  device 
designed  to  confuse  the  issue  by  offering  an  object 
of  counter-interest  to  that  accusing  figure — the 
working-man.  However,  Dr  Crozier  is  welcome 
to  canvass  for  all  the  crocodile  tears  the  bourgeoisie 
may  have  at  its  disposal,  to  be  expended  on  the 
man  who  considers  he  has  a  right  to  place  an 
indefinite  charge  for  all  time  upon  that  labour 
without  which  his  invention  would  be  as  useless  to 
himself  or  to  society  as  the  fish  that  remain  at 
the  bottom  of  the  sea  are  to  the  fisherman.  The 
Socialist  will  certainly  never  discover  any  justice, 
economic  or  otherwise,  in  his  demand,  still  less 
feel  his  heart  moved  to  any  sympathy  with  such 
a  fellow,  or  his  "heirs  and  assigns." 

Now  let  us  consider  the  indications  afforded  us 
by  Dr  Crozier  of  the  extraordinary  "  scheme  "  he 
seems  to  think  Marx  of  all  people  in  the  world, 
and  with  him  all  revolutionary  Socialists,  have  up 
their  sleeve.  In  the  first  place,  it  may  surprise 
him  to  hear  that  modern  Socialism,  and  least  of  all 
Marx  himself,  does  not  offer  any  "  scheme  "  at  all. 
Some  individual  Socialists  may  elaborate  "  schemes," 
but  these,  whether  right  or  wrong,  good  or  bad, 


174    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

represent  only  their  own  personal  opinions.  Social- 
ism as  a  doctrine,  as  recognised  by  the  Socialist 
party  as  a  whole,  proclaims  tendencies,  the  viain 
lines  upon  which  political  and  economic  action 
must  take  to  be  effective  in  bringing  us  nearer 
the  goal,  namely,  the  complete  communisation  of 
the  means  of  production,  distribution,  and  exchange, 
which  is  the  fundamental  economic  aim  of  Social- 
ism. But  as  regards  the  immediate  practice  on 
which  the  detail  of  action  or  policy  rests  at  any 
given  time  or  at  any  particular  phase  of  social 
progress,  the  guiding  maxim  of  Socialism  is  pre- 
eminently sohitur  ambulando — always,  of  course, 
within  the  limits  of  the  economical,  political,  and 
ethical  bases  of  the  party-programme.  But  I  am 
unaware  of  even  any  individual  Socialist  of  any 
note  who  has  ever  put  forward  a  scheme  involving 
the  absurdities  attributed  to  the  unfortunate  Marx 
and  his  followers  by  my  respected  opponent  in  the 
present  controversy. 

As  usual  with  the  critics  of  Socialism,  Dr  Crozier 
confuses  between  current  Capitalist  conditions  and 
Socialist  conditions.  He  tacitly  assumes  the  whole 
framework  of  existing  society  and  the  existing  state, 
and  interpolates  into  it  a  measure  supposed  to  repre- 
sent the  carrying-out  of  some  principle  of  Socialist 
society.  The  incompatibility  being  obvious,  it  only 
remains  for  him  to  exclaim,  "  Behold  the  absurdity, 
behold  the  monstrosity,  of  this  proposal ! "    He  can- 


MISUNDERSTOOD   SOCIALISM     175 

not  see  that  just  as  a  statement  of  the  main  features 
of  modern  CapitaKst  society,  rehearsed  by  some 
prophetic  seer  to  a  feudal  baron  of  the  twelfth 
century,  would  have  involved  preposterous  absur- 
dities to  the  mind  of  the  latter  simply  because 
he  crudely  judged  them  by  the  conditions  and 
standard  of  the  society  in  which  he  lived ;  so  he, 
Dr  Beattie  Crozier,  finds  a  difficulty  in  placing 
himself  at  the  point  of  view  of  the  principles 
enunciated  by  the  scientific- Socialist  seer  of  to- 
day, simply  because  he  is  equally  incapable  with 
our  hypothetical  feudal  baron  of  divesting  himself 
of  the  prepossessions  derived  from  the  social  con- 
ditions of  the  age  in  which  he  lives. 

Let  us  take  Dr  Crozier's  assumption,  which 
troubles  him,  like  so  many  other  would-be  refuters 
of  Socialism,  to  wit,  the  assumption  anent  "  pay- 
ment "  of  labour,  to  the  effect  that  a  rigid  beggarly 
pittance  is  to  be  the  lot  of  all,  including  even  that 
gentle  and  oppressed  creature  "the  inventor." 
Now  here  again  we  have  a  confusion  between 
Socialism  as  a  realised  ideal  of  Society  and  Socialism 
in  the  making,  between  Socialism  still  militant  and 
Socialism  triumphant.  For  a  completed  Socialist 
society  this  question  of  payment  does  not  arise ; 
for  such  a  society  it  is  an  anachronism.  A  Socialist 
society,  as  such,  with  its  production  for  the  use 
of  all  its  members  and  not  for  the  profit  of  the 
few,  implies  the  requirements  of  life  being  equally 


176    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

within  the  reach  of  each  and  all.  In  such  a  society, 
therefore,  the  bogey  anent  the  amount  paid  in 
wages  will  disappear  since  the  wage-system  itself 
will  have  disappeared,  the  whole  wealth  of  the 
Socialised  world  being  created  for  the  needs  of 
the  inhabitants  of  that  world.  Some  may  require 
more  of  the  "  good  things  of  life,"  others  less,  just 
as  some  men  now  require  three  full  meals  a  day, 
while  the  present  writer  is  content  with  what 
amounts  to  about  one  and  a  half.  Again,  some 
may  require  more  in  one  direction,  less  in  another ; 
one  may  require  things  which  minister  to  his  intel- 
lectual needs,  but  be  indifferent  to  the  quantity  and 
the  quality  of  those  things  pertaining  to  his  animal 
requirements ;  with  another  it  may  be  just  the 
reverse ;  a  third  may  be  a  man  of  the  juste  milieu 
all  round. 

But  whatever  the  requirements  of  the  Socialised 
world  may  be,  a  communistic  production,  distri- 
bution, and  exchange,  with  the  power  man  has 
acquired,  is  acquiring,  and  must  further  acquire, 
over  the  powers  of  nature,  will  afford  abundant 
means  of  satisfying  each  and  all.  Then  for  the 
Hrst  time  in  history  the  mass  of  mankind  will  have 
at  least  the  opportunity  of  leading  that  higher 
life  of  which  we  hear  so  much.  Socialists  hold 
that  they  have  grounds  for  believing  that  this 
economic  change  will  be  followed  by  a  corre- 
sponding intellectual  change,  and  that  the  "  three 


MISUNDERSTOOD   SOCIALISM     177 

parts  animal,"  of  which  Dr  Crozier  speaks,  will 
tend  to  disappear  as  the  sphere  of  the  human  ex- 
tends itself.  Hitherto  economic  conditions  have 
effectually  hindered  this  transformation  of  the 
animal  into  the  human. 

But  what  Dr  Crozier  probably  has  in  his  mind 
when  he  is  troubled  as  to  scales  of  payment  is  not 
the  completed  Communistic  Society  above  referred 
to,  but  the  earlier  stages  of  the  transformation 
of  Civilisation  into  Socialism.  Here  necessarily 
a  modified  form  of  the  wage-system,  and  hence 
of  payments,  must  continue  to  survive.  It  might 
be  alleged,  of  course,  that  it  were  incorrect  to  term 
such  a  transitional  state  of  Society  Socialism  at  all. 
In  this  I  am  unable  to  agree.  I  hold  that  as  soon 
as  the  conscious  aim  of  the  directive  and  administra- 
tive forces  of  Society  is  towards  Socialism,  then 
Socialism  may  be  deemed  to  have  begun.  In  this 
I  adhere  to  the  statement  in  Socialism,  its  Growth 
and  Outcome  (p.  285),  which  reads: — "It  is  clear 
that  the  first  real  victory  of  the  Social  Revolution 
will  be  the  establishment,  not  indeed  of  a  complete 
system  of  communism  in  a  day,  which  is  absurd, 
but  of  a  7'evolutionary  administration  ivJiose  definite 
and  conscious  aim  will  be  to  prepare  and  further, 
in  all  available  ways,  human  life  for  such  a  system 
— in  other  words,  of  an  administration  whose  every 
act  will  he  of  set  purpose  zvitk  a  view  to  Socialism." 
This  definition  clearly  shuts   out  mere   Socialistic 

12 


178    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

legislation,  such  as  may  obtain  to-day  within  the 
framework,  economic  and  political,  of  present 
Capitalist  society,  from  the  right  to  be  described 
as  Socialism,  as  is  often  done  by  "practical 
politicians."  Well,  it  is  to  this  earliest  phase  of 
Socialism  proper  that,  I  take  it,  Dr  Crozier  is  refer- 
ring when  he  expresses  himself  with  so  much  con- 
cern as  to  his  heart's  love,  the  "  inventor,"  having 
to  subsist  on  the  wages  of  the  unskilled  labourer. 
But  who,  I  would  ask,  informed  Dr  Crozier  of 
any  such  hard  and  fast  line  as  he  supposes  having 
been  drawn  and  decreed  by  Socialism  ?  Certainly 
not  Karl  Marx,  for  nowhere  in  his  writings  does  he 
discuss  points  of  constructive  detail  such  as  these. 

So  long  as  the  work  of  Socialisation  is  incomplete 
and  the  system  of  wage-payments  for  work  done 
continues,  such  payment  would  doubtless  be  deter- 
mined, to  some  extent  at  least,  by  the  conditions 
of  a  still-surviving  "  market."  And  even  apart 
from  this  it  would  probably  be  regulated  in  some 
proportion  to  the  needs  of  the  special  class  of 
worker.  That  there  would  be  a  strong  tendency  to 
"levelling  up"  on  the  one  side  and  to  "levelling 
down"  on  the  other  is  undoubtedly  true.  But 
if  it  could  be  shown  that  a  certain  class  of  work, 
owing  to  its  being  more  exhausting  or  for  any  other 
reason,  required  a  different  standard  of  living  from 
other  classes  of  work,  this  fact  would  doubtless 
be  an  element   in  the  determination  of  the   rate 


MISUNDERSTOOD   SOCIALISM     179 

of  payment  for  such  work.  To  each  "  according 
to  his  needs "  is  a  doctrine  of  the  old  Utopian 
SociaHsm  which  will  never  intrinsically  lose  its 
application.  The  dummy  Marxian  "  street-corner 
stalwart"  of  Dr  Crozier's  imagination  may,  not- 
withstanding, possess  his  soul  in  peace  as  regards 
the  danger  of  any  differences  of  actual  remuneration 
at  this  stage  bringing  back  "  all  the  old  inequalities 
of  fortune  and  all  the  old  exploitations  again." 

In  proportion  as  the  Socialisation  of  the  means  of 
production,  distribution,  and  exchange  progressed, 
the  possibility  of  the  Capitalisation  of  individual 
savings,  and  hence  of  their  becoming  the  nucleus 
of  a  new  exploitation  of  labour  for  private  profit, 
would  diminish  in  an  increasing  ratio  day  by  day. 
Any  positive  material  advantage  that  one  man 
had  over  another  at  this  stage  could  for  practical 
purposes  only  take  the  form  of  consumable  wealth, 
which  would  be  a  matter  of  little  consequence  one 
way  or  the  other. 

I  cannot  enter  at  length  into  Dr  Crozier's 
psychology  of  human  nature  or  his  dogmatic 
assumptions  as  to  the  yearning  of  mankind,  bien 
entendu  of  all  mankind,  I  suppose,  that  was,  or  is, 
or  is  to  come,  for  Inequality !  I  would  only 
remind  him  that  early  humanity  lived  for  ages 
under  conditions  of  primitive  communism  without 
experiencing,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  any  of  that 
yearning  for  that  inequality  which  seems  to  be  a 


180    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

"ground  principle"  in  the  "human  nature"  postu- 
lated by  Dr  Croziers  psychology.  The  ideal 
indicated  by  the  latter  is  that  of  human  life  as  based 
universally  upon  the  gambling  principle,  though 
the  intensive  application  of  the  principle  may  be 
subjected  to  some  sort  of  quantitative  regulation. 
Now,  I  am  no  sympathiser  with  the  Nonconformist 
conscience  or  with  its  ascetic  theory  of  morals, 
and  in  consequence  I  have  not  the  smallest  objection 
to  gambling  as  a  pastime,  any  more  than  to  any 
other  pastime  not  involving  cruelty,  and  pursued 
with  reasonable  moderation.  I  have  no  sympathy 
with  the  hypocrisy  which  persecutes  gamblers  for 
amusement  and  suppresses  games  of  chance,  while 
tolerating  and  approving  the  gigantic  system  of 
gambling  involved  in  modern  business  life.  But 
it  is  precisely  this  principle  of  gambling  which  the 
present  organisation  of  Society  involves  as  an 
essential  element  that  Dr  Crozier  would  apparently 
consecrate  as  being  proper  to  human  nature  for  all 
time.  Need  1  remind  the  reader  that  it  is  this 
very  condition  out  of  which  all  the  ethical  elements 
of  our  time,  some  of  them  not  even  avowedly 
Socialistic,  are  professedly  yearning  to  raise  human- 
ity. And  yet  this  same  appears  to  Dr  Crozier, 
who  would  probably,  like  a  good  Christian  gentle- 
man, regard  roulette  or  baccarat  as  very  wicked 
and  demoralising,  as  a  source  of  moral  strength 
and  joy  in  life.     To   base  the  whole  principle  of 


MISUNDERSTOOD   SOCIALISM     181 

human  life,  with  all  the  serious  issues  it  involves, 
on  chance  plus  cunning  is  as  it  should  be ;  to 
speculate,  as  an  occasional  pastime,  a  few  shillings 
"  upon  the  hazard  of  a  die  "  is  a  terrible  evil  to  be 
promptly  dealt  with  by  drastic  legislation.  While 
it  is  wicked  to  play  a  game  of  chance  as  an 
occasional  episode  in  life,  it  is  right  to  treat  life 
itself  as  a  game  (Dr  Crozier  himself  calls  it  the 
"game  of  life"),  so  at  least  says  the  bourgeois 
moralist  of  the  Nonconformist  persuasion. 

Not  only  does  Dr  Crozier,  like  many  of  his  pre- 
decessors in  the  task  of  finding  fault  with  Socialism, 
read  present  conditions  into  a  Socialist  society,  but 
he  sets  himself  to  depict  certain  evils  which  are  the 
conspicuous  and  inevitable  results  of  present-day 
competitive  society — the  dead-level  of  sordidness, 
the  "scraping  together  the  few  odd  shillings," 
broken-up  family  life,  etc. — and  then,  if  he  will 
pardon  me  for  saying  so,  by  an  astounding  piece 
of  controversial  "  bluff,"  attempts  to  saddle  them 
on  to  a  Socialist  Society  of  his  own  imagining. 

But  if  we  examine  the  main  drift  of  Dr  Crozier 's 
dread  of  what  he  terms  the  "  dead-level  of  economic 
equality,"  we  shall  find  that  this  consists  not  so 
much  in  the  fear  lest  he  himself  should  not  get 
enough  of  the  good  things  of  this  life,  as  in  the 
dislike  of  the  "other  fellow"  having  the  same 
advantages  with  regard  to  them  as  himself.  That 
the  fecundity  of  economic  production  under  Social- 


182    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

ism  cannot  fail  to  provide,  not  merely  a  sufficiency 
but  an  abundance  for  each  and  all,  1  have  already 
pointed  out.  But  this,  I  fear,  would  not  satisfy 
some  of  the  critics  of  Socialism,  Dr  Crozier  among 
them.  It  matters  not  that  they  might  have  within 
their  reach  enough  to  satisfy  all  their  reasonable 
requirements  ;  they  would  not  be  happy,  or  at  least 
they  think  they  would  not,  without  the  knowledge 
that  others  were  worse  off  than  themselves,  with- 
out the  consciousness  that  others  were  suffering 
from  the  want  of  those  things  which  subserved 
their  own  necessities  and  happiness  in  life.  In  a 
word,  if  we  may  believe  their  own  report  about 
themselves,  their  objection  to  Socialism  rests  upon 
the  most  brutal  and  unqualified  form  of  egoism, 
on  the  confession  that  complete  self-satisfaction 
is  impossible  unless  accompanied  by  a  sense  of 
economic  inequality,  i.e.  of  the  suffering  of  others. 
Now  this  strikes  me  as  about  the  rawest  and 
crudest  exemplification  of  that  so  often  mis- 
applied concept — selfishness — which  it  would  be 
possible  to  imagine.  In  fact,  so  crass  in  their 
brutality  do  the  words  of  these  critics  strike  me 
that  I  am  loath  to  "believe  their  own  report" 
about  themselves,  and  am  inclined  to  take  their  pro- 
tests in  the  light  of  a  dialectical  device  to  cover  up 
the  hollo wness  of  their  case.  However  this  may  be, 
I  have  reasons  to  hope  that  the  views  in  this  sense 
expressed  by  them  would  not  be  openly  admitted  by 


MISUNDERSTOOD   SOCIALISM     183 

any  considerable  section  of  "  human  nature  "  even 
as  it  is  at  present,  and  would  certainly  not  appeal 
to  the  "  under  dog,"  to  wit,  the  proletarian  masses. 
Once  again  let  me  point  out  that  the  inequality 
and  the  scramble  for  wealth  which  is  the  essence  of 
competitive  conditions,  so  far  from  furnishing  an 
incentive  to  the  best  human  endeavour,  is  wholly 
and  solely  productive  of  demoralised  and  bad  work. 
To  place  even  genius  in  the  position  to  give  the 
world  of  its  best,  the  present  accursed  incentive  of 
immoderate  material  gain  must  be  removed.     This 
it  is  which  is  the  breeding-ground  of  all  that   is 
trashy  and  worthless  in  literature,  in  music,  in  the 
plastic  arts,  and  in  all  the  higher  departments  of 
human  activity.     The  man  who  has  something  to 
give  the  world  worth  having  feels  he  must  give  it 
even  though  he  suffer  materially  the  while.     'J'he 
charlatan  who  has  nothing  of  worth  to  give,  and 
even  the  genius  who  has  yielded  to  the  temptation 
to   sell  his   birthright   for  the   economic   mess  of 
pottage   by  pandering  to  passing  and  usually  de- 
praved public   taste,  work  naught  but  corruption 
and  degradation.     In  the  case  of  the  latter,  indeed, 
mankind  is  a  positive  loser,  since  genius  is  perverted 
by   the   prospect  of  material   gain   from   its   true 
function  to  the  production  of  trash. 

Of  course,  we  are  treated  in  this  latest  attack  on 
Socialism  to  suggestions  as  to  the  tyranny  and 
coercion  the  "  Socialist  State  "  would  exercise  over 


184    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

the  individual.  Of  the  tyranny  exercised  to-day 
by  the  possessors  of  capital  over  the  non-possessing 
classes,  nothing  is  said.  The  tyranny  imposed  by 
the  directive  pov^er  of  a  Sociahst  Society  would  at 
most  amount  to  the  obligation  of  every  average  man 
to  contribute  a  limited  portion  of  his  time  to  the 
carrying  on  in  some  form  or  shape  of  the  necessary 
work  of  the  world,  by  which  a  true  liberty  would 
be  ensured  to  all.  Socialism  means  the  administra- 
tion of  things,  in  contradistinction  to  our  present 
civilisation,  which  means  the  coeixion  of  meii.  The 
present  state  imphes  coercion  in  the  interests,  direct 
or  indirect,  of  private  property,  all  round. 

The  ethical  basis,  which  is  the  motive-power  of 
the  movement  for  economical  and  political  re- 
construction, may  be  found  in  the  motto  of  the 
old  revolutionaries  of  the  eighteenth  century — 
"Liberty,  Equality,  Fraternity."  It  is,  however, 
pregnant  with  a  new  content.  The  sense  in  which 
the  earlier  revolutionary  took  it  has  proved  itself 
illusory,  but  its  ethical  significance  none  the  less 
remains. 

The  conditions  of  Capitalism  themselves  suffice 
to  do  the  coercion  in  the  economic  sphere, 
but  there  are  other  forms  of  coercion  of  men  in 
what  Mill  called  "self-regarding  actions,"  which 
the  State  still  exercises  directly.  It  coerces  men, 
in  many  cases  by  military  service,  to  fight  its 
battles   with   other    States.      This,   again,   is   the 


MISUNDERSTOOD   SOCIALISM     185 

result  of  the  desire  of  each  national  State-system 
to  get  the  better  of  its  neighbour,  and  of  them  all 
to  enslave  and  plunder  the  savage  and  barbaric 
peoples  of  the  earth  in  the  pursuit  of  new  com- 
mercial outlets  and  of  fresh  fields  for  the  capitalistic 
exploitation  of  natural  resources.  Modern  wars 
invariably  take  their  origin  in  commercial  or 
colonial  rivalry. 

Again,  in  the  purely  personal  relation  of 
marriage,  the  existing  State  claims  rights  over 
the  individual.  Yet  again,  in  the  matter  of 
religion  it  is,  as  a  rule,  bound  up  with,  and 
favours  some  form  of  the  dogmatic  Christian 
creed,  which  implies  the  coercion  in  various  ways 
of  the  individual  intelligence.  Now  Socialism 
stands  for  liberty  in  all  these  things.  It  stands  for 
equal  rights  for  all  nationalities,  and  for  the  freedom 
of  weak  and  backward  peoples  to  pursue  their  own 
life  and  to  develop  in  their  own  way  uncoerced 
from  without.  It  would  free  the  individual  from 
the  obligation  to  take  up  arms  in  defence  of 
the  capitalist  interests  of  the  class-State  to  which 
he  happens  to  belong.  With  the  sentiment  of 
patriotism  or  its  opposite  as  a  mere  private  emotion 
it  has  nothing  to  do.  It  would  free  marriage  from 
coercive  laws  having  their  origin  in  property 
relations  or  in  superstitious  beliefs,  while  in  no  way 
dogmatising  on  the  form  which  the  institution  of 
marriage   and  the  family  will  take  in  the   future 


180    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

or  as  to  what  is  the  best  form.  In  this  respect 
Sociahsm  is  no  more  opposed,  as  is  sometimes 
represented,  to  the  principle  of  Hfe-long  monogamy 
than  it  is  to  less  stringent  forms  of  the  sexual 
relation.  What  it  is  opposed  to  is  coercion,  either 
by  law  or  public  opinion,  of  the  individual  in  such 
a  self-regarding  matter.  The  question  of  children 
rests,  of  course,  on  a  different  basis,  and  ought  to  be 
dealt  with  separately. 

Similarly  with  theological  beliefs  and  religious 
cults.  Socialism  claims  a  secular  and  scientifically 
up-to-date  education  for  every  child  and  young 
person.  It  would  not  prevent  any  citizen  from 
amusing  himself  with,  or  persuading  himself  he 
believes  in.  Christian  theology,  Buddhist  theosophy, 
or  any  other  theory  concerning  the  supernatural. 
But  a  Socialist  polity,  as  such,  would  undoubtedly 
maintain  a  rigidly  secular  attitude,  showing  no 
favour  or  affection  for  priestcraft,  or  for  dogma 
claiming  supernatural  sanctions,  in  any  of  its 
forms. 

In  conclusion,  I  think  I  have  said  enough  to 
indicate  the  Socialist's  grounds  for  believing  that 
under  Socialism  for  the  first  time  in  history  the 
individual  will  have  the  opportunity  of  real  freedom, 
of  real  self-development,  an  opportunity  he  can 
never  possess  under  the  dead  level  of  sordid  struggle 
which  characterises  the  Capitalist  society  in  which 
we  live. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE    PROBLEM    OF    MODERN    FEMINISM 

We  may  trace  the  origin  of  modern  Feminism  in 
a  fairly  continuous  line  back  to  the  eighteenth 
century — to  protagonists  in  revolutionary  and  pre- 
revolutionary  literature — notably  to  Mary  WoU- 
stonecraft  and  William  Godwin.  From  that 
time  onward  the  Feminist  question  has  always 
been  present,  though  it  only  became  prominent 
during  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

It  was  about  the  end  of  the  sixties  that  the 
Woman's  Suffrage  plank  first  made  its  appearance 
in  the  modern  Socialist  movement,  in  the  original 
International  at  the  instance  of  Michael  Bakounin 
and  his  followers,  and  was  one  of  the  few  proposals 
emanating  from  that  quarter  that  was  accepted  by 
the  Marx  party.  But  for  a  long  time  the  question 
remained  in  the  background,  being  hardly  referred 
to  at  all  in  the  earlier  programmes  of  the  Con- 
tinental parties.  In  fact,  in  the  German  party  the 
"  Woman  Question,"  as  apart  from  the  general 
Social  question,  first  received  serious  attention  in 

187 


188    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

1883  in  Bebel's  book,  the  first  edition  of  which 
was  issued  under  the  title  of  Woman  in  the  Past, 
Present,  and  Future,  and  contained  very  much 
Woman  and  very  little  Socialism.  (In  the  later 
editions,  under  the  title  Woman  and  Socialism, 
it  is  only  fair  to  say,  the  proportions  have  been 
altered.)  In  this  work.  Rebel,  who  virtually  admits 
in  his  preface  that  the  bulk  of  the  party  at  that 
time  was  against  him,  maintained  the  dogma  of 
the  equal  capacity  of  woman  with  man,  with  its 
corollary,  the  right  of  women  to  occupy  all  posi- 
tions and  exercise  all  functions  hitherto  controlled 
by  men.  In  France,  Lafargue  was  active  on  the 
P^eminist  side  during  the  early  eighties. 

Since  then  the  Feminist  dogma  has  found  much 
favour  with  Socialists  everywhere,  and  the  demand 
for  Female  Suffrage  has  been  officially  embodied 
among  the  planks  in  the  immediate  political  plat- 
form of  the  Social  Democratic  party.  At  the 
same  time,  it  has  been  sought  to  exercise  a  pres- 
sure within  the  party  to  prevent  dissentient  Social 
Democrats  from  expressing  an  adverse  opinion. 

Time  was  when  Manhood  Suffrage  was  the 
cry  of  all  Democrats,  and  there  are,  doubtless, 
plenty  of  Social  Democrats  to-day  who  would 
be  glad  enough,  if  they  did  but  dare,  to  take 
their  stand  on  the  old  Suffrage  platform,  which 
was  good  enough  for  Chartists  and  earlier 
Socialists. 


MODERN   FEMINISM  189 

The  fact  is,  of  course,  this  sex  question  cuts 
athwart  other  issues.  Hence  it  is  that  the  con- 
ventional bourgeois,  unwilhng  as  he  is  to  admit 
the  sins  of  his  class  towards  the  proletariat,  is  often 
perfectly  ready  to  smite  his  manly  breast  and 
deplore  the  assumed  harshness  of  his  own  to  the 
opposite  sex.  There  is  no  logical  reason  for 
Socialism  specially  championing  the  position  of 
modern  Feminism.  That  SociaHsm  must  bring 
about  changes  in  the  position  of  women  may  be 
allowed,  but  the  special  direction  of  these  changes 
must  be  the  coefficient  of  the  permanent  physio- 
logical structure  and  functions  of  the  female  sex, 
with  the  new  economic  conditions  and  the  resultant 
new  social  forces.  To  dogmatise  on  the  future  as 
to  the  precise  nature  of  these  changes  at  the  present 
stage  is  eminently  unscientific. 

Let  us  take  the  practical  issue  of  the  Suffrage. 
People  commonly  talk  as  if  the  franchise  was  an 
end  in  itself  rather  than  what  it  is,  simply  a  means 
to  other  ends.  But  Feminists  and  Suffragists  know 
very  well  for  what  purpose  they  want  the  franchise. 
They  intend  to  use  their  new  weapon  to  give  a 
further  edge  to  what  may  be  termed  anti-man 
legislation.  They  rightly  think  that  this  class  of 
law-making  which  they  have  been  so  successful  in 
promoting  indirectly  for  a  generation  past,  they 
will  in  future,  with  the  leverage  of  the  vote,  be 
able  to  promote  directly  with  a  still  greater  success. 


190    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

This  is  what  lies  behind  all  protestations  of  sex 
equality  and  the  like.  The  equality  desired  is  the 
species  of  equality  the  chief  characteristic  of  which 
is  to  be  "  all  on  one  side." 

At  the  same  time,  some  of  the  arguments  adduced 
against  Female  Suffrage  do  not  strike  me  in  them- 
selves as  altogether  conclusive.  For  example,  it 
cannot  be  denied  that  the  argument  as  to  the 
sphere  of  women  being  the  home,  though  un- 
doubtedly true  in  the  past,  and  though  containing 
more  truth  to-day  than  the  average  Feminist  would 
admit,  has  undoubtedly  lost  some  of  its  force  owing 
to  the  changed  economic  conditions  of  the  present 
time.  Then,  again,  I  have  heard  it  argued  that 
contact  with  the  rough  and  tumble  of  political  life, 
with  its  intrigue,  ambitions,  sordid  rivalries,  etc., 
would  defile  the  pure  spirit  of  womanhood.  Well, 
here  again  I  do  not  think  the  argument  is  alto- 
gether convincing,  since  the  rabid  Feminist  might 
insist  that  the  pet  sex  would,  on  the  contrary, 
infuse  an  elevating  spirit  into  public  life,  that  a 
whifF  of  the  breath  of  Womanhood  (with  a  capital 
W)  would  act  like  magic  in  disinfecting  political 
life  and  raising  it  to  a  uniform  level  of  pure  dis- 
interested virtue.  And  although  we  may  be 
personally  quite  convinced  that  such  would  not 
be  the  case,  yet,  seeing  that  the  experiment  has 
not  yet  been  tried  on  any  large  scale  or  for  any 
considerable  length  of  time,  it  might  not  be  easy 


MODERN   FEMINISM  191 

to  prove   our  conviction   to   anyone  choosing   to 
affirm  the  contrary. 

Now  the  foregoing  and  some  other  arguments 
are  put  forward,  I  think,  by  many  men  with  the 
unconscious  desire  to  avoid  acknowledging  the 
real  ground  of  their  objections  to  Female  Suffrage. 
They  don't  like  to  state  this  ground  straight  out. 
Some,  if  hard  pressed,  will  try  to  shuffle  out  of 
admitting  it,  perhaps  even  to  themselves.  But 
their  secret  conviction  is  that  women,  as  a  sex,  are 
organically  inferior  to  men,  not  only  physically, 
but  intellectually  and  morally  as  well,  and  hence 
not  fit  to  be  trusted  proviiscuously  {i.e.  barring 
exceptions)  with  political  power.  Now,  no  man 
likes  to  say  this,  because  it  sounds  rude  and 
arrogant  to  "  the  ladies,"  even  though  the  evidence, 
physiological,  psychological,  historical,  and  common 
observational  for  his  conviction,  is  conclusive  for 
him.  In  my  essay  on  "  Female  Suffrage  and  its 
Implications,"  I  have  briefly  indicated  some  of  the 
main  heads  of  this  evidence  and  do  not  propose  to 
enter  into  it  again  here.  But  I  must  insist  on  the 
fact  that  for  me  (barring  one  other  reason  which, 
though  decisive  for  the  moment,  is  not  of  a  funda- 
mental nature,  and  which  I  shall  refer  to  directly) 
there  seems  no  logical  ground  for  opposition  to 
the  granting  of  the  franchise  to  women  save  the 
recognition  of  inferiority,  at  least,  an  inferiority 
ad  hoc.     If  one  acknowledges  complete  equality 


192    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

in  capacity  between  men  and  women,  the  case  for 
the  Suffrage  seems  to  me,  in  itself,  unanswerable. 

1  have  said  in  itself,  since,  as  things  are  at 
present  in  this  and  most  other  countries,  even  if 
the  capacity  for  political  and  administrative  judg- 
ment were  conceded,  there  is  another  ground  on 
which,  so  long  as  it  obtains,  it  would  be  just  to 
refuse  women  the  franchise.  And  this  ground  is 
the  fact  that  women  at  present  constitute  an  almost 
boundlessly  privileged  section  of  the  community. 
A  woman  may,  in  the  present  day,  do  practically 
what  she  likes  without  fear  of  anything  happening 
to  her  beyond  a  nominal  punishment.  The  English 
marriage  laws,  with  their  right  of  the  wife  to 
maintenance,  give  her  almost  unlimited  power  to 
oppress  her  husband.  (See  a  case  reported  in  detail, 
with  names  and  witnesses,  etc.,  in  John  Bull  for 
September  19,  1908.) 

Not  very  long  ago  a  case  occurred  in  the  north 
of  England  where  a  workman,  out  of  employment, 
was  about  to  be  committed  to  prison  at  his  wife's 
behest  for  omitting  to  pay  her  the  weekly  allow- 
ance ordered  by  the  court.  Exasperated,  the  poor 
fellow  struck  his  tyrant  a  fatal  blow — hanged ! 
About  the  same  time  a  wife,  during  an  admittedly 
trifling  tiff  with  her  husband,  stabbed  him  fatally 
with  a  hatpin  —  released  on  her  recognisances. 
These  two  cases  are  typical.  It  is  this  practical 
immunity  of  women  from  all  consequences  for  their 


MODERN   FEMINISM  193 

actions  upon  which  the  crew  of  Suffragists  traded. 
Had  they  been  liable  to  one  quarter  of  the  penalties 
men  incur  they  would  have  "  thought "  a  good 
many  times  before  inciting  to  raid  the  House  of 
Commons  or  to  commit  other  breaches  of  the  law. 
As  it  is,  they  knew  the  worst  they  had  to  fear 
was  a  short  term  of  pampered  imprisonment. 
Male  Socialists  have  had  to  go  to  prison,  not  for 
trying  to  raid  the  House  of  Commons,  but  for 
merely  breaking  some  local  bye-law  while  main- 
taining the  right  of  free  speech. 

Do  not  let  us  forget  that  the  women  who  are 
loudest  in  bawling  for  the  Suffrage  do  so  on  the 
ground  that  they  are  not  sufficiently  privileged 
already,  and  that,  as  we  have  said,  to  obtain 
the  supremacy  over  men,  the  savagely  vindic- 
tive laws  against  men  and  complete  immunity 
for  women  they  consider  their  due,  they  require 
the  leverage  the  vote  will  give  them.  Under 
the  circumstances  one  would  like  to  examine 
with  a  very  strong  electric  light  the  intellects  of 
those  persons  who  profess  to  believe  in  equality 
between  the  sexes,  and  who  yet,  as  things  are 
to-day,  can  advocate  Female  Suffrage.  Their  idea 
of  equality  is,  I  suppose,  "  All  yours  is  mine  and 
all  mine's  my  own. "  No  military  service  for  women, 
and  yet  they  shall  dictate  war  or  peace !  No 
corporal  punishment  for  them,  and  yet  they  shall 

decide  on  the  maintenance  of  corporal  punishment 

13 


194    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

for  men  in  prisons,  etc.  1  No  liability  to  maintain 
husband  or  children,  and  yet  the  right  to  decree 
laws  relating  to  marriage ;  and  many  more  such 
anomalies.  For  —  let  us  make  no  mistake  —  no 
Feminist  has  the  smallest  intention  of  abandoning 
any  one  of  the  existing  privileges  of  women.  On 
the  contrary,  the  intention  of  increasing  the  power 
and  privileges  of  the  sex  is  expressly  declared 
without  any  subterfuge.  And  be  it  remembered 
the  "adult  suffrage"  so  much  advocated  by  Socialists 
means  an  excess  of  a  million  female  over  male 
votes  so  far  as  Great  Britain  is  concerned. 

Socialist  bodies  proclaim  "social  and  economic 
equality  between  the  sexes  "  as  one  of  their  aims. 
Now,  as  a  "  stepping  stone "  towards  this  end,  I 
would  suggest  to  the  advocates  of  sex  equality 
(from  the  standpoint  of  our  present  society),  be- 
sides equal  wages  for  equal  work,  which  we  are  all 
able  to  agree  to,  (1)  obligation  of  wife  to  maintain 
herself  also  her  husband  if  sick,  and  to  contribute 
something  to  the  inaintenance  of  the  children  of  the 
marriage ;  and  further  (2)  equal  punishment  for 
equal  ciime  as  between  men  and  women ;  and  (3) 
abolition  of  all  laws  (e.g.  the  law  as  regards  libel 
and  slander)  favouring  women  at  the  expense  of 
men ;  and  (4)  the  liability  of  women  to  all  duties 
imposed  07i  men.  I  can  imagine  the  sort  of  wry 
face  the  Feminists  would  make  at  the  bare  sug- 
gestion of  these  equitable  demands.     Otherwise,  I 


MODERN   FEMINISM  195 

would  suggest  that  wherever  "  social  and  economic 
equality"  between  the  sexes  is  proposed  a  note 
should  be  added  that  (to  borrow  a  phrase  from  the 
famous  Rule  in  Shelley's  case)  the  words  be  taken 
as  "  words  of  limitation,"  in  short,  that  the  term 
equality  is  to  be  understood  in  a  non-natural  sense 
as  implying  all  the  kicks  for  the  brute  man  and 
all  the  halfpence  for  the  angel  woman.  Otherwise 
unsophisticated  comrades  might  be  disposed  to 
take  it  in  a  natural  sense,  which  would  involve  a 
grievous  misconception. 

Now,  speaking  as  a  plain  man,  surely  it  would 
be  unjust,  quite  apart  from  any  question  of  intrinsic 
suitability,  for  women  to  possess  the  Suffrage 
until  something  like  the  conditions  I  have  before 
formulated  obtain.  If  others  think  that  giving 
an  already  privileged  order  of  human  beings  the 
franchise  spells  equality,  I  do  not. 

But  supposing  the  present  balance  of  inequahty 
in  favour  of  women  were  remedied,  there  would 
then  remain  solely  the  question  of  the  average 
inferiority  of  women.  Now  here  I  must  again 
point  out  that  the  exercise  of  the  vote  is  mainly 
a  means  to  an  end — the  progress  and  well-being 
of  society.  Hence,  if  women  on  the  average  show 
an  inferiority  all  round  to  men,  or  even  an  inferi- 
ority in  the  power  of  practical  and  equitable  judg- 
ment in  public  affairs,  then  there  is  no  injustice  in 
refusing  them  "  in  the  bulk  "  the  right  of  interfering 


196    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

in  these  matters,  where  they  are  ex  hypothesi  less 
competent  than  men.  Here  we  have  to  deal  with 
a  question  of  fact  and  evidence.  For  those  who, 
like  myself,  regard  the  evidence  for  the  inferiority 
as  conclusive,  there  is  no  possible  alternative  to 
opposition  to  a  disintegrative  force  such  as  can  only 
be  harmful  to  progress.  To  discuss  the  question 
as  to  the  nature  of  the  evidence  would  take  us 
outside  the  immediate  purpose  of  this  chapter, 
but  I  deny  that  those  to  whom  the  evidence  for 
incapacity  appears  conclusive  can  consistently  be 
otherwise  than  opponents  of  Female  Suffrage  in  all 
its  forms.  For  to  favour  it  in  the  teeth  of  such  a 
conviction  would  mean  sacrificing  the  interests  of 
society  to  a  barren  abstraction,  to  wit,  the  abstract 
right  to  exercise  a  function  whether  fitted  for  it  or 
not.  And  to  this  no  one  who  really  values  progress 
ought  surely  to  be  prepared  to  consent. 

The  Feminism  of  modern  public  opinion,  which 
is  reflected  in  recent  statutes  and  judicial  decisions 
and  in  the  administration  of  law  generally,  has  been 
very  persistently  and  very  subtly  fostered  for  more 
than  a  generation  past.  The  Feminist  attitude  of 
public  opinion  has  been  sedulously  cultivated  not 
only  by  journalism  but  by  modern  literature  and 
art,  especially  such  as  is  of  a  popular  character. 
The  aim  has  been  to  portray  Man  as  an  ignoble, 
mean  creature,  as  a  foil  to  the  courage,  resource, 
and  gentle  virtues  of  Woman.     Who  has  not  seen 


MODERN  FEMINISM  197 

a  well-known  picture  representing  the  Thames 
Embankment  at  night,  and  the  "  unfortunate," 
possessed  of  an  improbably  angelic  face,  being 
taken  from  the  river,  with  the  gentleman  and  lady 
in  evening  dress,  who  have  just  got  out  of  the  cab, 
in  the  foreground,  the  gentleman  with  ostentatious 
callousness — brute  that  he  is  ! — turning  away  and 
lighting  a  cigarette,  and  the  lady — gentle  creature ! 
— bending  over  the  dripping  form  and  throwing  up 
her  arms  in  sympathetic  horror  ?  It  is  by  claptrap 
of  this  sort,  both  literary  and  artistic,  that  senti- 
mental Feminism  is  both  evoked  and  nourished. 
Some  time  ago  I  received  a  provincial  Socialist 
paper  (I.L.P.)  which  contained  a  feicilleton  con- 
sisting of  the  story  of  a  woman  who  had  killed 
her  baby  and  died  after  a  few  weeks  in  prison — the 
moral  being  apparently  the  monstrous  wickedness 
of  imprisoning  such  women  at  all,  rather  than 
rewarding  them  with  a  comfortable  pension  for 
life.  There  are  well-known  writers  I  could  name 
who  seem  to  take  peculiar  pleasure  in  painting 
their  own  sex  in  an  abject  light  by  way  of  pandering 
to  current  Feminist  prejudices. 

The  result  of  all  this  nurture  of  the  public  mind 
in  Feminist  sentiment  is  everywhere  noticeable. 
An  influential  section  of  public  opinion  has  come 
to  regard  it  as  axiomatic  that  women  are  capable 
of  everything  of  which  men  are  capable,  and  there- 
fore they  ought  to  have  full  responsibility  in  all 


198    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

honourable  and  lucrative  functions  and  callings. 
There  is  only  one  thing  for  which  unlimited  allow- 
ance ought  to  be  made  on  the  ground  of  their 
womanly  inferiority,  otherwise  so  strenuously 
denied,  and  that  is  their  own  criminal  or  tortuous 
acts  !  In  a  word,  they  are  not  to  be  held  respon- 
sible, in  the  sense  that  men  are,  for  their  own 
actions  when  these  entail  unpleasant  consequences 
for  themselves.  On  the  contrary,  the  obloquy 
and,  where  possible,  the  penalty  for  the  wrong- 
doing is  to  be  shifted  on  to  the  nearest  wretched 
man  with  whom  they  have  consorted.  I  cannot 
quote  unlimited  cases,  but,  by  way  of  illustration, 
I  will  mention  two  that  occur  to  me  at  the 
moment  of  writing. 

A  few  years  ago  a  woman  deliberately  shot  at 
and  wounded  a  solicitor  (a  married  man)  with 
whom  she  had  had  relations.  The  act  was  so 
premeditated  that  it  came  out  in  evidence  she 
had  been  practising  shooting  with  the  revolver 
for  days  beforehand.  There  was,  moreover,  no 
question  of  a  child  in  the  case,  and  not  even  one 
of  financial  embarrassment,  as  she  was  in  receipt  of 
a  quarterly  allowance  under  a  trust.  Hence  the 
case  presented  itself  as  a  cold-blooded  one  of  at- 
tempted murder  without  a  single  circumstance  of 
extenuation.  The  woman  was  sentenced  to  the 
very  lenient  penalty  of  seven  years'  penal  servitude. 
(Had  a  man  attempted  to  murder  in  this  way  a 


MODERN   FEMINISM  199 

jilting  mistress  he   would   have   received,  without 
doubt,  twenty  years  at  least,  if  not  a  life  sentence.) 
Now  it  seems   incredible,  but  it  is  a  fact,  that  a 
campaign  was  immediately  started  throughout  the 
whole  of  the  press,  largely  by  "  advanced  "  women 
and  male  Feminists,  in   favour   of  this  dastardly 
female   criminal,  who   only   fell  short  of  being  a 
murderess  by  accident !     The  second  case  is  that 
of  Daisy  Lord  three  or  four  years  ago.    To  read  the 
gush  on  that  occasion  one  might  have  thought  that 
the  murder  of  new-born  children  represented  the 
highest  ideal   of  motherhood.     This   Daisy  Lord 
became  for  the  nonce  a  kind  of  pinchbeck  Madonna 
in  the  eyes  of  the  Feminist  public.     Such  women 
as  the  above  ought,  of  course,  to  have  equal  voting 
rights  with  men,  but  equal  consequences  for  their 
actions — oh   dear,   no  I     If  there   is   one   demand 
which   is   popular  with    the   Feminists,   it   is   for 
raising  the  age  of  consent  from  sixteen  to  eighteen 
or  twenty-one  years,  at  which  latter  age,  presum- 
ably,  the   right   to    the    Franchise,   if    conceded, 
would  come  into  operation.     They  are   therefore 
evidently  of  opinion  that  the  woman  who  has  only 
just  ceased  to  need  the  protection   of  the  law  in 
the  control   of  her  own   body  becomes    immedi- 
ately fully  qualified  to  have  a  voice  in  the  manage- 
ment   of    public   affairs  I      The   extent  to   which 
Feminist  sentiment  can  fling  justice  to  the  winds 
in  these  days  is  shown  by  the  savage  demand,  in 


200    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

cases  of  infant  murder,  for  vicarious  vengeance  on 
one  who,  as  regards  the  offence  in  question,  is 
wholly  innocent — to  wit,  on  that  vile  and  obnoxious 
creature,  "  the  man." 

The  way  in  which  the  modern  Feminist  is  dead 
to  every  sense  of  equity  in  the  relations  of  the 
sexes  as  regards  elementary  fairness  to  the  man's 
side  of  the  sexual  equation,  is  illustrated  by  such 
documents  as  Lady  Maclaren's  "Woman's  Charter." 
One  of  the  demands  it  contains  is  that  "  no  married 
woman  should  be  bound  to  accept  a  foreign 
domicile."  This  is  delightful !  A  poor  man  can- 
not get  work  in  this  country  and  has  to  take  a 
position  abroad.  At  her  sweet  whim  his  wife  may 
live  apart  from  him  as  a  single  woman  and  compel 
him  to  keep  her  all  the  same!  Here  we  have  a 
splendid  example  of  "  woman's  right "  to  treat  man 
as  a  slave!  Suggestions  of  this  sort,  be  it  re- 
membered, come  from  those  who  indignantly 
repudiate  any  desire  for  female  privilege. 

As  regards  this  point  of  the  protestations  of  zeal 
for  equality  between  the  sexes,  when  specially 
challenged,  I  would  suggest  to  the  Feminist 
advocate,  male  or  female,  that  it  would  not  be 
amiss  if  this  zeal  for  sex  equality  ceased  to  assume 
the  form  of  concocting  bogus  grievances  on  the 
woman's  side,  and  occasionally,  at  least,  took  shape 
in  protests  against  modern  one-sided  sex  legislation, 
and   the  favouritism  uniformly  shown  to   women 


MODERN   FEMINISM  201 

in  the  courts,  civil  and  criminal.  To  this  might  be 
added  a  self-denying  ordinance  by  which  advanced 
ladies  should  agitate  for  the  abolition  of  reserved 
seats  for  "ladies  only"  in  the  British  Museum 
reading  room,  reserved  compartments  in  railway 
carriages,  etc.  The  New  York  elevated  railway 
has,  I  read,  begun  to  reserve  whole  carriages  for 
women,  from  which  men  are  rigidly  excluded,  no 
matter  how  full  the  train  may  be  otherwise.  For 
be  it  remembered  that  though  all  men  are  forbidden 
access  to  female  reserves,  women  in  these  cases,  as 
a  rule,  have  the  run  of  all  available  space,  there 
being  usually  no  male  reserves.  Were  they  to 
act  thus,  the  advocates  of  Feminism  would  at  least 
give  an  earnest  of  their  sincerity  in  the  matter 
of  sex  equality,  which  at  present  assumes  such 
a  questionable  shape  in  their  agitation  and 
discourses. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE    PROBLEM   OF   SEX   AND    SENTIMENT 

We  are  every  day  reminded  of  the  vitality  of 
survivals  in  habits  of  thought  no  less  than  in  ways 
of  life.  With  the  insidiousness  of  black  beetles 
in  an  old  house  they  return  again  and  again  to 
the  charge  after  you  think  you  have  finally  extir- 
pated them.  What  I  have  elsewhere  termed  the 
"  ethics  of  introspection  "  as  opposed  to  the  ethics 
of  social  utility  seems  to  have  a  most  astonishing 
vitality.  Now  the  "  ethic  of  introspection  "  finds  its 
sanction  in  some  traditional  sentiment,  or  mayhap 
in  some  catch  phrase  or  abstract  formula,  which 
has  probably  had  a  meaning  once,  but  which  has 
degenerated  into  a  "  canting  motto."  The  ethic 
of  social  utility,  on  the  other  hand,  finds  its  sanction 
solely  in  the  definite  and  obvious  demands  of  the 
welfare  of  the  social  body,  and  recognises  the 
greatest  possible  free  play  of  the  individual  in  all 
matters  not  directly  conflicting  with  social  interests 
as  a  whole.  The  object  of  the  introspective  ethics 
is  to  erect  asceticism  into  a  standard  of  conduct. 

202 


SEX   AND   SENTIMENT  203 

Though  it  will  equally  attack  any  of  the  wants 
of  the  flesh,  its  special  and  favourite  hunting-ground 
has  always  been  the  sexual  impulse.  Here  it  takes 
the  most  specious  forms  calculated  to  deceive  the 
very  elect.  We  must  not,  however,  be  led  astray 
by  the  sweet  reasonableness  it  may  assume.  Let 
us  remember  that  we  have  to  do  with  a  Melusina 
— that  the  fair-looking  exterior  is  but  a  metamor- 
phosed serpent  —  the  old  serpent,  asceticism,  the 
subtle  enemy  of  human  rights,  father  of  hypocrisy, 
and  of  every  violation  of  nature  —  the  accursed 
thing  which  to  recognise  should  be  to  strike 
down. 

Now  the  touchstone  of  the  ethics  of  Socialism 
is  that  the  "  ought,"  though  necessarily  concerned 
with  motive,  as  opposed  to  mere  outward  act,  is 
none  the  less  only  concerned  with  it  in  so  far  as 
its  object  is  definitely  social  and  not  where  its 
subject  matter  merely  concerns  individual  taste. 
The  latter  belongs  not  to  ethics,  but  to  aesthetics, 
two  standpoints  many  persons  seem  to  confound. 

Believers  in  the  old  theological  sanctions  have 
no  difficulty  in  finding  justification  for  asceticism. 
Those,  however,  who,  having  abandoned  the  old 
ethics  of  supernaturalism,  still  possess  a  hankering 
after  an  ascetic  ideal,  are  driven  to  forage  about 
for  a  new  justification  which  has  a  semblance  of 
being  based  on  rational  considerations.  I  say  a 
semblance,   since   at   bottom   these  considerations 


204    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

are  not  one  whit  more  rational  than  the  old  ones. 
Thus  some  years  ago  a  pseudonymous  writer 
put  forward  the  thesis  that  the  sexual  act  was 
"  wrong,"  "  degrading,"  "  a  prostitution  of  woman," 
and  I  do  not  know  what  all  else,  when  not  followed 
— or  at  least  not  engaged  in  with  the  object  of 
being  followed — by  offspring !  Now  if  he  had 
been  in  a  position  to  inform  us  that  God  Almighty, 
Jesus  Christ,  the  Holy  Virgin,  the  angel  Gabriel, 
or  other  personages  we  in  divers  times  and  places 
have  been  taught  to  love  and  reverence,  had 
miraculously  revealed  this  ethical  dogma  to  him, 
his  position  would  at  least  have  been  intelligible. 
He  made  no  pretensions  of  this  sort,  however,  so 
what  remained  was  this  pseudonymous  gentleman's 
assurance — his  ipse  dixit — that  it  was  so  "  even  as 
he  had  said."  I  have  quoted  the  above  instance 
not  on  account  of  its  intrinsic  importance,  but  as 
an  extreme  example  of  the  Introspective  Ethics 
as  applied  to  sexual  matters.  There  is  a  mass 
of  writing  and  thinking  to  be  found  not  so 
logical  and  hence  so  obvious  in  its  absurdity 
as  the  case  quoted,  but  all  tending  in  the  same 
direction. 

Another  example  of  the  attempt  to  smuggle  in 
asceticism  under  cover  of  lofty  ideals  is  furnished 
by  a  writer  on  the  subject  of  sexual  ethics  in  a 
Socialist  periodical,  also  of  some  few  years  back. 
This  writer,  after  giving  a  sufficiently  good  general 


SEX   AND   SENTIMENT  205 

sketch  of  the  development  of  the  sexual  instinct, 
concludes  with  the  thesis  that  in  its  highest 
development  in  man  it  is  bound  up  with  a  "  com- 
plexity of  psychological  states  which  is  covered 
by  the  term  love^  This  is  all  right.  But  now 
comes  the  extraordinary  non-sequitu?^  of  the  article. 
Obviously,  no  one  objects  to  the  high  idyllic  senti- 
ment which,  from  the  context,  is  what  the  writer 
evidently  understands  by  the  "complexity  of  states  " 
termed  love.  This  may  always  remain  the  highest 
ideal  of  sex  relationship.  And  I  have  yet  to  learn 
of  any  recent  development  of  morality  which,  as 
the  writer  alleges,  "  bids  us  divest  ourselves  of  this 
most  important  element  of  our  spiritual  nature." 
If  there  be  such,  it  must  be  so  rare  and  sporadic  a 
development  of  "  degeneracy  "  as  not  to  be  worth 
serious  consideration. 

But  here,  as  just  said,  comes  in  the  extraordinary 
logical  gymnastic  of  our  writer.  From  the  above 
unimpeachable  propositions,  to  which  we  can  all 
subscribe,  he  draws  the  astounding  conclusion  that 
love  (in  his  sense)  "  alone  can  supply  the  neces- 
sary ethical  sanction,''  etc.,  for  sexual  connection. 
Now,  how  by  any  ordinary  rational  method  he  has 
succeeded  in  reaching  this  result,  I  submit,  is 
enough  to  puzzle  the  celebrated  lawyer  of  Phila- 
delphia. I  for  one,  when  I  read  this,  was  fain  driven 
to  the  hypothesis  that  he  had  been  interviewing  the 
angel  Gabriel  or  some  other  distinguished  character 


206    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

from  above,  as  to  the  sexually  right  and  wrong. 
The  sexual  act  viewed  on  mundane  principles,  like 
any  other  animal  function,  per  se  belongs  to  the 
domain  of  cesthetics,  not  of  ethics  at  all.  In  order 
to  be  brought  within  the  sphere  of  ethics  it  nmst 
be  connected  in  some  way  with  a  distinct  social 
relation  outside  the  persons  immediately  concerned, 
otherwise  it  is,  what  Mill  would  have  called,  "  a 
self- regarding  action."  We  all  admit  that  the 
idyllic-love  sexual  relation  is  the  most  beautiful. 
But  according  to  the  writer's  own  showing  there 
are  a  number  of  persons  who,  from  temperament 
or  circumstances,  are  condemned  to  remain  outside 
it.  All  these  poor  creatures  whose  "  complexity  of 
states  of  the  psychological  order  .  .  .  covered  by 
the  term  love,"  do  not  reach  the  prescribed  sixth- 
form  standard  with  respect  to  each  other,  are  to 
be  sent  away  howling  into  the  wilderness.  This  is 
clear  since,  in  spite  of  his  talk  about  "  love  in  its 
manifold  manifestations,"  our  moralist  rules  out 
mutual  consent,  which  to  most  of  us  would  cover 
one  of  the  most  common  "  manifestations  "  of  love. 
What  he  wants  is,  clearly,  love  a  la  Senta  and  the 
Flying  Dutchman — the  ich  bin  die  dick  dw^h  Hire 
Heil  erlose  sort  of  thing.  Now  I  should  much  like 
to  know  the  percentage  of  married  couples  in 
England  who,  supposing  "  the  great  white  throne  " 
were  set,  the  books  were  opened,  and  the  writer 
in  question   acting  as   hea^'enly   attorney-general, 


SEX   AND   SENTIMENT  207 

would  not  quail  before  his  searching  eye  as  he  rose 
to  indict  their  morality  on  the  principles  of  his 
"  ethics  of  sexual  relationship." 

No  one  is  more  alive  than  myself  to  the  fact 
that  the  idyllic  love  of  the  poets  exists.  But  it 
is  an  exception,  rather  than  the  rule,  and  will, 
so  far  as  we  can  see,  remain  so  for  a  very  long 
time  to  come.  To  require  of  a  man,  to  whom 
circumstances  have  not  granted  this  idyllic  love, 
sexual  abstention,  is  about  as  reasonable  as  to 
require  him  to  stop  breathing  in  the  courts  and 
alleys  of  Whitechapel,  where  he  cannot  obtain 
good  air,  or  to  tell  him  that  since  he  cannot  get 
the  highest  class  of  French  cookery,  his  "  clear  line 
of  conduct"  ethically  is  to  abstain  from  eating 
altogether.  For  even  in  the  affairs  of  the  stomach 
there  is  a  higher  and  a  lower,  just  as  in  those  of 
other  organs.  And  more  betoken  this  higher 
and  lower  has  its  influence  on  character.  Feeding 
on  "cagmag,"  London  "fried  fish,"  or  such-like 
abominations,  under  the  filthy  conditions  that  pre- 
vail, future  ages  will  probably  recognise  to  have 
defiled  the  men  of  to-day  as  much  as  what  is 
deemed  the  most  degraded  form  of  sexual  in- 
dulgence has  ever  done.  The  influence  of  food 
and  drink  (apart,  of  course,  from  the  well-worn 
subject  of  excess  in  alcohol)  has  been  far  too  much 
neglected  as  a  factor  in  the  making  or  marring  of 
character.     There  is  a  sentiment  in  cookery  as  well 


208    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

as  in  love.  If  my  analogy  be  objected  to  on  the 
ground  that  while  we  cannot  live  without  food 
we  can  without  sexual  satisfaction,  I  would  point 
out  that  this  is  only  relatively  true,  since,  as  the 
anchorites  and  the  Hindoo  Yogis  have  taught  us, 
we  can  do  with  a  very  exiguous  minimum  of  food, 
and,  moreover,  I  have  never  heard  of  even  partial 
starvation  being  advocated  by  the  modern  Puritan 
as  sexual  abstinence  has  been  and  is  advocated  by 
the  same  individual.  Again,  when  it  is  said  we 
can  live  without  sexual  satisfaction,  that  is  also 
only  true  very  relatively.  There  are  exceptions, 
I  am  aware,  but  for  the  average  man  sexual  satis- 
faction is  just  as  essential  to  a  healthy  life^  i.e.  to 
the  mens  saiia  in  corpore  sa?io,  as  food  is  to  bare 
existence.  "  Continence  "  is,  for  the  average  man, 
I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  unconditionally,  to  be 
deprecated  as  directly  producing  an  uncleanly  habit 
of  body,  usually  accompanied  by  an  uncleanly  habit 
of  mind,  if  nothing  worse.  That  the  latter  is  the 
case  has  been  proved  ad  nauseam  by  the  history 
of  religious  movements.  "  Continence "  may  be 
conducive  to  a  "  virtuously "  ascetic  life,  but  it 
certainly  does  not  conduce  to  a  socially  ethical  life 
(at  least  for  the  vast  majority  of  men).  Hence,  I 
can  only  again  repeat  that  if  you  choose  to  seek 
for  an  immediate  ethical  bearing  in  the  sexual  act, 
you  must  find  it  in  the  duty  of  a  man  to  be  natural 
(for  the  sake  of  his  health  and  usefulness  in  society). 


SEX   AND   SENTIMENT  209 

and  natural  in  the  obvious  sense  and  meaning  of  the 
word  of  Hving  according  to  his  nature. 

Our  pure  and  lofty  moralist  wants  to  be  an  angel 
and  with  the  angels  sing.  That  is  all  right.  But 
then  he  should  not  wish  to  force  his  neighbours  to  be 
angels  also,  and  to  make  them  sing,  too,  whether 
they  want  to  or  not.  The  illogical  attempt  to  take 
back  under  the  name  of  duty  what  he  has  conceded 
under  the  name  of  right  will  not  help  him,  since  no 
clear  ethical  thinker  will  admit  that  it  can  be  a 
"  duty "  to  forego  any  "  right,"  i.e.  as  a  matter 
of  principle.  (There  may  be,  of  course,  special 
occasions  on  which,  for  exceptional  and  clearly 
defined  reasons,  it  may  be  a  duty  to  forego  for  the 
moment  the  particular  exercise  of  a  right,  but 
never  to  surrender  the  right  itself  as  such.)  No, 
no,  my  worthy  friend,  the  attempt  to  force  the 
angelic  wings  on  unwilling  recipients  has  been  tried 
too  long  and  too  often  throughout  history,  and  has 
uniformly  resulted  in  failure  ! 

Asceticism  {i.e.  a  false  introspective  view  of  duty) 

has  invariably  proved  the  parent  of  hypocrisy  and 

corruption.     Socialistic  morality  must  once  for  all 

break   with   it.     Our   watchword   must   be,  "  Let 

us  be  natural ! "     If  we  are  destined  to  become 

angels,  the  wings  will  grow  in  their  own  good  time. 

Surely  ever  so  small  a  growth  of  true  and  genuine 

angel's  wing  is  of  more  worth  than  any  amount  of 

the  great  flapping  stage-property  wing  with  which 

14 


210    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

Asceticism  would  adorn  us.  Applying  what  is 
here  said  to  sexual  ethics,  what  results  do  we 
obtain?  Clearly  these:  (1)  Every  human  being 
has  a  complete  ethical  right  to  the  physical  exercise 
of  his  or  her  sexual  instincts  apart  from  anything 
else  whatever.  This  moral  right  is,  per  se,  "full, 
round,  and  orbicular."  (2)  It  is  also  the  duty  of 
every  human  being  to  exercise  this  faculty  in  pro- 
portion to  the  needs  of  his  or  her  physical  constitu- 
tion, in  order  to  ensure  a  healthiness  of  mind  and 
body.  (3)  The  ideal  of  sexual  exercise  may  be 
that  it  take  place  under  the  conditions  of  the  love 
of  the  idyllic  poet.  But  the  most  usual  condition, 
and  for  most  men  and  women  a  fairly  satisfactory 
one,  is  what  the  writer  terms  "  mutual  consent " 
(be  the  marriage  "free"  or  "legal"),  which  may 
also  develop  into  the  idyllic  love  in  time,  or,  least- 
ways, into  a  very  good  imitation  of  it.  The  third 
condition  mentioned  by  the  writer — prostitution — 
must  be  regarded  as  a  pis  alter  of  capitalistic 
society,  a  deplorable  necessity  sometimes  within  the 
limits  of  that  society,  but  in  all  cases  the  most  un- 
desirable form  of  sexual  relation — though,  perhaps, 
intrinsically  not  worse  than  the  marriage  for  money. 
It  is  necessary  to  come  back  from  heaven  to 
earth  in  sexual  matters,  to  recognise  that  the 
"  physical  basis  "  has  its  own  concrete  rights  apart 
from  aught  else.  By  all  means  seek  the  highest 
form  of  sexual  relationship,  but  let  us  recognise 


SEX    AND   SENTIMENT  211 

the  ethical  right  of  every  man — that  he  is  not 
immoral  when,  if  he  cannot  have  what  he  likes  in 
this  connection,  he  makes  himself  content  with 
what  he  has. 

As  to  the  "pure-minded  man  and  woman"   (a 
cold-blooded   human   entity   unfortunately  often- 
times apt  to  degenerate  into  the  insufferable  prig), 
he  or  she  has  a  good  deal  to  learn,  and  will  have  to 
be  educated.     First  of  all,  he  or  she  will  have  to 
be  taught  to  clear  his  or  her  mind  of  cant,  sexual 
as  well  as  other,  and  to  recognise  differences  of 
constitution  as  severally  having  their  own  justifica- 
tion.    He   or  she  will  further  have  to  be  taught 
that  it  is  as  wrong  to  hate  those  who  differ  from 
us  sexually  as  those  who  differ  from  us  in  other 
matters.     Let  me  adjure  our  aspiring  moralist  to 
take  in  hand  the  pure-minded  man  and  woman  of 
his  acquaintanceship  lest  a  worse  thing  happen ! 
For  if  "the  pure-minded  man   and   woman"   be 
allowed  to  rampage  too  much  in  their  wild  state, 
the  average  sexually-minded  man  and  woman  may 
eventually  rise  in  riotous  revolt,  calling  for  three 
cheers  for  the  "  old  Adam  and  the  old  Eve  " — and 
let  him  think  what  a  shocking  thing  that  would  be  I 
In  the  foregoing  paragraphs  I  have  dealt  with  an 
extreme  expression  of  a  form  of  introspective  ethics 
which  still   lurks   consciously  or  unconsciously  in 
a  good  many  minds  and  still  colours  the  views  of 
many  persons  on  the  subject  of  the  ethical  sanction 


212    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

of  sex.  Other  aspects  of  the  problem  are  here  left 
untouched.  I  have  purposely,  in  the  foregoing,  left 
the  question  of  offspring  on  one  side,  in  itself,  un- 
doubtedly, an  ethical  problem  of  deep  import,  and 
this  for  the  simple  reason  that  I  hold  it  to  be, 
per  s'c,  distinct  from  the  problem  of  sexual  conduct 
considered  as  such.  There  exists  a  vast  mass  of 
sexual  intercourse  into  which  the  question  of  off- 
spring does  not  enter  at  all.  The  two  problems, 
(1)  love  and  sexual  intercourse,  per  se,  and  (2) 
the  procreation  of  children,  should  be  clearly 
distinguished  and  threshed  out  apart  from  one 
another.  After  having  done  this  thoroughly,  we 
shall  be  in  a  position  to  consider  clearly  their 
mutual  bearings.  This  we  certainly  are  not  when 
we  incontinently  mix  up  these  two  perfectly 
distinct  aspects  of  the  great  problem  of  sex  with 
one  another,  thereby  hopelessly  confusing  the 
issues  involved.  The  first  is,  per  se,  an  aesthetic 
and  personal  self-regarding  question  ;  the  second  is 
pre-eminently  an  ethical  and  social  question.  The 
recognition  of  this  distinction  is  for  me  the  primary 
condition  for  adequate  discussion  of  the  subject. 
The  sexual  relation,  as  such,  is  a  thing  of  purely 
personal  taste.  This  is,  as  yet,  not  fully  recognised. 
Time  was  when  the  notion  of  toleration  in  religious 
belief  was  unknown,  when  not  merely  Catholics 
but  every  Protestant  sectary  thought  of  nothing 
else  than  to  impose  his  own  set  of  dogmas  and  his 


SEX   AND   SENTIMENT  213 

own  theory  of  church  organisation  vi  et  aiinis  on 
the  rest  of  the  world.  Then  came  the  epoch  when 
the  doctrine  of  toleration  appeared,  and  finally  gave 
rise  to  a  mutual  resolve  that,  while  each  sectary 
might  maintain  the  belief  in  the  superiority  of  his 
own  position,  it  should  be  regarded  as  "  bad  form  " 
to  "  damn  "  his  neighbour  for  thinking  otherwise — 
in  a  word,  when  the  attempt  to  obtain  religious 
uniformity  was  abandoned.  The  world  has  yet  to 
learn  toleration  in  sexual  matters  ;  it  has  yet  to 
learn  that  various  temperaments  must  have  a 
latitude  of  outlook  in  these  things,  that,  however 
estimable  the  current  sexual  theory  of  Christendom 
may  be,  mechanical  monogamy  must  be  definitely 
abandoned,  and  freedom  of  choice,  within  at  least 
certain  limits,  granted  as  just  and  righteous.  The 
endeavour  to  enforce  sexual  uniformity  has  hitherto 
been  productive  of  nothing  but  human  misery,  and 
has  proved  the  seed-ground  of  the  worst  form  of 
hypocrisy,  a  hypocrisy  which  has  helped  to  sap 
the  moral  fibre  of  one  generation  after  another. 
Whatever  else  may  be  natural,  that  is  certainly 
unnatural,  and  not  merely  unnataral,  but  also  in 
the  highest  degree  imvioral.  These  are  thy  fruits, 
oh,  misnamed  "  purity  "  !  When,  I  ask,  will  society 
learn  the  lesson  of  toleration  in  sexual  matters  as  it 
has  even  now,  as  compared  with  past  ages,  learnt 
it  as  regards  intellectual  matters  ? 


CHAPTER  X 

THE    PROBLEM    OF   ALCOHOL 

The  question  of  the  use  and  abuse  of  alcohol  is 
one  of  those  questions  of  the  detail  of  social  life  in 
which  fanaticism  seems  to  me  eminently  out  of 
place,  and  its  presence  to  indicate  the  degeneration 
of  legitimate  opinion  or  conviction  into  a  fad.  By 
a  "  fad  "  (or  a  "  crank " ),  as  I  think  I  have  else- 
where explained,  I  do  not  mean  an  opinion  (or  the 
champion  of  an  opinion),  which  I  hold  to  be  errone- 
ous in  itself,  but  rather  an  opinion,  whether  true  or 
false,  championed  in  a  manner  showing  the  lack  of 
all  sense  of  proportion  as  to  its  relative  importance. 
As  regards  the  Alcohol  Problem,  I  must  plead 
guilty  to  adopting  the  tame  and  unheroic  attitude 
of,  while  condemning  the  abuse,  defending  the 
use  of  alcohol,  an  attitude  which,  if  tame  and  un- 
heroic, strikes  me  as  the  only  true  and  sane  position. 
Alcohol  may  be  a  poison,  but,  somehow  or  other, 
mankind,  as  a  whole,  has  got  along  well  with  it 
from  prehistoric  times  up  to  the  rise  of  modern 
capitalism,   before   which    time    distilled,   as    dis- 

214 


ALCOHOL  215 

tinguished  from  naturally  fermented  liquors,  were 
almost  unknown.     The  rise  of  the  later  phases  of 
capitalism  and  the   spread   of  dram- drinking   are 
practically  synchronous.     Not  that  I  am  prepared 
unconditionally   to   condemn  the   use   of  distilled 
forms   of  alcohol,  under  favourable  circumstances 
and  with  due  moderation.     It  is  necessary  to  point 
out,  however,  that  there  is  good  evidence  that  a 
not  inconsiderable  difference  obtains  between  the 
physical  effects  of  these  two  classes  of  alcoholic 
liquors,  and  therefore  it  is  essential  to  distinguish 
rather  more  carefully  than  do  some  of  our  teetotal 
friends  between  them   in  different  cases.     Again, 
no  teetotal  advocate  that  I  have  ever  heard  of  has 
taken   the  trouble  to  discriminate   to   any  extent 
worth   speaking   of  between   the   action   of  pure 
alcoholic   drinks   of   all   classes   and   that   of    the 
adulterated   products   of  latter-day   unscrupulous 
capitalism.      A   rich    man   with   his   well-stocked 
cellar  may  indulge  with  impunity  in  a  three  or 
more  times  greater  amount   of  alcohol   than  his 
poorer  neighbour,  who  is  ruining  his  constitution 
with  the  vile  decoctions  available  at  public-house 
bars.     Even  so,  alcohol  and  its  adulterations  are  by 
no  means  the  only,  or  perhaps  not  even  the  worst 
poisons,  eatable  or  drinkable,  which  the  proletarian 
is  forced  to  consume  under  present  conditions.     To 
my  thinking  the  teetotal  argument  is  completely  viti- 
ated by  the  indiscriminating  and  utterly  unproven 


216    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

attribution  to  alcohol   of  all  the  bodily  ills  that 
modem  flesh  is  heir  to,  and  through  the  almost  com- 
plete ignoring  of  the  considerations  just  referred  to. 
My  own  "  lay  "  observation  leads  me  to  the  con- 
clusions that  while  (1)  there  is  a  limit   for  every 
man  beyond  which  he  cannot  continue  imbibing 
alcohol   without   deleterious  effects,  (2)    that   this 
limit  is  subject  to  such  wide  individual  variation 
that  no  hard  and  fast  rule  can  be  usefully  formu- 
lated concerning  it.     Each  man  must  find  this  out 
for  himself  by  personal  experience  of  the  effects  of 
alcohol  on  his  own  constitution.     His  duty  is,  of 
course,  to  see  to  it  that  he  does  not  habitually 
exceed  this  limit,  it  being  a  social  duty  not  only 
to  avoid  making  a  nuisance  of  himself  to  others, 
as  regular  "  boozers  "  do,  but  in  addition  to  main- 
tain himself  in  his  normal  standard  of  efficiency. 
In  my  own  case   1   have  been  commonly  in  the 
company  of   men   who   can   take,  without   doing 
themselves  any  noticeable  harm,  three  or  four  times 
the  amount  of  alcohol  that  I  can.     These  men,  I 
consider,  have  a  right,  therefore,  to  indulge  in  this 
larger  quantity,  whereas  it  might  well  be  deemed 
reprehensible  on  my  part  to  follow  their  example. 

Now,  as  to  the  theory  of  the  absolutely  poisonous 
nature  of  alcohol  on  which  depends  the  present 
anti-alcoholic  mania  among  doctors  and  others — 
we  must  not  forget  that  the  present  is  the  day  of 
the  discovery  of  "  death  in  the  pot "  everywhere. 


ALCOHOL  217 

Time  was  when  tea,  as  "  the  cup  that  cheers  but 
not  inebriates,"  was  held  to  be  the  most  harmless  of 
beverages,  and  indeed  was  often  enough  played  off 
against  alcohol  as  the  sober  poor  man's  drink.  Now 
tea  is  alleged  by  some  of  the  self-same  eminent 
authorities  who  condemn  alcohol  to  be  almost,  if 
not  quite,  as  deadly,  while,  in  its  very  nature,  more 
insidious.  Some  time  ago  a  journal  was  published 
called  Rational  Food,  the  chief  function  of  which 
was  to  demonstrate  the  fatal  effects  on  the  health 
of  bread  and  potatoes  !  Many  of  us  will  recollect 
some  years  ago  an  eminent  surgeon's  list  of  foods 
productive  of  appendicitis,  which  included,  if  I 
remember  rightly,  almost  every  article  of  diet  with 
the  exception  of  toast  and  water.  We  all  know 
that  to  the  vegetarian  every  form  of  flesh  food  is  a 
highly  baneful  toxic  in  its  physiological  effect,  and 
unsuited  to  the  human  constitution.  If  we  com- 
bine the  teachings  of  all  the  eminent  authorities  on 
the  subject  of  meat  and  drinks,  we  shall  find  our- 
selves reduced  in  time  to  the  nutriment  afforded 
by  the  dead  bodies  of  microbes  contained  in  well- 
cooked  London  water,  with,  say,  an  occasional  bite 
of  digestive  biscuit  to  add  solidity. 

The  allegation  that  alcohol,  as  such,  and  in  how- 
ever small  quantities,  is  a  poison,  is  usually  sup- 
ported by  two  sets  of  arguments :  firstly,  the 
chemico-physiological  argument,  and,  secondly,  the 
statistical.     As  regards  the  former,  a  careful  read- 


218    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

ing  of  the  evidence  fails  to  disclose  to  me  any  proof 
of  toxic  effects,  save  when  alcohol  is  taken  to  excess. 
This  excess,  I  readily  admit,  may  obtain  in  some 
constitutions  with  an  exceedingly  small  quantity 
of  alcohol.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  plenty 
of  constitutions  where  the  evidences  of  toxic  effect, 
and  hence  of  excess,  are  only  shown  after  the  con- 
sumption of  a  relatively  large  amount.  Of  course 
we  know  that  there  are  universally  admitted  poisons 
{e.g.  arsenic)  which  may  be  taken  without  ill  effects 
in  small  or  graduated  doses.  This,  therefore,  does 
not  prove  that  alcohol  is  not  a  poison.  But  all  I 
can  say  is,  that  if  alcohol  is  to  be  reckoned  a  poison, 
the  range  within  which  it  may  be  taken  with  im- 
punity is  so  immensely  greater  than  in  the  case  of 
the  more  undoubted  poisons  as,  for  all  practical 
purposes,  to  take  it  out  of  the  category  of  true 
poisons  altogether. 

The  argument  from  statistics,  in  most  questions 
an  unreliable  one,  is  especially  so  in  the  present. 
As  an  illustration  of  this  1  may  quote  some  of  the 
most  recent  figures  on  the  subject.  A  few  years 
ago  some  elaborate  statistics  furnished,  if  I  mistake 
not,  originally  by  Sir  Albert  Rollit,  on  the  subject 
of  drink  and  longevity  were  given  in  the  daily 
press.  Now  mark  the  way  in  which  the  published 
report  was  put  together  so  as  to  produce  the  effect 
desired.  The  accuracy  of  the  figures  themselves  I 
am  not  in  a  position  either  to  impugn  or  to  corro- 


ALCOHOL  219 

borate.  But  the  arrangement  of  the  report  is  truly 
significant  of  the  manner  in  which  figures,  let  them 
be  the  most  accurate  in  themselves,  can,  by  a  stroke 
of  the  pen,  be  made  to  prove  just  what  is  wanted. 

As  we  all  know,  the  ''business  end"  of  the 
present  agitation  is  directed,  not  against  drunken- 
ness, but  against  moderate  drinking.  Accordingly 
we  find  that  the  author  of  the  report  referred  to 
divides  the  population  into  three  classes — total 
abstainers,  moderate  drinkers,  and  publicans.  On 
this  basis  of  the  report  he  readily  succeeds  in 
proving  that  "publicans"  have  the  shortest  lives, 
"  moderate  drinkers "  the  next,  and  "  total  ab- 
stainers" the  longest. 

Now,  it  is  obvious  that  publicans,  as  being  a 
class  specially  liable  to  temptation,  will  be  likely 
to  contain  a  large  percentage  of  excessive  drinkers 
to  the  extent  of  ruining  their  health.  We  are  not 
surprised,  therefore,  to  find  that  pubUcans  show 
up  unfavourably  in  this  respect  as  against  total 
abstainers.  It  is  in  the  second  category  that  the 
tricky  nature  of  the  arrangement  comes  out.  We 
need  only  note  that  men  are  not  to  be  exhaustively 
divided  in  potatorial  matters  into  publicans, 
moderate  drinkers,  and  total  abstainers.  There 
are,  on  the  contrary,  a  number  of  extremely  im- 
moderate drinkers  who  are  not  publicans  by  trade, 
any  more  than  they  are  total  abstainers  by  practice. 
Now,  on  this   division,  where   do   tkey  come  in? 


220    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

Obviously  they  are  included  under  the  second, 
vague  and  elastic,  heading  of  "  moderate  drinkers." 
In  this  way  the  second  division,  that  of  the 
"moderate  drinkers,"  swelled  by  all  the  non- 
publican  drunkards  and  semi-drunkards,  can,  of 
course,  easily  be  shown  to  present  a  higher  death- 
rate,  and  a  shorter  average  life,  than  that  of  the 
"total  abstainers."  "That's  the  way  it's  done," 
and  moderate  drinking  sought  to  be  brought  into 
disrepute. 

On  the  other  hand,  was  it  not  the  then  Sir 
Walter  Foster  who  showed  some  time  ago  that 
the  really  moderate  drinker,  who  carefully  kept 
within  the  drinking  capacities  of  his  constitu- 
tion, had  a  longer  average  life,  not  merely  than 
the  drunkard,  but  also  than  the  total  abstainer  ? 
Once  more,  the  late  Sir  Wilfrid  Lawson,  a  man 
for  whose  integrity  in  public  affairs  I  always 
had  a  considerable  respect,  when  on  the  anti- 
drink  lay,  was  not  always  exempt  from  tricki- 
ness  in  argument.  For  instance,  replying  on  one 
occasion  to  the  allegation  I  have  myself  often  heard 
medical  men  make  to  the  effect  that  more  persons 
kill  themselves  through  over-eating  than  through 
over-drinking.  Sir  Wilfrid  Lawson  confined  him- 
self to  making  fun  of  the  paucity  of  cases  in  which 
death  is  certifiable  as  being  directly  due  to  over- 
eating, omitting,  of  course,  the  thousands  of  cases 
in  which  the  constitution  is  weakened  and  life  is 


ALCOHOL  221 

shortened  by  the  habitual  practice  of  guzzling  two 
or  three  heavy  meals  a  day.  What  would  Sir 
Wilfrid  have  thought  of  a  champion,  say,  of  the 
Licensed  Victuallers'  Association,  who  confined  his 
argument  to  showing  that  the  number  of  deaths 
directly  certifiable  as  due  to  delirium  tremens  were 
comparatively  few  ?  Yet  this  is  precisely  the  line 
he  himself  takes  in  endeavouring  to  minimise  the 
evils  of  over-eating  in  order  to  maximise  those  of 
over- drinking. 

In  conclusion,  one  must  not  forget  the  role  played 
in  the  temperance  agitation  by  the  morality  of 
Puritanism  and  asceticism.  This  code  of  morals, 
belonging  to  what  I  have  elsewhere  termed  "  the 
introspective  ethics,"  having  survived  its  theo- 
logical sanctions,  seeks  to  buttress  itself  up  with 
appeals  to  self-sacrifice  for  its  own  sake.  As  if 
there  were  not  plenty  of  occasions  for  the  exercise 
of  a  self-denial  issuing  in  real  good  to  humanity 
or  in  real  immediate  services  to  one's  fellows, 
without  seeking  out  opportunities  for  the  display 
of  objectless  moral  gymnastics  such  as  delight  the 
heart  of  the  anchorite  and  the  Puritan.  Hence, 
not  content  in  resting  their  case  on  the  good  or 
bad  qualities  of  alcohol  as  proved  by  experience, 
the  votaries  of  this  school  are  apt,  in  default  of 
better  arguments,  to  appeal  to  the  motives  of 
Simon  Styhtes.  As  regards  strengthening  and  dis- 
ciplining  the   will    power,    surely  to   practise   the 


222    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

requisite  moderation  in  drinking  is  more  conducive 
to  this  end  than  weakly  yielding  to  the  fear  of  ex- 
cess by  total  abstention.  Surely  the  man  who  can 
stop  at  the  right  moment  shows  more  character 
than  the  man  who,  from  fear  of  not  being  able  to 
do  so,  gives  up  drinking  altogether. 

A  similar  line  may  be  taken  as  regards  the  argu- 
ment from  example  so  often  trotted  out  by  tee- 
totallers. The  man,  probably  the  average  man, 
whose  constitution  can  stand  a  certain  amount  of 
alcohol  and  whose  will-power  is  sufficient  to  pre- 
vent him  exceeding  the  limits  in  this  respect, 
prescribed  by  his  constitution,  ought,  it  is  said, 
to  forego  the  use  of  alcohol  for  the  sake  of  the 
example  offered  by  his  doing  so  to  the  exceptional 
man  who  drinks  to  excess.  Preachers  of  this 
doctrine  forget  that  to  be  consistent  they  must 
give  it  a  wider  application  than  the  alcohol  ques- 
tion. For  instance,  I  am  recovering  from  a  broken 
leg,  or  suffering  from  phlebitis,  varicose  veins,  or 
some  other  malady,  for  which  exercise  is  a  bad 
thing ;  my  inclinations,  nevertheless,  are  to  move 
about  and  thereby  injure  myself.  It  follows,  there- 
fore, that  my  healthy  but  high-souled  neighbours, 
those  with  whom  I  am  thrown  in  contact,  ought 
to  forego  all  walking  exercise  in  order  to  set  an 
example  to  me  not  to  injure  myself  by  the  same. 

The  fact  is,  of  course,  that  this  theory  of  the  duty 
of  a  healthy  man  to  forego  something  which  his 


ALCOHOL  223 

constitution  and  temperament  permit  and,  perhaps, 
even  enjoin,  as  an  example  to  some  other  weak 
or  unhealthy  person  not  to  do  the  same  things, 
because,  in  his  case,  the  doing  of  them  would  be 
prejudicial  to  him,  is  fundamentally  wrong.  Not 
merely  has  no  man  a  right  to  require  another  man 
to  pander  to  his  weakness,  but  the  pandering  itself 
is  a  direct  encouragement  to  the  cultivation  of 
weakness  of  will  in  the  individuals  for  whose  sake 
this  particular  self-sacrifice  of  the  healthy  and 
normal  man  is  made.  The  weak  and  abnormal 
man  ought  to  learn  to  regulate  himself  off  his  own 
bat,  so  to  say,  without  exacting  from  his  neigh- 
bour a  sacrifice  on  his  behalf  which  is  purely 
irrelevant  and  unnecessary.  The  high  -  souled 
Puritan  who  abstains  from  alcohol,  not  because  it 
is  bad  for  him  or  because  he  is  likely  to  be  tempted 
to  take  it  to  excess,  but  because  some  other  person 
for  whom  it  is  bad,  or  who  may  be  liable  to  drink 
too  much,  might  conceivably  be  influenced  by  his 
example  not  to  drink  at  all,  is  simply  helping  to 
promote  moral  backbonelessness  in  his  weaker 
brother.  A  truly  virile  personal  morality  in 
alcohol,  as  in  the  other  appetites,  would  strive  for 
the  maintenance  of  the  juste  milieit,  as  opposed 
alike  to  shrivelling  in  abstinence  or  wallowing  in 
excess.  What  is  really  behind  the  abstinence  move- 
ment is  the  old  asceticism  in  a  new  guise,  and  for 
this  reason,  if  for  no  other,  it  is  to  be  distrusted. 


CHAPTER   XI 

THE    PROBLEM   OF    LIBERTY   AND    LIBEL 

What  is  the  7'aison  d'etre  of  the  law  of  libel,  civil 
and  criminal,  and  in  how  far  does  such  a  law 
infringe  the  principle  of  the  liberty  of  the  Press  ? 
The  main  purpose  of  a  libel  suit  is  supposed  to  be 
the  clearing  of  character  of  false  and  calumnious 
aspersion.  The  effect  of  the  English  law  of  libel 
in  its  administration  as  at  present  obtaining  is  to 
draw  into  the  net  of  the  libel  action  practically 
anything  that  may  be  said  by  way  of  criticism  of 
any  person  or  group  of  persons.  In  other  words, 
the  existing  law  of  libel  is  a  direct  infringement  of 
the  principle  of  liberty  of  the  Press.  No  distinc- 
tion is  made  between  a  definite  allegation,  such  as 
that  A  stole  a  £lO  note  from  B's  pocket  in  the 
year  1910,  and  the  statement  of  the  writer's  opinion, 
as  an  opinion,  without  quoting  facts  in  support  of 
it,  that  A  is  not  a  trustworthy  person.  Now,  the 
bringing  to  book  of  the  maker  of  a  false  assertion 
of  a  damaging  character,  as  in  the  first  case  sup- 
posed, may  certainly  justify  the  intervention  of  the 

224 


LIBERTY   AND   LIBEL  225 

law  without  involving  any  real  infringement  of  the 
liberty  of  the  Press.  The  same  remarks  apply  to 
the  insinuations  of  a  writer  that  he  has  something 
"  up  his  sleeve,"  which,  "  if  he  listeth,"  etc.  As 
much  cannot  be  said  for  the  second  of  the  cases 
supposed.  If  liberty  of  the  Press  is  not  to  be  a 
meaningless  phrase,  any  writer  clearly  ought  to  be 
allowed  to  publish  an  expression  of  opinion  on  any 
person,  at  least  if  he  be  in  any  capacity  before  the 
public.  The  opinion  expressed  may  be  utterly 
wrong,  unjust,  and  unwarranted,  but  that  ought 
not  to  hinder  the  absolute  right  of  the  holder  of 
such  opinion  to  give  expression  to  it.  If  it  is 
wrong,  the  remedy  for  this  wrong  lies  with  public 
opinion.  People  of  ordinary  intelligence  will  not 
accept  an  opinion  of  this  sort  without  evidence. 
And  in  so  far  as  this  elementary  principle  of  justice 
and  fair  play  is  observed,  no  harm  can  come  from 
the  expression  of  any  opinion  as  such,  however 
unjustified  it  may  be.  So  much  for  the  case  of 
an  injurious  opinion  destitute  of  all  foundation 
whatever. 

But  in  nine  cases  out  of  ten  a  published  opinion 
of  this  nature  is  not  entirely  destitute  of  founda- 
tion. Its  justification  may  have  varying  degrees 
of  completeness,  from  a  mere  rebuttable  suspicion 
to  something  like  moral  certainty.  Yet,  however 
great  may  be  the   grounds  of  justification  of  the 

opinion   expressed,  this   does  not  shield  a  writer 

15 


226    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

expressing  such  opinion  from  the  terrors  of  the  law 
of  libel.  A  distinction  which  is  obviously  fair  is 
never  drawn  between  the  degree  of  evidence  justi- 
ficatory of  the  expression  of  an  adverse  opinion, 
direct  or  indirect,  regarding  a  person,  and  the 
evidence  that  ought  to  be  required  before  a  prisoner 
in  the  dock  is  convicted  of  an  offence.  It  is  a 
very  different  thing  to  publicly  express  an  adverse 
opinion  concerning  a  man,  and  to  send  him  to  gaol. 
In  the  latter  case  it  is  undoubtedly  right  to  exact 
the  most  rigidly  clinching  evidence  before  convic- 
tion. In  the  former  case  a  very  much  lower  degree 
of  probability  ought  to  justify. 

As  regards  the  existing  law  of  libel  and  the 
way  it  is  administered,  there  is  no  doubt  whatever 
that  it  acts  as  a  powerful  weapon  for  the  shielding 
and  aggrandisement  of  rogues.  Cases  are  known 
of  doubtful  characters  who  have  made  a  good  living 
out  of  libel  actions.  Any  published  statement  not 
laudatory  of  the  subject  of  it  is  nowadays  adequate 
ground  for  taking  proceedings  for  libel.  The 
matter,  from  the  point  of  view  alike  of  the  liberty 
of  the  Press  and  from  what  is  known  as  the  "  public 
interest,"  is  getting  serious.  But  what  is  the 
remedy  ?  The  remedy  which  lies  nearest  to  hand 
would  seem  to  be  to  effectively  render  the  average 
plaintiff  in  libel  actions  odious  to  public  opinion. 
No  opportunity  should  be  lost  to  pillory  the 
plaintiff  in  a  libel  suit.     Those  opposed  to  the 


LIBERTY   AND   LIBEL  227 

present  state  of  things  should  not  tire  of  pointing 
out  that  the  winner  of  an  action  for  hbel  is  by  no 
means  necessarily  the  injured  innocent  he  makes 
himself  out  to  be.  It  should  be  ceaselessly  im- 
pressed upon  the  average  man  that  the  winning  of 
a  libel  suit  does  not  mean  the  clearing  of  character, 
and  that  there  is  not  even  any  guarantee  that  the 
statements  complained  of  are  not  substantially 
true.  The  aim  should  be  to  introduce  a  social 
boycott  of  the  plaintiffs  in  all  frivolous  and  doubt- 
ful cases.  Until  a  sufficiently  strong  body  of  public 
opinion  is  set  in  motion  nothing  will  be  done. 
Such  a  prejudice  against  plaintiffs  in  libel  actions 
does,  I  believe,  obtain  in  some  of  the  states  of  the 
North  American  Union,  where  the  libel  action, 
although  nominally  existing,  is  practically  inopera- 
tive. The  result  is  that  the  worst  excesses  of  yellow 
journalism  in  the  matter  of  vilification  do  no  harm 
to  honest  men,  as  no  one  pays  any  attention  to 
them,  while  the  rogue  has  no  legal  fence  behind 
which  he  can  skulk,  and  by  which  the  confraternity 
of  rogues  can  exercise  a  terrorism  over  the  Press  in 
order  to  prevent  the  actual,  if  technically  unprovable, 
truth  about  themselves  from  being  made  known. 

It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  the  libel 
action,  with  its  casting  in  damages,  is  the  only  way 
of  dealing  with  an  unjustifiable  aspersion  on  char- 
acter on  the  part  of  the  Press.  In  the  case  of  a 
journal  the  law  might  very  well  compel  an  editor 


228    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

to  insert  a  denial  or  exculpation  of  the  defamatory 
statement  running  (say)  to  two  columns,  and  this 
on  the  first  issue  of  the  publication  after  such  com- 
munication was  received.  Failing  such  immediate 
publication,  an  injunction  might  be  obtainable 
preventing  any  further  issue  of  the  journal  in 
question  not  containing  the  rebutting  communica- 
tion. To  an  editor  overcharged  with  important 
matter  awaiting  publication  this  might  in  itself  be 
no  light  punishment.^ 

The  unfairness  with  which  the  precious  "remedy" 
provided  by  the  English  statute-book  against 
aspersed  character  acts  is  obvious.  In  the  first 
place,  it  compels  persons  whose  character  has  been 
in  truth  wrongfully  attacked  by  some  lying  organ 
of  the  Press  to  bring  a  libel  action  whether  they 
will  or  not  on  pain  of  the  false  allegations  made 
against  them  being  accepted  by  the  public  in 
default.  The  really  innocent  person  would  in 
most  cases  much  prefer  it  if  the  law  would  allow 
him  to  treat  the  matter  with  contempt,  relying 
on  his  character  and  reputation  as  sufficient  pro- 
tection in  the  eyes  of  the  public.  But  the  legal 
interest  does  not  see  the  matter  in  this  light,  and 

1  It  may  be  remarked  that  the  principle  of  the  above 
suggestion  is  already  embodied  in  the  French  Code,  in  the 
Press  Law  of  1881,  Art.  12,  which  provides,  under  penalty  of  a 
fine,  for  the  insertion,  within  three  days  of  its  reception,  of  any 
explanatory  or  rectificatory  matter  up  to  double  the  length  of 
the  article  complained  of. 


LIBERTY  AND   LIBEL  229 

has  no  intention,  if  it  can  be  helj3ed,  of  relinquishing 
such  a  mine  of  professional  profit  as  the  libel  action  ; 
and  judges,  acting  apparently  as  guardians  of  the 
interests  of  the  great  legal  trade  union,  naturally 
encourage  the  bringing  of  these  actions. 

The  unfairness  to  non-litigious  persons  of  the 
present  state  of  the  law,  forcing  such  willy-nilly 
to  bring  libel  suits  in  sheer  defence,  is  bad  enough, 
but  worse  remains  behind.  For  while  any  ordi- 
nary person  can  obtain  damages,  often  vindictive 
damages,  for  some  trivial  statement  or  expression 
of  opinion  concerning  themselves  which  displeases 
them,  a  man  known  to  hold  unpopular  opinions 
(say  he  is  an  atheist,  a  militant  Socialist,  an  anti- 
jingo,  etc.)  can  obtain  no  redress  for  the  most 
serious  allegations  against  his  character,  allegations 
that  would  gain  for  an  ordinary  respectable  Philis- 
tine swingeing  damages  from  a  sympathetic  and 
indignant  judge  and  jury.  The  cases  of  Mr  J.  M. 
Robertson,  M.P.,  of  Mr  W.  E.  Williams,  and  of 
Mr  Edmondson  will  bear  out  what  is  here  said.  Mr 
Robertson,  the  Secularist  lecturer,  was  wrongfully 
accused  of  taking  part  in  an  improper  publication  by 
a  Conservative  organ.  Mr  Williams,  the  Socialist 
and  Labour  agitator,  was  described  as  a  "  loafer  " 
by  a  paper  to  whom  his  views  were  objectionable ; 
and  Mr  Edmondson,  also  a  well-known  Sociahst, 
who  had,  of  his  own  accord,  gone  out  to  fight 
in    the    South    African    war,   was    designated    a 


230    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

"  coward  "  similarly  by  an  organ  of  public  opinion 
opposed  to  his  political  principles.  Needless  to 
say,  verdict  for  the  defendant  in  all  these  cases. 
Now,  for  my  own  part,  I  don't  think  calling 
a  man  a  "loafer"  or  calling  him  a  "coward" 
either,  both  of  which  are  mere  expressions  of 
opinion,  views  widely  differing  as  to  their  applica- 
bility in  any  given  instance,  ought  to  be  actionable, 
or  to  render  the  person  using  these  expressions 
liable  to  pains  and  penalties ;  in  fact,  in  common 
with  many  others,  I  should  regard  the  act  of 
deliberately  going  out  to  fight  against  the  Boer 
Republics  as  more  morally  disgraceful  than  any  act 
of  cowardice  from  the  military  point  of  view  com- 
mitted on  the  field.  But  the  fact  remains  that,  if 
used  of  the  respectable  Philistine,  the  above  expres- 
sions would  undoubtedly  enable  the  latter  to  obtain 
a  heavy  sum  of  money.  Hence  the  remedy  provided 
by  law  as  at  present  administered  is  practically  only 
available  for  him  whose  views  are  not  known  to 
be  distasteful  to  the  ruck  of  middle-class  "  respect- 
ability." On  him  the  law  of  libel,  and  those  who 
administer  it,  smile  with  favour,  rogue  though  he 
may  be.  But  woe  betide  the  man  of  heterodox 
views,  however  untarnished  his  honour ! 

The  protection  of  characters  that  are  worth 
anything  does  not  in  most  cases  require  the  inter- 
vention of  the  law,  which  it  can  easily  be  seen  does 
more   harm  than  good.     The  real  remedy  lies  in 


LIBERTY   AND   LIBEL  231 

the  education  of  public  opinion  to  prove  all  things 
relevant  thereto  before  accepting  allegations  in 
aspersion  of  character,  and  to  be  always  mindful 
of  the  fact  that  though  A  may  have  a  perfect  right 
to  express  any  opinion  he  likes  of  B,  yet  that  the 
fact  of  his  expressing  it  does  not  prove  his  state- 
ments to  be  of  any  value  whatever.  Public  opinion, 
if  it  sets  its  mind  to  it,  is  quite  capable  of  dealing 
with  persons  or  journals  carelessly  or  maliciously 
publishing  libels  as  it  deals  with  other  forms  of 
objectionable  social  conduct. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE    PROBLEM   OF    BllITAIN    AND    THE    HUMAN   RACE 

The  Democrat  and  Socialist  of  the  Continent  has 
got  so  much  into  the  habit  of  regarding  Great 
Britain  as  the  home  of  freedom,  that  nothing,  it 
seems,  will  induce  him  to  recognise  that  the 
England  of  to-day  and  the  England  of  even  fifty 
years  ago  are  two  utterly  different  countries. 
The  Fabian,  Sidney  Webb,  has  truly  said  {Nine- 
teenth Century,  September  1901)  that  in  that  space 
"the  English  have  become  a  new  nation."  He 
further  observes  that  "  centuries  separate  us  from 
the  first  period  of  the  reign  of  Victoria."  Allowing 
for  hyperbolic  exaggeration,  there  is  a  considerable 
element  of  truth  even  in  this  last  assertion.  The 
first  period  of  the  reign  of  Victoria  was  the  period 
when  the  proletariat  of  England  was  stirred  to 
its  depths  by  the  Chartist  agitation,  when  it  was 
more  self-conscious,  notwithstanding  its  necessarily 
strong  infiltration  with  ideas  essentially  belonging 
to  the  small  middle  class,  then  the  leading  class 
of  democracy,  than  it  has  ever  been  since.     The 

232 


BRITAIN  AND  THE  HUMAN  RACE    233 

middle  class  itself,  at  that  time,  did  not  lack  ideals. 
Beyond  a  certain  anti-French  feeling,  surviving 
from  the  Napoleonic  era,  and  the  dread  of  imminent 
invasion  by  the  grande  arinee,  there  was  no  special 
Chauvinism  noticeable.  Popular  statesmen  like 
Molesworth  and  Roebuck  could  even  wish  success 
to  the  French  Canadian  rebels.  An  unjust  war 
in  Burmah  was  extremely  unpopular.  The  mon- 
archy itself  was  by  no  means  in  especial  favour, 
still  less  regarded  as  above  criticism.  Colonial 
expansion  as  a  policy  was  as  yet  not  dreamt  of. 
The  glory  of  the  Englishman  was  then  not  his 
"empire,"  but  his  alleged  free  institutions. 

To-day  it  is  far  otherwise.  Every  month  that 
passes  shows  us  clearly  that  the  modern  Briton 
is  a  moral  and  political  degenerate.  The  one 
ideal  of  the  modern  Englishman  and  Scotchman 
(the  Welshman,  maybe,  is  somewhat  better  in 
this  respect)  is  the  autocracy  of  Britain  over  other 
peoples,  and  the  cheap  glory  accompanying  it. 
For  this  he  is  willing,  if  necessary,  to  barter  his 
free  institutions,  invite  conscription,  and  sacrifice 
the  whole  national  tradition  or  legend.  Unhappily, 
one  cannot  say  that  the  above  applies  exclusively 
or  even  mainly  to  the  well-to-do  classes,  the  aris- 
tocracy and  bou?-geoisie.  The  bulk  of  the  un- 
organised working  classes,  at  least,  are  in  the  same 
galley. 

Britain  is  to-day   in  the  grip  of  international 


234    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

"high  finance."  Therein  Hes  its  safety.  No 
continental  nation  fears  the  British  army,  while 
the  manning  of  the  navy  is  said  by  experts  to 
leave  much  to  be  desired.  The  real  reason  of 
England's  comparative  security  is  its  being  the 
head-centre  of  the  world's  finance.  The  financial 
interest  in  every  country  is  always  pro-British. 
The  money-lords  {alias  gold-bags)  hold  the  key 
of  the  capitalist  fortress,  and  modern  capitalism 
tends  to  become,  with  the  new  era  of  trusts  and 
big  combines,  of  Rockefellers  and  Pierpoint- 
Morgans  and  Carnegies,  more  and  more  domin- 
ated by  its  financial  side.  Now  Great  Britain  has 
been  the  centre  of  the  world  of  finance  from  the 
very  beginning.  Hence  it  is  that  she  has  become 
the  great  bulwark  in  Europe  of  modern  capitalism. 
The  financier  knows  what  the  overthrow  of  the 
British  power  would  mean  to  him  and  to  the 
order  he  represents.  The  British  power,  in  fact, 
represents  capitalism  pure  and  simple,  and  in  its 
most  dangerous  form,  namely,  capitalism  with  a 
power  of  expansion,  capitalism  in  a  position  to 
prolong  its  own  life. 

But  the  British  nation,  including  the  bulk  of 
its  working  classes,  stands  in  another  and  a  special 
sense  for  the  capitalist  system  in  that,  of  all  civilised 
nations,  it  is  the  one  possessing  the  weakest  class- 
conscious  proletariat.  The  English  proletariat  still 
remains,  in  the  great  mass,  slow  to  assimilate  revolu- 


BRITAIN  AND  THE  HUMAN  RACE    235 

tionary  Socialism,  and  therefore  there  is  no  effective 
check  upon  the  worst  excesses  of  market-hunting 
and  colonial  labour  exploitation.  That  this  has  its 
origin  in  racial  characteristics  I  have  always  main- 
tained ;  but  there  is  the  third  sense  above  hinted  at, 
in  which  Great  Britain  may  be  described  as  the 
great  bulwark  of  modern  capitalism,  namely,  in 
the  remarkable  capacity  possessed  by  the  "  Anglo- 
Saxon  "  (or  Anglo-Celtic)  races  for  colonial  expan- 
sion, in  the  ability  which  they,  and  especially  the 
British  themselves,  both  south  and  north,  possess 
for  effectively  occupying  and  settling  new  countries. 
Now,  modern  Capitalism  must  either  expand  or 
evolve  rapidly  into  Socialism.  If  it  can  succeed 
in  conquering  new  markets  and  fresh  fields  for 
industrial  exploitation  quickly  enough,  it  may 
sustain  itself  under  the  regime  of  trusts  and  com- 
bines for  some  time  yet.  If  not,  the  final  phase 
of  its  evolution  being  accomplished,  it  must  make 
way  for  the  new  world-order  destined  to  succeed 
it.  Now  the  Anglo-Saxon,  judging  by  experience, 
as  already  said,  is  the  only  race  capable  of  per- 
forming the  feat  of  opening  up  and  settling  the  as 
yet  non-capitalistic  portions  of  the  earth's  surface 
within  the  period  necessary.  This,  I  repeat,  is  his 
admitted  /or^e.  The  Latin  nations  that  have  tried 
their  hand  at  it  (not  even  excepting  France)  have 
failed,  and  in  most  cases  signally  failed.  Russia 
has  expanded  enough  in  all  conscience,  but   has 


236    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

hardly  got  beyond  the  phase  of  penal  settlements 
and  military  posts.  Even  Germany,  with  all  her 
Cameroons  and  Hereros,  has  no  success  in  colonisa- 
tion to  signalise.  For  this  reason  Britain  is  that 
power  which  presents  the  greatest  obstacle  to 
Socialism. 

I  know  this  last  statement  always  sounds  like  a 
paradox.  It  may  be  asked,  where  do  you  have 
such  free  institutions  as  in  England?  Where 
such  fair  play  to  all  political  views  ?  Our 
continental  brethren  are  much  impressed,  I  am 
well  aware,  by  this  argument.  But  now  let  us 
for  a  moment  consider  the  question  of  these 
free  institutions.  Firstly,  what  is  the  difference 
between  the  methods  of  governmental  repression 
on  the  Continent  and  here  ?  It  is  mainly  this — on 
the  Continent  the  forces  of  reaction,  as  represented 
by  a  class-government,  use  the  police  for  the 
repression  of  adverse  opinions  ;  in  England,  with  a 
much  greater  astuteness,  they  use  the  non-official 
mob.  In  using  the  police,  they  may  be  accused  of 
tyrannical  oppression,  but  when,  by  employing — 
or,  at  any  rate,  encouraging — a  gang  of  venal 
roughs,  they  can  allege  that  it  is  "the  people" 
themselves  who  rise  against  their  opponents,  the 
base  Radicals  and  Revolutionists,  and  that  they  are 
unable  to  stem  the  torrent  of  popular  indignation 
at  the  doings  of  the  aforesaid  wicked  and  traitorous 
firebrands,  what  more  can  be  said  ?     The  result  is 


BRITAIN  AND  THE  HUMAN  RACE     237 

the  same  in  either  case.      Freedom  of  speech  is 
suppressed.^ 

But,  even  apart  from  this,  we  have  in  the  present 
day  in  Britain  an  absolute  indifference  to  the  pre- 
servation of  those  liberties  on  vi^hich  the  English- 
man has  hitherto  prided  himself.  For  instance, 
one  of  his  proudest  boasts  has  always  been  his 
freedom  from  compulsory  military  service.  And 
now  what  do  we  see  ?  Societies  established  and  a 
condition  of  public  feeling  fostered  that  would 
make  that  service  inevitable  !  Does  anyone  believe 
that  the  average  modern  Briton,  if  he  saw  his  way 
to  enslaving  other  and  weaker  nationalities  better 
by  means  of  conscription,  would  not  gladly  submit 
to  it  ?  No,  the  privileged  classes  of  Great  Britain 
have  succeeded  in  demoralising  the  lower  middle 
and  working  classes  of  the  country  with  the  cry, 
or  rather  the  cat-call,  of  '*  patriotism  "  to  such  an 
extent  that  they  will  sacrifice  anything  for  the 
pleasure  of  seeing  weaker  peoples,  barbaric  and 
civilised,  trampled  under  their  feet.  Hence  I 
argue  that  the  superstition  that  England  is  the 
land  of  liberty  ought  by  this  time  to  be  fairly 
exploded. 

But  even  if  we  grant  the  assumption  that  within 

the  four  seas  comprising  this  island  there  is  greater 

liberty  than  elsewhere,  and  that  a  similar  liberty  is 

enjoyed  in  Canada,  Australia,  and  New  Zealand, 

^  Written  during  the  Boer  war. 


238    TROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

this  can  by  no  possible  warranty  be  affirmed  of 
countries  ruled  ove?^  by  Great  Britain.  Nobody 
could  assert  that  there  is  greater  freedom,  greater 
absence  of  governmental  and  police  coercion,  in 
Ireland,  at  the  Cape,  in  India,  than  in  the  depend- 
encies of  other  States.  On  the  contrary,  when 
Britain  has  dominated  over  another  race,  the  callous 
brutality  of  the  methods  employed  are  notorious. 
Again,  another  point  is  often  forgotten  in  compar- 
ing the  relative  internal  conditions  of  Britain  and 
continental  European  countries.  In  Germany, 
France,  Russia,  governments  may  be  bad,  but 
the  heart  of  the  people — the  working  classes  and 
even  large  sections  of  the  middle  classes — is  politi- 
cally sound.  The  action  of  the  Government  is 
abhorred  by  the  people  as  a  whole,  or  at  least  by 
large  sections  of  them.  In  England,  on  the  con- 
trary, at  the  beginning  of  this  twentieth  century, 
the  great  mass  of  the  people  must  needs  applaud 
all  that  its  Government  does — for  the  new-style 
patriotic  reason,  if  for  no  other,  that  it  is  "the 
Government  of  its  country." 

We  hear  much  of  Majestdtsbeleidigung  in  Ger- 
many, and  indeed  it  is  an  atrocious  law  of  which 
any  nation  ought  to  be  ashamed.  But  does  anyone 
suppose  that,  were  such  a  law  sought  to  be  intro- 
duced into  this  country,  the  masses  of  the  *'  loyal  " 
British  people  would  protest  ?  Some  would 
doubtless  issue  indignant  remonstrances  and  hold 


BRITAIN  AND  THE  HUMAN  RACE     239 

meetings,  but  it  would  be  the  same  small  band  of 
stalwarts  who  protested  against  the  Transvaal  war, 
and  their  protest  would  be  about  as  effectual.  As 
it  happens,  for  the  moment,  the  governing  classes 
have  sufficient  sense  remaining  not  to  wish  to 
imitate  the  German  model.  They  would  doubtless 
be  very  willing,  however,  on  occasion,  to  patronise 
any  band  of  hooligans  who  would  make  it  their 
avocation  to  administer  condign  punishment  to 
anyone  speaking  disrespectfully  of  royalty.  And 
if  the  above  be  true,  where  is  your  security  against 
the  enactment  of  a  law  against  Majestdtsbeleidi- 
gung  once  you  get  a  strong  empire  with  a  gilded 
plutocratic  government  which  declares  it  necessary 
to  the  welfare  of  the  said  empire  that  captious 
criticism  should  be  suppressed? 

On  the  causes  of  this  corruption  of  the  British 
character  much  might  be  said.  But  for  practical 
purposes  it  suffices  that  it  is  there,  that  it  has 
taken  its  place  as  a  factor  in  human  develop- 
ment. And  what  does  this  factor,  viewed  in 
conjunction  with  the  aforesaid  capacity  of  the 
British  race  for  colonial  expansion,  by  which  the 
ends  of  modern  capitalism  are  best  subserved, 
imply?  I  answer  that  human  progress  has  here 
to  face  an  enemy  which  is  not  merely  one  of 
class  or  of  caste,  but  one  of  race.  By  mere  good- 
natured  optimists  it  is  commonly  said  that  England 
with  all  her  faults  is  not  so  bad  after  all.     Look  at 


240    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

Russia,  look  at  Germany,  look  at  Italy,  we  are 
told  !  True,  in  Germany,  in  Russia,  in  Italy  you 
may  have  a  system  of  government  which  varies 
in  its  badness  from  being  merely  police-ridden  to 
being  inhumanly  and  atrociously  tyrannical.  But, 
after  all,  you  have  only  a  system  of  government^ 
with  its  embodying  caste,  to  deal  with  in  these 
cases,  even  in  the  worst  of  them.  And  a  system 
of  government  may  change  from  one  week  to 
another.  The  evils  it  entails  are  generally  more 
or  less  transitory  and  remediable.  This  is  not 
true  of  our  economic  system.  The  ascendancy  of 
other  existing  national  states  means  at  worst  the 
ascendancy  for  a  period,  of  a  bad  government,  de- 
tested by  large  sections  of  the  people  of  these 
countries.  The  ascendancy  of  Great  Britain,  on 
the  other  hand,  means  the  heading  back  of  that 
great  economic  revolution  which  shall  transform 
modern  Civilisation  into  Socialism,  inasmuch  as 
the  history  of  the  nineteenth  century  has  shown 
that  the  Anglo-Saxon  alone  can  effectively  open 
up  new  countries  in  the  time  modern  capitalism  re- 
quires them  to  be  opened  up  in  order  to  save  itself 
from  imminent  revolution. 

I  have  spoken  of  the  degeneracy  of  the  modern 
Britisher.  As  an  illustration  of  the  physical  and 
moral  decline  of  the  race,  it  is  almost  sufficient 
to  point  to  such  a  mob  as  celebrated  the  relief  of 
Maf eking,  a  spectacle  which  I  venture  to  assert 


BRITAIN  AND  THE  HUMAN  RACE     241 

could  be  afforded  by  no  capital  in  Europe  other 
than  London.  In  Paris,  in  Berlin,  in  Rome,  in 
Venice,  such  a  thing  would  be  inconceivable. 
You  might  have  violent  mobs,  you  might  have 
brutal  mobs,  you  might  have  foolish  fanatical  mobs, 
but  the  squalid  inanity  of  a  Mafeking  mob  you 
would  look  for  in  vain.  This  unspeakable  abomin- 
ation is  not,  then,  a  product  of  Capitalism  merely, 
but  of  Capitalism  plus  Race — it  represents  not 
merely  man,  but  Anglo-Saxon  man  in  process  of 
decomposition.  But  lest  it  should  be  said  that 
the  Mafeking  mob  is  an  unfair  test  of  the  physical 
and  moral  depravity  of  the  modern  Briton,  let  us 
take  certain  other  circumstances  connected  with  the 
Boer  war,  things  which  were  recited  and  defended 
in  cold  blood,  without  a  blush,  by  English-speaking 
people,  and  which  I  maintain  show  a  complete 
moral  atrophy  such  as  can  be  found  in  no  other 
nation  of  European  origin: — (1)  The  sending  out 
of  a  quarter  of  a  million  men  to  crush  a  small 
nation  with  an  army  of  30,000,  without  the  smallest 
sense  of  shame,  a  feat  only  paralleled  by  the 
glorious  deeds  of  the  British  Army  at  Omdurman, 
which  consisted  in  the  slaughter  of  Arabs  (who 
either  had  no  rifles,  or  who  couldn't  shoot  straight) 
from  behind  machine  guns ;  (2)  the  diabolical  ex- 
termination of  the  Boer  children  in  the  concentra- 
tion camps ;  (3)  the  sending  of  expansive  bullets 
to  South  Africa  against  the  decision  of  the  Hague 

16 


242    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

Congress,  and  then  shrieking  with  indignation 
when  the  Boers,  who  had  captured  cases  of  these 
bullets,  intended  to  be  used  against  themselves, 
employed  them  against  the  British  troops  ;  (4)  the 
systematic  and  brutal  burning  of  homesteads  out 
of  sheer  wanton  spite  ;  (5)  the  dastardly  murder 
of  prisoners  of  war,  notably  the  massacre  at 
Elandslaagte  and  the  murder  of  S cheeping,  who 
fell  into  British  hands  accidentally  through  sick- 
ness ;  (6)  the  excuse  that  "  war  is  war,"  used  to 
whitewash  every  violation  of  the  laws  of  civilised 
warfare,  followed  by  a  snivelling  whine  when  the 
Boers  mildly  ventured  to  pay  the  British  soldier 
back  in  his  own  coin ;  (7)  the  refusal  of  medicine, 
doctors  and  ambulances,  to  the  Boer  combatants — 
a  piece  of  devilish  and  dastardly  ferocity  which 
has  not  been  approached  since  the  worst  episodes 
of  the  Thirty  Years'  war.^ 

Now  I  submit  that  a  nation  that  approves  or 
even  tolerates  these  things  is  not  fit  at  the  present 
time  to  exist  as  a  political  entity  wielding  sway, 
directly  or  indirectly,  over  dependencies  in  any 
way  alien  in  blood  to  itself.  I  contend,  further, 
that  a  race  that  can  at  the  beginning  of  the 
twentieth  century  condone  such  things  must  be 
so  morally  corrupt  that  the  mere  consolidation  of 

1  Since  the  above  was  written  events  have  shown  that  other 
nationalities^  e.g.  the  Italians  in  Tripoli,  can  emulate  the  class  of 
acts  i-eferred  to  in  the  text. 


BRITAIN  AND  THE  HUMAN  RACE    243 

its  power  among  men  of  its  own  blood  is  a  serious 
menace  to  humanity  generally. 

Let  us  make  no  mistake,  I  repeat  we  have  to 
do  not  with  a  bad  government^  as  in  Russia,  but 
with  a  morally  corrupt  'people — a  people  of  which 
whole  sections  exhibit  the  character  of  the  coward, 
the  bully,  and  the  braggart,  for  such  it  has  shown 
itself  repeatedly  within  the  last  few  years.  I^et 
that  heroic  nation  famous  over  all  Europe  for  its 
unconquerable  habit,  during  the  Boer  war,  of 
surrendering  before  the  slightest  show  of  superior 
force  try  conclusions  with  a  single  continental 
army.  No  one  fears  England  to-day.  It  is  the 
cosmopolitan  financiers  at  the  back  of  England  that 
are  feared.  The  modern  Briton  is  being  discovered 
now  not  to  be  of  the  heroic  mould,  in  spite  of  his 
bullying  braggatorio  on  occasion. 

And  now,  what  of  the  other,  the  American  section 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  ?  Never  having  been  in 
America,  I  am  unable  to  speak  from  first  hand  ; 
but,  so  far  as  I  can  judge,  the  American  people, 
while  possessing  many  of  the  aforesaid  undesirable 
characteristics  of  the  British  (some  of  them,  indeed, 
in  an  exaggerated  form),  have  been  saved  from  the 
complete  moral  degeneracy  of  the  latter  by  a 
circumstance  which  I  shall  revert  to  again  directly, 
viz.,  by  the  fact  that  the  population  is  not,  as  in 
the  other  case,  pure  Anglo-Saxon  (using  the  term 
Anglo-Saxon  for  the  original  blend  of  Kelt,  Roman, 


244    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

Jute,  Angle,  Saxon,  Dane,  and  Norman,  constitut- 
ing in  different  degrees  the  population  of  England 
and  southern  Scotland).  This  blend,  which  forms 
the  basis,  has  been  to  some  extent  modified  by  a 
variety  of  supervening  ethnical  elements.  As  an 
instance  of  the  difference  in  the  two  national 
"  tones,"  the  Americans  showed  a  decidedly  more 
widespread  and  vigorous  opposition  to  their  own 
government's  infamous  enterprise  in  the  Phihppines 
than  can  be  said  of  the  English  opposition  to  the 
South  African  war. 

This  leads  us  to  our  concluding  topic,  viz.,  what 
combination  of  circumstances  would  avert  the 
danger  threatening  human  progress  through  the 
ascendancy  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  as  he  is  at  present  ? 
First  of  all,  there  is  the  possibility  of  his  changing 
his  Ethiopian  skin  and  his  leopard  spots.  As  we 
all  know,  changed  circumstances  often  do  cause 
rapid  changes  in  national  character.  As  we  have 
pointed  out,  the  English  nation  of  to-day  is  very 
different  from  the  English  nation  of  the  forties 
and  fifties  of  the  last  century.  But  does  the 
England  of  1912  show  such  a  considerable  advance 
politically  and  ethically  on  the  England  that  made 
merry  on  Maf eking  Day  in  May  1900  ?  I  fear 
we  have  no  indications  of  such  being  the  case. 
Barring,  then,  a  speedy  change  in  the  nature  of  the 
human  Anglo-Saxon  as  represented  in  this  island, 
what  external  conditions  would  be  likely  to  effect 


BRITAIN  AND  THE  HUMAN  RACE     245 

the  result  spoken  of?  These  conditions  must  he 
in  the  direction  of  the  limitation  of  British  power 
and  the  disintegration  of  the  British  Imperial 
system.  In  addition,  they  might  well  include  the 
bringing  of  a  new  race-blend  into  those  countries 
where,  as  in  the  British  Colonies,  this  could  effec- 
tively be  done  owing  to  the,  at  present,  smallness 
of  the  population.  The  two  sides  of  this  question 
are  dependent  on  one  another,  since  a  consolidated 
British  power,  with  its  tentacles  stretched  over  all 
the  world,  would  be  in  a  position  to  counteract 
any  such  effective  blending  —  promoting  rather 
inter- Imperial  migration.  A  consolidated  British 
empire,  as  things  go  at  present,  would  mean  an 
impenetrable  bulwark  of  capitalism  in  its  most 
effective  form,  under  Anglo  -  Saxon  auspices, 
athwart  progress.  The  only  possibility  of  the  new 
race-blend  arising  would  seem  at  present  to  lie  in 
foreign  conquest.  The  conquest  of  Australasia  by 
Germany  or  Japan,  however  repellant  to  British 
colonial  feeling,  would  at  least  give  a  chance  for 
the  production  of  the  new  race-blend,  and  from 
this  point  of  view  could  not  be  regarded  as  an 
unmitigated  evil.  For  the  reasons  above  given  a 
strong  rapprochement  between  this  country  and 
the  United  States  is  to  be  deprecated  as  tending 
to  the  increased  power  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  element 
in  America  and  indirectly  to  the  consolidation  of 
the  British    colonial   power.     Where   the   Anglo- 


246    PROBLEMSOFMEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

Saxon  rules,  there  you  seem  to  have  capitaUsm 
entrenched  in  its  securest  stronghold.  Modern 
finance  indispensably  needs  the  Anglo  -  Saxon 
power  for  its  international  operation.  Interna- 
tional Socialism,  as  I  contend,  imperatively  calls 
for  the  break-up  of  the  British  Imperial  system, 
and  hence  it  should  be  the  policy  of  the  British 
Socialist  Party  to  favour  all  disruptive  tendencies 
within  the  Empire.  In  furthering  the  aim  of  local 
or  national  independence  unhampered  by  the  suze- 
rainty of  a  larger  capitalist  Power  under  their 
respective  flags,  the  Socialist  Party  would  be  taking 
the  first  step  towards  realising  the  final  ideal  of  the 
international  union  in  a  world  federation  under  the 
Red  Flag  of  Social  Democracy.  Meanwhile  "he 
that  letteth  will  let,"  and  the  very  strong  letting 
power  in  this  case  is — British  Imperialism  ! 


CHAPTER   XIII 

THE    PROBLEM    OF    THE    ORIGIN    OF    CHRISTIANITY 

The  interest  attaching  to  the  task  of  attempting 
the  historico-critical  reconstruction  of  that  great 
episode  in  universal  history  which,  through  a 
combination  of  circumstances,  became  the  landmark 
of  the  turning  point  in  the  evolution  of  the  civilised 
world,  namely,  the  origin  of  Christianity,  never 
seems  to  lose  its  fascination.  Among  the  immense 
number  of  scholars  and  thinkers  who,  for  a  century 
past,  have  set  their  intellects  and  their  pens  to  the 
task  there  is  no  risk  in  affirming  that  few  have 
produced  more  remarkable  results  than  Karl 
Kautsky  in  his  Uf^sprung  des  Christentums.  On 
a  basis  of  fact  well  known  to  scholars  and  historical 
students,  but  by  no  means  familiar  to  the  average 
man  of  intelUgence  and  culture — whose  culture  is, 
by  the  way,  generally  confined  to  literature  and 
literary  criticism  and  recks  little  of  history — 
Kautsky  has  succeeded  in  producing  a  volume  of 
absorbing  interest.  In  fact,  as  a  purely  literary 
production    we    would    unhesitatingly  pronounce 

247 


248    PROBLEMS  OF  MEK,  MIND,  MORALS 

Dei'  Ursprimg  des  Ckristentums  to  be  the  master- 
piece of  the  great  literary  protagonist  of  SociaUsm 
ill  Germany.  This,  notwithstanding  that  the 
arrangement  of  the  work  we  hold  to  be  faulty. 
The  book  is  divided  into  four  sections,  the  first 
a  short  one  on  the  sources  of  Pagan  and  Christian 
tradition  for  the  personality  of  Jesus.  This  is 
followed  by  a  long  section  containing  a  brilHant 
and  graphic  summary  of  the  social  conditions  of 
the  early  Empire.  The  author  then  returns  chrono- 
logically in  the  third  section  to  an  equally  brilliant 
survey  of  Jewish  history  from  its  origin.  The 
latter  part  of  this  deals,  it  is  true,  with  post-exilian 
Judaism  and  the  Jewish  sects  of  the  Christian  era, 
thereby  leading  on  to  the  fourth  and  longest  section, 
which  is  concerned  with  the  beginning  of  Chris- 
tianity itself.  The  arrangement  strikes  us  as 
clumsy.  The  portion  of  the  fourth  section  dealing 
with  the  early  history  of  Israel  ought  surely  to 
have  come  before  the  discussion  on  the  sources  of 
the  Jesus-figure  and  the  description  and  analysis 
of  the  society  of  the  Augustan  period. 

Apart  from  the  vigour  and  interest  of  its  literary 
presentation  and  marshalling  of  historical  facts, 
Kautsky's  book  is  remarkable,  as  those  who  know 
anything  of  the  other  works  of  the  author  will 
scarcely  need  to  be  told,  for  its  thorough-going 
and  consistent  attempt  to  reduce  Christian  origins 
and    the    phenomena    connected    with    them    to 


THE   ORIGIN  OF   CHRISTIANITY     249 

economic  causes.  The  book  represents,  indeed,  an 
endeavour  to  apply  practically  the  materialistic 
doctrine  of  history  of  Marx.  But,  in  addition  to 
this,  many  interesting  points  are  brought  out  in 
the  course  of  the  discussions  of  various  historical 
problems.  What  Kautsky  has  to  say  on  the  tra- 
ditional Jesus-figure  is  practically  summed  up  on 
page  19,  where  the  author  insists  that  the  historical 
kernel  of  the  Jesus  legend  amounts  to  no  more  than 
v^rhat  Tacitus  reports,  to  the  effect  that  during  the 
reign  of  Tiberius  a  Jewish  prophet  was  executed, 
from  whom  the  Christian  sect  took  its  origin. 
"  What  this  prophet  did  and  thought,"  observes 
Kautsky,  "we  have  not  the  slightest  means  of 
ascertaining  with  any  certainty.  In  no  case  could 
he  have  aroused  the  attention  alleged  by  the  early 
Christian  writers,  otherwise  assuredly  Josephus, 
who  relates  many  unimportant  matters,  would  have 
had  something  to  say  about  him.^  The  agitation 
and  execution  of  Jesus  unquestionably  excited  not 
the  least  interest  among  his  contemporaries." 

The  legendary  figure  which  has  come  down  to  us 
formed  itself  gradually,  as  the  originally  small  and 
obscure  sect  grew  out  of  the  aspirations  and  ideas 
of  the  various  successive  layers  of  its  increasing 
adherents.     How  the  sect  came  to  grow  in  numbers 

^  The  single  passage  in  our  Josephus  in  which  the  founder 
of  Christianity  is  referred  to  is  now  universally  admitted  to  be 
a  later  forgery. 


250    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

and  importance,  ultimately  occupying  the  place  it 
did  in  the  Roman  world,  is  the  task  Kautsky  has  set 
himself  to  solve  by  aid  of  the  Marxian  key,  as  we 
shall  see  later  on.  Meanwhile,  we  may  linger  a 
moment  over  the  Kautskian  view  of  the  titular 
founder  of  Christianity  and  the  nature  of  his 
personality.  For  Kautsky,  Jesus  was  simply  one 
of  the  numerous  agitators  and  messiahs  which  the 
two  last  generations  of  the  Jewish  State  brought 
forth.  On  the  absurdities  and  contradictions  of 
the  Gospel  version  of  the  events  preceding  the 
execution  of  Jesus  our  author  has  much  to  say. 
He  points  out  the  clumsiness  with  which  probably 
authentic  scraps  of  tradition  concerning  the  char- 
acter of  the  historical  rebel-zealot,  opposed  alike 
to  the  Roman  power  and  to  the  respectable  Jewish 
parties  of  the  time,  who  were  prepared  to  com- 
promise with  the  former,  were  allowed  to  remain 
in  the  Gospel  narrative  side  by  side  with  the  later 
conception  of  Jesus  as  the  meek  and  lowly  apostle 
of  non-resistance  and  passive  obedience,  which  it 
was  one  of  the  new  Gospel's  main  objects  to  embody. 
The  unhistorical  absurdity  of  the  whole  Gospel 
narrative  of  the  trial  and  crucifixion  is  well  brought 
out.  Kautsky 's  view  of  the  story  of  the  arrest  is 
that  it  took  place  during,  and  was  in  consequence 
of,  a  conspiracy  started  by  Jesus  and  his  band 
against  the  authorities  of  Jerusalem — the  rendez- 
vous of  the  conspirators  being  the  Mount  of  Olives 


THE   ORIGIN   OF   CHRISTIANITY     251 

— and  which  seems  to  have  been  planned  to  follow 
on  the  disturbance  in  the  court  of  the  Temple 
which  resulted  in  the  driving  out  of  the  bankers 
and  salesmen  who  were  installed  there.  On  an 
impartial  survey  of  the  evidence,  which  will  be 
found  well  marshalled  in  the  work  under  review, 
no  fair-minded  reader,  we  think,  will  be  able  to 
avoid  the  conclusion  arrived  at  by  Kautsky,  to 
wit,  that  the  historical  Jesus  was  simply  the  leader 
of  a  not  very  important  local  attempt  at  insurrec- 
tion, and  that  his  seizure,  trial,  and  execution 
followed  immediately  on  the  suppression  of  the 
revolt.  The  unimportance  is  attested  by  the  fact 
that,  while  other  messiahs  acquired  sufficient 
influence  to  have  left  a  name  in  contemporary 
historical  testimony,  Jesus  of  Nazareth  did  not 
do  so.  How  then,  it  may  be  asked,  was  it,  if  the 
original  movement  of  Jesus  was  of  a  local  and 
temporary  character,  that  the  Christianity  of 
history  eventually  arose  out  of  it  ?  This  is  the 
problem  for  which  Kautsky  has  his  own  solution 
to  offer,  and  in  respect  to  this  solution  some  of  us 
may  be  inclined  to  part  company  with  our  dis- 
tinguished author. 

As  already  said,  the  idea  of  Kautsky  in  writing 
the  Ursprung  des  Ckristentums  was,  in  the  first 
instance,  to  furnish  a  practical  application  of  the 
"materialistic  doctrine  of  history."  Now,  in  the 
present  case,  Kautsky 's  trump  card  is  to  be  found 


252    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

in  the  alleged  communistic  tendencies  of  the  early 
Christian  comnmnities.  The  far-reaching  influence 
acquired  by  the  tradition  of  these  communities,  as 
well  as  the  growth  and  diffusion  of  the  communi- 
ties themselves  in  spite  of  their  insignificant  origin, 
Kautsky  attributes  mainly,  if  not  entirely,  to  their 
association  with  the  principle  of  communistic 
property-holding.  As  against  this,  however,  two 
important  considerations  may  be  urged  :  (1)  Is  the 
assumed  communism  of  the  early  Christians 
demonstrable  as  an  historical  fact  ?  and  (2)  Even 
conceding  this  fact,  is  it  possible  to  regard  it  as 
even  a  remotely  adequate  cause  of  the  very  far- 
reaching  effects  ascribed  to  it  ?  For  my  own  part 
I  am  constrained  to  answer  both  questions  by  a 
decided  negative.  The  so-called  communism  of 
the  primitive  Christian  community  at  Jerusalem, 
when  closely  viewed,  amounted  to  no  more  than 
an  exaggerated  alms-giving  called  forth  by  special 
circumstances.  The  principal,  and  indeed,  only 
original  source  we  have  for  its  existence  at  all, 
seems  specially  to  emphasise  its  voluntary,  and 
hence  so  far  as  the  principles  of  the  community 
were  concerned,  its  non-essential,  character.  Evi- 
dence we  have  none  of  any  organisation  in  the 
early  Church  embodying  real  communism  in 
contradistinction  to  the  charity  of  the  richer 
members  towards  the  poorer  brethren  of  the 
community  or  certain  forms  of  ceremonial  obser- 


THE   ORIGIN   OF   CHRISTIANITY     253 

vance  in  common.  Kautsky  is,  of  course,  anxious 
to  "  rope  in  "  every  statement  or  tradition  he  can 
to  prove  his  thesis,  to  wit,  that  the  Christian 
Church  was  originally  a  communistic  organisation ; 
the  dogmas  that  it  embraced,  or  that  grew  up 
around  it  being,  in  the  first  instance,  little  more 
than  "  ideological "  decorations  and  emblems  of  this 
central  economic  fact.  The  circumstance  recorded 
of  the  Apostles  that  when  on  a  journey  they  had  a 
common  purse  or  "  bag  "  is  noted  by  our  author  as 
evidence  of  the  communistic  doctrine  and  tend- 
encies of  primitive  Christianity.  At  this  rate  there 
should  be  plenty  of  communism  going  about  in 
Western  Europe  every  autumn  holiday  season 
(especially  in  connection  with  Cook's  tours),  con- 
sidering the  number  of  tourist  parties  whose 
members  find  it  convenient  to  have  a  common 
account  during  their  trip.  I  give  this  as  an 
instance  of  how  perfectly  commonplace  statements 
can  be  coloured  by  a  pre-conceived  theory. 

But  if,  even  in  spite  of  the  lack  of  evidence,  we 
concede  the  communistic  character  of  the  early 
Christian  churches,  what  necessary  or  probable 
reason  have  we,  I  ask,  for  assuming  this  character 
to  have  been  even  the  central  element  in  them, 
much  less  the  distinguishing  feature  in  Christianity, 
that  which  differentiated  it  from  amid  the  welter 
of  religio-mystical  cults,  sects,  and  brotherhoods 
with  which  it   was   surrounded   in  the  world   of 


254    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

the  contemporary  Roman  Empire?  Was  the 
admittedly  crude  and  imperfect  communism  of 
consumption  (as  opposed  to  that  of  production), 
alleged  to  have  been  practised  by  the  early 
Christians,  a  sufficiently  distinctive  and  important 
phenomenon  in  that  age  to  have  by  itself  attracted 
numbers  to  the  Church,  and  to  have  acquired  for 
Christianity  the  influence  it  obtained  ?  Kautsky, 
himself,  indirectly  answers  this  question  against 
his  own  thesis. 

A  certain  theologian,  anxious  to  rescue  primi- 
tive Christianity  from  the  charge  of  communism, 
urged  against  Kautsky  that,  although  a  variety 
of  ugly  accusations  were  brought  by  the  con- 
temporary Pagan  world  against  the  Christian  sect, 
nowhere  do  we  find  any  indications  that  the  early 
Christians  were  ever  charged  with  practising  com- 
munism. The  fact  of  its  not  being  mentioned 
by  contemporary  critics  of  Christianity  might 
indeed  militate  against  the  theory  that  it  formed 
a  very  prominent  side  of  the  new  sect,  but  the 
argument  from  the  silence  of  these  opponents  is, 
we  must  agree  with  Kautsky,  certainly  not  any 
proof  of  its  not  having  existed.  For,  as  Kautsky 
very  pertinently  points  out,  communism  as  it  was 
understood  in  the  ancient  world,  did  not,  either  in 
theory  or  practice,  imply  any  reproach.  It  was 
not  viewed  as  having  any  special  connection  with 
revolutionary  tendencies.     On  the  contrary,  it  was 


THE   ORIGIN   OF   CHRISTIANITY     255 

associated,  more  or  less,  with  many  forms  of 
religious,  social,  and  even  political  organisation  that 
were  in  high  esteem  and  was  traditionally  con- 
nected with  the  honoured  names  of  Pythagoras 
and  Plato.  But  in  pointing  this  out,  Kautsky 
does  not  seem  to  see  that  he  is  arguing  against  his 
own  main  position,  to  wit,  that  communism  was  a 
distiriguishing  feature  of  Christianity. 

What  may  possibly  be  regarded  as  ceremonial 
survivals  of  the  traditions  of  communism  in  the  early 
forms  of  human  society  obtained  in  well-nigh  all  the 
fraternities,  guilds,  and  corporations  of  the  ancient 
world,  so  that,  for  that  matter,  it  is  quite  likely, 
notwithstanding  the  absence  of  affirmative  evi- 
dence, that  the  early  Christians  may  have  had  cer- 
tain tendencies  pointing  to  communism  in  the  life 
of  their  organisation.  As  for  the  periodical  social 
feastings,  these  they  undoubtedly  had,  though 
probably  no  one  but  Kautsky  would  regard  them 
as  any  evidence  of  actual  communism.  On  the 
contrary,  in  their  Love  feasts,  which,  as  pointed 
out  by  the  Rev.  Baring-Gould  {Strange  Survivals, 
pp.  161-162),  were  but  an  adaptation  of  the 
feasts  of  Aphrodite,  "the  well-to-do  brought 
food  and  wine  with  them  and  ate  and  drank  by 
themselves,"  while  the  poorer  brethren  were  often 
compelled  "to  look  hungrily  on."  But  even 
allowing  the  utmost  latitude  to  the  alleged  com- 
munistic tendencies  of  early  Christianity,  we  are 


256    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

still  a  long  way  from  the  assumption  that  com- 
munism was  an  essential  part  of  Christian  doctrine, 
or  even  practice,  still  less  that  it  was  the  ground  of 
its  success  over  similar  sects  and  doctrines.  Even 
if  communism,  in  the  sense  of  the  dividing-up  of 
consumable  wealth,  obtained  in  the  early  Christian 
Churches,  this  was  quite  certainly  a  purely  side- 
issue.  It  was  not  this  which  led  Christianity  to 
victory  over  the  Roman  world.  It  was  not  mere 
exaggerated  alms-giving,  such  as  that  described  in 
the  Acts,  which  effected  this  result.  Moreover,  the 
first  great  successes  of  the  new  sect  began  after  the 
supposed  communistic  practices  were  admittedly 
becoming  obsolete  in  the  Church. 

What,  then,  was  the  distinctive  feature  in  early 
Christianity  which  gave  it  "  the  pull "  over  Judaism 
and  the  various  Pagan  cults  and  mysteries  pro- 
fessing the  same  general  intellectual  and  moral 
outlook  as  Christianity  ?  The  answer,  I  take  it,  is 
in  the  main  obvious.  During  the  second  century, 
how  and  why  we  cannot  at  present  trace,  the 
Christian  Church  discovered,  and  made  its  own, 
the  formula  or  formulas  best  adapted  to  express 
a  strong  intellectual  and  moral  current  already 
existing  for  some  generations  throughout  the 
East  and  the  Mediterranean  lands,  while  at  the 
same  time  it  absorbed  from  the  various  Pagan 
cults  around  it  the  ceremonies  and  ritual  best 
adapted  to  body  it  forth. 


THE   ORIGIN   OF   CHRISTIANITY     257 

How  and  why  it  managed  to  effect  this  by  a 
process  of  selection,  conscious  or  unconscious, 
as  just  said,  it  is  impossible  at  this  distance  of 
time  to  find  out.  That  the  purely  materialistic 
side  of  the  organisation  of  the  early  Christian 
communities,  together  with  the  general  con- 
ditions of  life  in  the  great  cities  of  the  Empire, 
powerfully  contributed  in  the  general  result  is 
undeniable.  But  neither  the  economic  con- 
ditions of  the  society  out  of  which  it  grew  nor 
those  which  it  shaped  for  itself  within  its  own 
communities,  can,  having  regard  to  the  historical 
evidence,  be  located  as  the  central  or  determining 
factor  in  the  evolution  of  the  Christian  Church. 
What,  then,  was  this  central  factor  ?  Undoubtedly 
the  doctrine  of  the  relation  of  the  individual  human 
soul  to  the  central  power  of  the  universe.  This 
was  the  problem  round  which  the  thought  of  the 
then  civihsed  world  had  been  circling  for  genera- 
tions. This  was  the  theme  of  the  Mysteries,  of 
the  new  cults  introduced  from  the  East,  and  the 
new  interpretation  of  the  old  myths  and  ceremonies 
of  an  earlier  Paganism.  It  was  the  ideal  content 
of  the  dominant  thought  of  the  age  which  crystal- 
lised in  the  Christian  sect  and  around  its  central 
figure,  which  came  to  serve,  so  to  say,  as  the 
tailor's  block  to  set  forth  these  tendencies.  That 
every  doctrine  and  practice  belonging  to  the 
Christian  religion  is  traceable  in  the  contemporary 

17 


258    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

and  pre-existing  Paganism  and  Judaism  of  the 
time  is  a  fact  no  longer  disputed  by  any  serious 
student  of  history,  and  to  enlarge  upon  it  here,  at 
any  length,  would  be  superfluous. 

Why  these  ideas,  common  as  they  were  to  the 
serious-minded  men  of  the  age  and  expressed  in  a 
detached  form  in  the  various  cults  and  mysteries, 
should  have  concentrated  themselves,  as  in  a  focus, 
precisely  in  the  Christian  sect  rather  than  in  any 
other  of  the  various  cults  then  prevalent,  I  again 
repeat,  is,  to  a  large  extent,  one  of  the  secrets  of 
history  to  which  our  imperfect  materials  for  a 
knowledge  of  the  time  furnish  us  with  no  adequate 
key.  We  can  only  explain  it  in  general  terms  as 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  Christian  religion  suc- 
ceeded in  finding  the  formula  most  suitable  for 
the  growing  monotheism  and  ever  -  intensifying 
introspective  spiritual  and  ethical  tendencies  of 
the  age,  together  with  the  form  of  organisation 
best  adapted  to  maintain  material  continuity  and 
independence  for  the  Christian  sect  as  a  sect. 
That  the  alleged  element  of  communistic  practice 
in  the  Christian  Church,  if  it  ever  existed,  had 
nothing  to  do  with  historical  Christianity  can 
hardly  be  doubted  when  we  reflect  that  the 
Essenes,  the  Therapeutee,  the  votaries  of  Serapis, 
not  to  speak  of  other  lesser  communistic  brother- 
hoods and  religious  bodies  existing  at  the  time — 
whose  communism  is  not  a  matter  of  doubt,  and 


THE   ORIGIN   OF   CHRISTIANITY     259 

was  developed,  it  will  not  be  denied,  to  a  much 
greater  degree  than  could  have  been  the  case  with 
the  early  Christian  Churches  —  nevertheless  did 
not  maintain  their  independence  as  was  the  case 
with  the  new  sect.  It  may,  perhaps,  be  conjectured 
that  the  elaborate  system  of  inter-communication  by 
wandering  preachers  and  by  letters  in  which  inter- 
course was  kept  up,  and  a  uniformity  of  doctrine 
and  practice  promoted  among  the  Christian  com- 
munities of  the  Empire,  and  under  the  influence 
of  which  gradually  the  imperium  in  imperio  of  the 
Catholico-Christian  Church  was  developed,  was  the 
most  powerful  factor  on  the  material  side  in  the 
success  of  the  new  religion. 

As  regards  the  ideal  side  of  the  latter,  the  essential 
element  in  Christianity,  so  far  from  its  being  com- 
munistic, was  the  very  antithesis  of  communism. 
The  Christianity  of  history  represents,  primarily, 
the  quintessence  of  the  individualism  of  a  decadent 
civilisation  as  far  as  possible  removed  from  the 
communism  of  primitive  times,  which  had  its 
symbolical  expression  rather  in  those  primitive 
local  Pagan  practices  with  which  Christianity 
waged  so  deadly  a  war.  The  central  point  of 
Christianity  was  the  relationship  of  the  individual 
soul  to  God  as  the  creative  principle  of  the 
universe,  combined  with  the  idea  of  a  future  life. 
It  was  this  mystical  relation  of  the  individual  soul 
to   God   who,   in    popular   thought,   came    to    be 


200     PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

regarded  as  a  preternatural  superman,  on  which 
the  whole  Christian  theory  turns.  This  it  was, 
and  not  any  exaggerated  almsgiving,  in  which 
Kautsky  discovers  communistic  tendencies,  that 
really  gained  over  the  Roman  world  of  the 
first  three  centuries.  Kautsky,  in  his  sacramental 
devotion  to  the  historical  materialism  of  Marx, 
fails  altogether  to  recognise  the  importance  of  this 
introspective  individualism  and  mysticism  as  a 
salient  phase  of  human  evolution.  The  latter,  of 
course,  got  overshadowed,  among  the  great  mass 
of  nominal  Christians  as  soon  as  large  populations 
became  converted  and  the  Church  waxed  rich,  by 
interested  motives  ;  while,  with  the  acceptance  of 
the  Christian  creed  by  the  barbarians,  and,  still 
more,  with  the  establishment  of  their  kingdoms, 
it  became  entirely  overgrown  with  the  crude 
animistic  beliefs  of  an  earlier  phase  of  social  life 
and  thought.  But,  though  this  continued  sub- 
stantially throughout  the  Middle  Ages,  the  mystic- 
individualist  idea  remained  always,  nevertheless,  the 
motive  power  of  the  saint  and  the  higher  intellects 
of  the  Church. 

The  above  criticism  must  on  no  account  be  taken 
to  imply  that  the  present  writer  underrates  the 
value  of  Kautsky 's  investigations.  His  work 
contains  much  historical  suggestiveness  of  a  very 
high  order.  He  may  not  have  succeeded  in  proving 
the   existence   of  communistic   tendencies  in  any 


THE   ORIGIN   OF   CHRISTIANITY    261 

legitimate  sense  of  the  word,  in  the  early  Church 
— not  even  in  the  primitive  Church  of  Jerusalem, 
and  assuredly  not  in  the  Christian  communities 
which  spread  over  the  Mediterranean  countries 
after  the  fall  of  Jerusalem — but  he  has  succeeded, 
nevertheless,  in  establishing  an  important  fact  in 
connection  with  primitive  Christianity.  Kautsky 
has  shown,  beyond  all  probable  doubt,  that  the 
little-noticed  sect  of  rebel-zealots  at  Jerusalem  who 
claimed  Jesus  of  Nazareth  as  their  founder,  was 
predominantly  of  a  proletarian-anarchist  character 
— understanding  the  word  proletarian  in  the 
classical  sense  of  the  word,  as  denoting  a  rabble 
of  indigent  or  destitute  freemen.  That  its  objects 
were  substantially  the  same  as  that  of  the  other 
insurrectionary  cliques  then  common  throughout 
Palestine  is  highly  probable,  to  wit,  the  freeing  of 
the  country  from  the  Roman  yoke  and  the  re- 
establishment  of  the  Jewish  religion  on  a  demo- 
cratic and  popular  basis,  with  the  control  of  the 
Temple  and  its  vast  treasures  by  their  own  leaders. 
Unlike  other  bodies  professing  similar  aims,  the 
above  revolutionary  society  succeeded  in  holding 
together  after  the  death  of  its  leader.  The  com- 
munity at  Jerusalem  it  was  to  which  all  the  pro- 
letarian associations  of  Christianity  were  attached, 
and  it  came  to  an  end  soon  after  the  year  70. 

From    this    date     Christianity     assumes    quite 
another  character ;  it  ceases  to  be  rebellious,  and 


262    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

becomes  a  religion  of  non-resistance  to  evil,  and 
it  is  from  this  time  forward  that  it  begins  to 
absorb  the  mystical  tendencies  of  the  age.  The 
old  messianic  and  rebellious  doctrines  of  the 
original  Jerusalem  community  became  soon  a  heresy, 
the  so-called  "Ebionite"  heresy.  "True  Chris- 
tianity," if  by  this  be  meant  the  Christianity  of 
history,  began  its  career.  The  figures  most  inti- 
mately associated  with  the  changed  Christianity 
of  the  closing  period  of  the  first  century  is  that  of 
Paul  the  Apostle.  Now  the  greatest  blemish  in 
Kautsky's  book  is  his  complete  ignoring  of  the 
figure  of  Paul.  A  treatise  on  the  origin  of 
Christianity  which  ignores  the  author  of  the  four 
great  Epistles  constituting  the  foundation  of  the 
Christian  theology,  and  therewith  the  Christianity 
of  history,  certainly  suggests  the  notorious  perform- 
ance of  the  play  of  Hamlet  with  the  part  of  the 
Prince  of  Denmark  left  out ;  for,  whatever  may  be 
said  for  or  against  the  historicity  of  the  Jesus- 
figure,  the  fact  remains  that  it  is  to  the  author 
of  the  Pauline  Epistles  that  the  origin  of  the 
Christian  dogmas  are  due.  From  the  closing  years 
of  the  first  century  onwards  Christianity  began 
absorbing  elements  of  various  Pagan  cults  and 
tendencies  of  the  age,  and  it  is  not  too  much  to 
assert  that  the  bulk  of  the  dogmas  and  ceremonies 
constituting  Christianity  at  the  present  time,  in  all 
its  various  forms,  and  which  have  constituted   it 


THE   ORIGIN   OF   CHRISTIANITY     263 

throughout  its  historical  career,  date  from  the  first 
half  of  the  second  century.  This,  the  only  Chris- 
tianity with  which,  for  practical  purposes,  we  are 
concerned  to-day,  is,  in  essence,  neither  communistic 
nor  proletarian,  but,  on  the  contrary,  mystical, 
introspective,  and  individualistic. 

As  has  been  recently  pointed  out,  the  mystical 
Christ  of  the  Pauline  Epistles  in  the  later  theology 
has  nothing  really  in  common  with  the  patriotic 
rebel  leader  of  the  reign  of  Tiberius.  The  former 
is  a  supernatural  or  quasi-supernatural  being,  with 
no  essential  relation  to  any  mortal  individual. 
{Cf.  Bruckner,  Die  Enstehung  der  paulifiischen 
Christologie,  1903,  12  ;  also  Drews'  Christmythus.) 
For  Paul,  the  historical  existence  of  any  human 
being  who  played  a  part  in  the  social  and  religious 
struggles  of  contemporary  Palestine,  and  to  whom 
the  origin  of  the  Christian  sect  could  be  traced, 
would  probably  have  been  a  matter  of  complete 
indifference.  What  he  was  interested  in  was  the 
new  mystical  interpretation  of  the  old  corn-god 
myth  which  meets  us  in  so  many  guises  in  the 
cults  and  legends  of  the  ancient  world.  In  its 
new  interpretation,  the  story  of  the  god  or 
the  god-man  dying  and  rising  again  became 
a  symbol  of  the  mediative  agency  between  the 
individual  soul  and  the  world-soul,  between  the 
all-powerful  creative  persona  and  its  imperfect 
created  image.     It  was  the  symbol  of  an  eternal 


264    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

process.  As  Professor  Drews  has  said,  Paul  would 
not  have  regarded  the  execution  of  any  individual 
human  being  as  being  anything  more  than  the 
accomplishment  of  a  symbolical  rite,  the  person- 
ality of  the  victim  in  any  particular  case  being  a 
matter  of  indifference.  The  few  passages  in  the 
Pauline  Epistles  in  which  the  historical  Jesus  is 
referred  to,  the  same  writer  shows  good  grounds  for 
regarding  as  later  interpolations.  In  any  case,  an  his- 
torical mundane  Christ-personality  does  not  seem  to 
fit  in  with  the  main  system  of  the  Pauline  theology. 
Reverting  to  the  Jesus-figure  as  portrayed  in  the 
Gospels,  assuming  it  be  historical  at  all,  it  would 
seem  as  though  we  had  to  do  with  something  like 
a  composite  portrait,  combining  the  divergent  and, 
even  in  some  cases,  contradictory  characteristics 
of,  at  least,  two  or  three  distinct  personalities. 
The  somewhat  ferocious  rebel  leader,  apotheosised 
by  the  dissenting  hymn-maker  as  "gentle  Jesus, 
meek  and  mild,"  the  social  guest  at  wedding  feasts, 
the  companion  of  publicans  and  sinners,  and  the 
introspective  moral  and  religious  Rabbi  of  the 
Sermon  on  the  Mount,  may  quite  possibly  indicate 
the  traits  of  distinct  individuals.  It  is  certainly  a 
very  common  phenomenon  of  legend-formation, 
this  merging  of  different  types  in  one  complex 
legendary  personality.  In  any  case,  with  the 
Jesus-figure  alone  as  portrayed  in  our  Gospels,  it  is 
improbable  Christianity  would  have  got  very  far. 


THE   ORIGIN   OF   CHRISTIANITY     265 

The  Christianity  of  history  has,  as  its  real  founder, 
Paul  the  Apostle,  if  by  that  name  we  may  desig- 
nate the  author  of  the  four  great  Epistles  and  the 
missionary  forming  the  central  figure  of  the  narra- 
tive in  the  Acts.  It  was  the  theology,  founded 
originally  on  the  mythical  groundwork  common 
to  the  races  of  Western  Asia  and  Egypt,  and 
elaborated  with  the  help  of  Greek  metaphysics, 
that  found  a  convenient  rallying  point  in  the 
communities  whose  ensign  was  the  figure  of  the 
rebel  prophet,  the  messiah  -  patriot  of  Galilee. 
It  was  the  satisfaction  this  theology  afforded  to 
the  spirit  of  an  age  whose  chief  serious  interest 
lay  in  questions  concerning  the  individual's  destiny 
after  death  and  his  relation  to  the  Supreme  Power 
of  the  universe,  inasmuch  as  it  offered  a  convenient 
answer,  on  a  basis  not  foreign  to  the  general 
speculative  outlook  of  the  age,  to  these  questions. 
Successful  organisation,  almsgiving,  the  duty  of 
mutual  assistance  and  the  like,  undoubtedly  con- 
tributed their  part  to  the  successes  of  the  early 
Christian  Church,  but  I  contend  it  is  at  once  un- 
historical  and  unpsychological  to  regard  them  as 
the  chief  even,  not  to  say  the  sole,  cause  of  those 
successes. 

What  many  persons,  and  it  would  seem  Kautsky 
among  the  number,  seem  to  fail  to  realise  is  that 
the  really  living  belief  in  a  speculative  theory  which, 
because    it    is   a   really   living    belief,   powerfully 


266    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

affects  the  imagination  of  its  votaries,  can  form 
fully  as  mighty  a  motive  power  for  action  as 
is  to-day  constituted  by  economic  interests.  Now 
such  was  the  case  amid  large  sections  of  the  society 
of  the  Roman  Empire.  It  is  a  fact  familiar  to  all 
students  of  Pagan  literature  of  the  early  Christian 
centuries  that  the  dread  of  death  continually 
appears  as  casting  a  gloom  over  the  life  of  the 
period.  We  meet  with  it  even  in  the  Augustan 
age  of  classical  literature,  in  Horace,  Virgil, 
Catullus,  etc.  The  tendency,  of  course,  increased 
with  the  decadence  of  the  Graeco-Roman  world. 
According  to  Kautsky  it  was  the  economic 
blessings  afforded  by  its  supposed  communism 
or  its  real  dispensation  of  eleemosynary  relief, 
that  accounts  for  the  growth  of  the  early  Chris- 
tian Church.  For  him  the  economic  factor  is 
the  exclusively  determining  one  throughout  every 
period  of  history  and  in  every  stage  of  social  evolu- 
tion, all  other  interests  being  defined  by  it  alone. 
For  the  present  writer  the  economic  factor,  though  in 
modern  times,  under  the  regime  of  a  fully  developed 
capitalism,  undoubtedly  predominant  well-nigh  to 
the  exclusion  of  all  else,  and  though  in  the  main 
dominant  throughout  history  as  the  motive  power 
of  change,  may  be,  and  has  been,  on  occasion, 
subordinated,  as  a  motive-power,  to  the  other,  the 
intellectual  and  emotional  factor,  in  human  affairs. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE    PROBLEM    OF    CHRISTIANITY    AS    "  VALUE  " 

The  modern  view  of  the  reign  of  law  in  history, 
and  of  the  "  historical  relativity  "  which  is  its  out- 
come, often  leads  the  unwary  to  a  kind  of 
mechanical  fatalism  in  the  estimation  of  historical 
phenomena.  The  truth  that  everything  is  relative 
to  the  general  conditions  of  a  period  leads  with  some 
to  a  sort  of  sacramental  necessity  being  assumed  as 
attached  to  the  whole  of  the  concrete  reality  of 
an  age  which  it  is  conceived  must  have  happened 
so,  and  could  not  have  happened  otherwise. 

For  example,  in  discussing  the  question  of  the 
origin  and  success  of  the  Christian  propaganda  in 
the  lands  constituting  the  Roman  Empire  during 
the  first  three  centuries  of  the  Christian  era,  the 
average  modern  rationalist  is  apt  to  assume  the 
Christian  religion  in  all  its  aspects  to  have  been 
the  necessary  form  for  the  ethical  and  theological 
thoughts  of  mankind  to  take  at  this  period,  and 
hence  that  its  success  was,  as  it  were,  pre-ordained 
by  the  general  conditions  of  historical  evolution. 

267 


268    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

Now  this  view  belongs  to  the  order  of  ideas  which 
consciously  or  unconsciously  treats  the  real  world 
as  being  wholly  composed  of,  or  dominated  by, 
determinate  and  determining  concepts,  rules,  and 
laws  :  in  a  word,  by  its  logical  aspect  alone.  It  is 
a  view  that  ignores  the  truth  elsewhere  insisted 
upon  by  me  with  considerable  elaboration  (cf. 
The  Roots  of  Reality) :  to  wit,  that  all  reality 
consists  au  Jond  of  two  elements  or  aspects,  an 
alogical  as  well  as  a  logical ;  that  the  former  can 
never  be  completely  absorbed  by  the  latter  or 
legitimately  treated  as  reducible  under  it,  not- 
withstanding that  in  our  experience  we  find  both 
elements  in  indissoluble  union. 

Now,  if  we  are  to  form  a  correct  judgment 
upon  the  content  of  history  as  a  real  process  in 
time,  it  is  essential  to  distinguish  between  the 
element  in  that  content  which  is  determined  by 
the  inner  necessity  of  the  whole  historical  move- 
ment at  the  period  dealt  with,  and  that  other 
element  which,  while  forming  part  of  the  total 
result,  is  nevertheless  per  se  accidental,  and  hence 
which  might  have  happened  otherwise,  which,  in 
short,  belongs  to  the  alogical  side  of  the  historical 
process. 

Reverting  to  the  instance  before  mentioned, 
which  forms  the  main  subject  of  the  present  chapter, 
as  to  the  way  in  which  we  regard  the  functions  of 
the  Christian  religion  in  history,  the  problem  would 


CHRISTIANITY   AS   "VALUE  "     269 

seem  to  stand  as  follows : — In  how  far  are  we  to 
attribute  the  success  of  the  Christian  Church  in  the 
Roman  Empire  to  its  answering  to  certain  intel- 
lectual and  moral  aspirations  {i.e.  to  its  having  a 
certain  value)  forming  part  of  the  mental  atmos- 
phere of  the  then  world,  and  hence  in  how  far  may 
we  regard  it  as  a  necessity  of  the  historical  process 
itself,  and  in  how  far  it  was  an  event  which,  con- 
sistently with  the  general  trend  of  that  process, 
need  not  have  happened  or  might  have  happened 
otherwise  ? 

If  we  take  an  impartial  view  of  the  conditions 
of  the  first  three  centuries,  we  shall  find  that  the 
general  consciousness  was  moving  along  certain 
lines,  and  was  becoming  dominated  by  certain  be- 
liefs and  aspirations.  The  sei^ious-viinded  man  of 
all  classes  and  of  all  countries  (in  the  first  and 
second  centuries),  coming  within  the  range  of  the 
civilisation  of  the  ancient  world,  was  eminently 
introspective,  i.e.  his  chief  object  of  interest  was 
his  own  soul  and  its  welfare  after  death,  which  he 
connected  with  some  mystical  relation  it  bore  to 
the  Supreme  Power  of  the  universe  as  personified 
in  him.  His  whole  theory  of  life  was  based  on  the 
supernatural  and  the  belief  in  magic.  Hence  for 
him  questions  of  God  and  personal  existence  after 
death  were  questions  of  very  intense  and  practical 
moment  indeed,  just  as  for  the  serious-minded  man 
of  to-day  are  social  and  economic  questions.     Of 


270    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

the  course  of  social  life  and  thought  from  earlier 
times  which  led  up  to  this  state  of  things,  of  the 
contemporary  political  and  economic  condition 
which  contributed  to  intensify  the  general  intel- 
lectual attitude,  it  is  unnecessary  to  speak  here. 
It  is  sufficient  that  it  existed,  that  notions  deriv- 
able from  this  thought  and  atmosphere  belonged 
to  the  social  consciousness  of  the  time,  and  that 
some  religious  system  formulating  them,  together 
with  the  needs  and  aspirations  bred  of  them,  was 
inevitable.  Every  philosophical  and  religious  theory 
of  the  universe  which  was  then  current  endeavoured 
to  meet  these  demands  in  its  own  way.  Chris- 
tianity did  this,  and  gradually  absorbed,  or  success- 
fully competed  with,  the  rest,  owing  to  reasons 
which,  with  our  scant  and  imperfect  data,  it  is 
impossible  at  present  fully  to  determine. 

Now,  the  main  point  of  interest  for  us  here  is 
that  the  element  of  "  inevitability  "  in  the  historical 
success  of  Christianity  consisted  solely  in  its  ex- 
pression of  the  aforesaid  tendency  of  thought  and 
aspiration.  That  which  is  logically  given  in  the 
general  movement  is  inevitable ;  that  which  is  not 
so  given  is  not  inevitable.  But  there  were  other 
features  specially  characterising  the  Christian  faith 
and  Church,  which  we  have  no  reason  to  regard 
as  inevitable,  i.e.  as  necessarily  given  in  the  con- 
ditions of  the  time,  but  which  might  well  have 
been  otherwise. 


CHRISTIANITY   AS   "VALUE  "     271 

First   and  foremost  among  the  features  which 
from  out  all  the  creeds  and  cults  of  the  Roman 
Empire   is   peculiar   to    Christianity   alone   is   the 
idea  of  religious  intolerance,  of  compulsory  assent 
to   dogma,    of  a   disbelief   in   a   theory   as   being 
criminal.     There  is  no  difficulty  in  conceiving  that 
(let   us   say)  the   religion   of  Mithras,  that   Neo- 
platonism,  that  Manicheeism — all  of  which  systems 
embodied  the  same  general  tendencies  as  Chris- 
tianity— might   have   succeeded   in   ousting  their 
rival.     In  fact,  it  is  well  known  that  there  was  a 
time  during  the  third  century  when,  to  the  modern 
scholar  looking  back,  it  seems  to  have  been  a  mere 
toss  up  which  the  world  should  become,  Mithraic, 
Manicheean,  or  Christian.     Now,  had  the  former 
alternative   happened  —  had,   indeed,   any   one   of 
these    other   claimants   for   the   suffrages    of   the 
serious-minded   man   of  the   three   first   centuries 
succeeded  in  overcoming  the  Christian  Church — 
the  element  of  dogmatic  intolerance,  and  with  it 
of  religious  persecution,  which  was  otherwise  alien 
to  the  ancient  world,  would  never  have  arisen  to 
stain  the  pages  of  subsequent  history. 

Another  peculiarity  of  the  Christian  religion, 
doubtless  derived  from  the  Judaism  in  which  it 
first  originated,  was  the  dogmatic  aggressiveness 
of  its  monotheism.  The  Trinitarian  dogma  which 
it  evolved  later  was  a  concession,  of  course,  to 
Pagan  thought,  but  did  not  materially  affect  the 


272    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

issue.  That  issue  was  the  direct  responsibiUty  of 
the  Supreme  Being  conceived  of  as  personified  and 
as  perfect,  for  the  creation  and  tlie  ordering  of  the 
world.  This  was  the  main  point  at  issue  between 
the  Church  of  the  second  century  and  the  Gnostic 
systems.  While  the  Church  maintained  that  all 
things  evil  no  less  than  good  had  been  called  into 
being  by  the  direct  fiat  of  the  Creator,  who  was 
identified  with  the  Supreme  God,  the  Gnostics 
relegated  the  responsibility  for  the  creation  of  a 
world  in  which  evil  was  predominant  to  an  inferior 
being  or  beings,  partially  at  least  the  negation  of 
the  higher  spiritual  powers,  and  in  no  sense  the  object 
of  adoration,  Now  it  is  by  no  means  clear  that 
the  late  Judeo-Christian  conception  of  a  Creator- 
God,  the  sum  of  all  perfection  in  power,  wisdom, 
and  goodness,  and  yet  the  Creator  and  Providence 
of  a  world  in  which  the  element  of  evil  is  pro- 
minent, was  essential  to  the  intellectual  and 
emotional  aspirations  of  the  first  two  centuries. 
Other  contemporary  religious  systems  were  spared 
the  immoral  and  illogical  attempt  to  justify  the 
ways  of  the  Creator-God.  Paganism  recognised 
no  special  embodiment  of  the  universal  Creative 
Power.  Hence  we  have  no  reason  for  regarding 
the  erection  into  a  supreme  object  of  worship  of  the 
author  of  this  world  as  inevitably  given  in  the  specu- 
lative thought  of  the  age,  and  as  such  we  may 
fairly  treat  it  as  a  speciality  of  the  Christian  faith. 


CHRISTIANITY   AS   "VALUE  "     273 

Yet  another  speciality  of  the  faith  propagated  by 
the  Christian  Church,  but  the  inevitability  of  which 
cannot  be  concluded  from  the  general  historical 
process,  is  the  imperfection  of  the  character-ideal 
embodied  in  its  central  figure.  I  am  aware  that 
many  hold  the  Jesus-figure  to  have  been  the  great 
piece  de  resistance  of  the  Christian  faith,  that  which 
enabled  it  to  successfully  outbid  rival  systems  and 
cults.  While  it  is  often  admitted  that  the  morality 
of  the  Gospel  discourses  is  not  original,  since  it 
is  to  be  found  in  earlier  and  elsewhere  in  con- 
temporary thought,  the  Jesus-figure  is  supposed 
to  have  exercised  a  unique  charm  on  that  most 
uncritical  stratum  of  the  population  of  an  uncritical 
age,  from  among  which  the  converts  to  the  Chris- 
tianity of  the  first  and  second  centuries  were  mainly 
drawn.  Even  if  we  admitted  that  there  might  be 
something  in  this,  the  relative  success  of  other 
religious  systems — one,  at  least,  very  nearly  ap- 
proaching in  numbers  and  influence  Christianity — 
which  had  no  historical  or  quasi-historical  figure 
as  an  object  of  devotion,  would  tend  to  show  that 
such  a  figure  was  not  essential  or  inevitable  to  the 
religious  consciousness  of  the  time. 

Professor  Bury,  in  his  introduction  to  Mr  Stewart 
Hay's  remarkable  study  of  the  Emperor  Elagabalus 
(xxvii.),  speaking  of  the  relation  of  Christianity  to 
other  cults  of  the  time,  observes  :  "  It  is  unproven 
that   Christianity   is   the    best    alternative."      He 


274    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

further  expresses  the  opinion  that,  had  it  succumbed 
before  one  of  its  rivals,  "  we  should  be  to-day  very 
much  where  we  are."     I    therefore   contend   that 
both  the  principle  of  religious  intolerance,  i.e.  of 
the  culpability  of  disbelief,  the  cult  of  the  Creator- 
God,  and  the  Jesus-figure,  with  all  its  imperfections, 
belong  to  the  accidental  side  of  the  history  of  the 
time,  and  not  to  its  essential  and  inevitable  trend, 
that  they  are  special  characteristics  of  the  Christian 
Church   and   its   doctrine,  and   not   given   in  the 
general  tendencies  of  the  age ;  and  that  hence  we 
are  justified  in   charging  them,  for  good  or  evil, 
to  the  account  of  the  Christian  religion,  per  se, 
— namely,  as  a  particular  product  of  the  human 
mind,  and  judging  it  with  regard  to  them  as  an 
isolated   phenomenon.     It   is   from   this   point   of 
view  that  I  hold  we  are  further  justified  in  pro- 
nouncing Christianity  as  on  the  whole  a  bad  religion 
from  the  outset,  just  as  I  pronounce  a  man  to  be 
a  bad  man  who  has  certain  bad  personal  qualities 
over  and  above  those  attributable  to  his  age,  class, 
or  race.      With   the   Christian   religion  the   case 
would  seem  to  stand  thus :  Its  good  sides  are  not 
original,  but  are   shared    by   it   in   common  with 
other   contemporary    creeds   and   cults.     What  is 
peculiar  to  it  are  three  points  named,  i.e.  dogmatic 
intolerance,  the  cult  of  the  Creator-God,  and  the 
Jesus-figure  of  the  Gospels. 

If  challenged  as  to  the  super-eminent   human 


CHRISTIANITY   AS   "VALUE"     275 

virtues  of  the  Jesus-figure  as  presented  in  the 
Gospels,  I  am  ready  with  my  answer.  I  do  not 
rest  my  case  on  my  non-appreciation  of  particular 
traits — e.g.  of  a  young  person  who  at  twelve  years 
takes  to  "  disputing  "  with  his  learned  elders,  or  of 
the  wisdom  of  heaven-sent  teachers  who  use  strong 
language  at  trees  for  not  bearing  fruit  at  the  wrong 
time  of  year  as  a  vent  to  their  ill-humour  at  being 
unable  to  satisfy  their  hunger.  Neither  do  I  press 
home  too  severely  the  question  as  to  the  reason- 
ableness of  basing  a  dogmatic  estimate  of  personal 
character  solely  on  an  avowedly  partisan  recital  ^  of 
certain  events  and  speeches  selected  out  of  a  three 
years'  propaganda  tour.     What  I  do  say  is,  that 

^  The  unscrupulously  partisan  nature  of  the  Gospel  narrative 
is  strikingly  exemplified  in  the  treatment  of  a  rival  agitator  to 
Jesus.  "  Barabbas,"  whose  name  is  now  a  byword,  but  which 
simply  means  the  Son  of  Abba,  is  abusively  styled  a  "  robber," 
and  is  accused  of  '^ committing  murder"  in  an  insurrection. 
The  data  given  would  simply  seem  to  indicate  that  this  Son  of 
Abba  was  a  leader  of  one  of  the  numerous  abortive  emeutes 
occurring  in  Jerusalem  at  the  time,  and  that  his  worst  crime  was 
probably  an  excess  of  patriotic  zeal  and  religious  enthusiasm. 
Insurrections  are  not  generally  made  with  rose  water,  and  that 
lives  were  lost  in  street  fighting  is  likely  enough  ;  but  to  charge 
"Barabbas"  with  "murder"  looks  like  sheer  malignancy.  How 
about  the  attack  on  persons  lawfully  engaged  in  earning  their 
livelihood  in  the  forecourt  of  the  Temple  by  Jesus  and  his 
followers .''  For,  as  Mr  Sturt  of  Oxford  has  recently  shown,  it  is 
quite  clear  that  this  incident,  if  historical  at  all,  implies  the  armed 
raid  of  a  band,  by  whom  the  Temple  authorities  were  for  the 
time  being  overpowered.  Would  lives  lost  in  this  case  have 
meant  "murder"  .^  It  would  seem  from  the  narrative  that  the 
parallel  between  the  cases  of  Barabbas  and  Jesus  was  obvious 
alike  to  Pilate  and  the  Jerusalem  mob. 


276    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

the  character  portrayed  in  the  Gospel  narrative,  so 
far  as  one  can  form  a  judgment  on  it  from  the  data 
given,  conveys  the  impression  of  a  real  self- idolatry, 
combined  with  a  disingenuous  humility  which  is 
singularly  unpleasing,  and  which,  elevated  to  the  rank 
of  a  model,  has,  I  conceive,  been  a  fruitful  source 
of  that  vice  of  hypocrisy  to  which  the  Christian 
religion  in  all  ages  has  so  readily  lent  itself  In 
the  above-mentioned  impression  I  am  so  far  from 
being  alone  that  an  eminent  divine  of  the  Scottish 
Church,  in  an  article  in  a  leading  review  some  few 
years  ago,  virtually  admits  the  self-idolatry,  but 
saves  his  ecclesiastical  face  by  trying  to  forge  out 
of  it  an  argument  for  the  dogma  of  the  divinity  of 
Jesus.  We  are,  says  he  in  effect,  on  the  horns  of 
a  dilemma — either  Jesus  was  a  vanitous  person  and 
a  quite  imperfect  character,  or  else  he  was  God, 
and  as  representing  divinity  in  human  form  he  had 
a  perfect  right  to — "put  on  side"  (so  to  say)!  Our 
Scotch  theologian,  if  I  remember  rightly,  even 
adduces  the  case  of  an  ambassador  of  a  great  power 
who  has  to  remind  the  foreigner  perpetually  of  his 
importance  and  dignity.  The  naive  and  childlike 
suggestion  of  the  eminent  Scottish  divine  will 
hardly  fail  to  excite  a  smile  with  many  persons. 
The  idea  of  God,  of  the  divine  government,  sending 
down  to  earth  an  envoy-extraordinary  is  to  me 
humorous,  but  it  would  certainly  appeal  to  the 
barbaric  mind.     Be  this  as  it  may,  the  recogni- 


CHRISTIANITY   AS   -VALUE"     277 

tion  of  the  imperfection  of  the  character  from  a 
human  point  of  view  is  significant  as  coming  from 
a  distinguished  luminary  of  the  Christian  Church. 

Who  of  us  has  not  known,  or  known  of,  propa- 
gandists of  to-day  who,  aUke  without  personal 
exaltation,  without  parading  the  fact  that  they  have 
had  no  certainty  of  a  night's  lodging,  and  without 
ostentatious  "  humility,"  have  carried  on  their  work 
for  a  lifetime  {e.g.  the  protagonists  of  the  Russian 
revolutionary  movement)  ? 

There  is  a  third  point  regarding  Christianity  as 
a  special  and  particular  manifestation  of  the  religious 
tendency  of  the  age  in  which  it  arose,  over  and 
above  the  necessities  of  that  tendency  itself,  and 
which  is  also  reflected  in  the  recorded  conduct  of 
its  founder,  I  refer  to  the  apparently  unacknow- 
ledged plagiarism  of  the  precepts  of  the  Gospel 
discourses,  precepts  which  we  all  (at  least  up  to  a 
certain  point)  recognise.  We  all  know  that  the 
morality  called  Christian  had  been  preached  before, 
and  was  being  preached  at  the  time  by  Stoics, 
Buddhists,  probably  by  the  Essenes,  and  certainly 
a  little  earlier  by  the  Jewish  Rabbi  Hillel.  Now, 
whatever  may  be  the  case  with  the  other  sources 
mentioned,  it  is  hardly  conceivable  that  a  Jew  of 
Palestine  in  the  time  of  Augustus,  interested  in 
religious  matters,  should  not  have  heard  of  the 
Rabbi  Hillel  and  his  teaching.  Hence  it  is  very 
difficult  to  acquit  the  author  of  the  Gospel  dis- 


278    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

courses     of    appropriating     noble    ideas    without 
acknowledgment ! 

The  foregoing  are  certainly  defects  in  the  Chris- 
tian system  viewed  as  a  special  phenomenon  of 
human  culture.  The  reply  of  the  Christian  to  such 
a  criticism  (apart  from  personal  abuse  of  the  critic, 
his  usual  weapon)  I  can  very  well  foresee.  "  By 
its  fruits  ye  shall  judge  it,"  he  will  say.  "  (1)  How 
came  it  that  such  an  imperfect  creed,  as  you 
picture  it,  gained  over  other  systems  also  embody- 
ing the  general  religious  aspirations  of  the  first 
three  centuries t  and  (2)  how  was  it  that  such  a 
creed  purified  and  regenerated  the  world  ? " 

The  rejoinder  to  the  first  question  is  that  in  the 
absence  of  any  even  approximately  adequate  data 
as  to  the  inner  social  and  intellectual  life  of  the 
period,  above  all,  our  almost  total  absence  of  know- 
ledge of  the  feelings  and  aspirations  of  the  masses, 
it  is  a  sheer  begging  of  the  question  to  assume  that 
the  success  of  Christianity  was  due  to  its  intrinsic 
merits.  Even  as  it  is,  we  can  see  many  external 
causes  which  undoubtedly  contributed  to  that  suc- 
cess {e.g.  a  skilfully  devised  and  carried  out  system 
of  agitation  and  organisation,  the  latter  includ- 
ing eleemosynary  relief).  The  conversion  of  the 
Roman  world  was  a  slow  process ;  moreover,  its 
greatest  numerical  extension,  it  should  be  noted, 
took  place  precisely  at  a  time  when  it  is  admitted 
by  most  Christians  themselves  that  their  religion 


CHRISTIANITY   AS   "VALUE"     279 

had  lost  its  original  purity,  and  was,  indeed,  advanced 
far  in  the  path  of  corruption. 

The  second  question,  as  to  the  purifying  and  re- 
generative effects  of  Christianity,  may  be  answered 
by  a  simple  denial  of  the  facts.  To  make  good 
this  denial  at  the  present  time  and  place  does  not 
lie  within  my  present  scope  ;  but  the  open-minded 
reader  may  be  referred  to  two  popular  and  succinct 
statements  of  the  case  from  this  point  of  view — to 
the  late  Cotter  M orison's  Service  of  Man,  and  to 
Mr  M'Cabe's  recently  published  work,  The  Bible  in 
Europe.  In  short,  it  can  be  very  easily  and  con- 
clusively shown  that  not  a  single  one  of  the  bene- 
ficent effects  ascribed  to  the  advent  of  the  Chris- 
tian rehgion  in  the  Roman  Empire  are  really  due 
to  it,  but,  in  so  far  as  they  rest  on  facts,  are  trace- 
able to  quite  other  causes — causes  in  most  cases 
already  in  operation  before  Christianity  dawned  on 
mankind. 

On  the  other  hand,  three  things  Christianity  has 
undoubtedly  given  to  mankind — viz.,  religious  per- 
secution, an  evil-producing  world-creator  as  object 
of  worship,  and  religious  hypocrisy.  A  Catholic 
bishop  had  the  effrontery,  after  the  judicial  murder 
of  Ferrer,  to  talk  in  an  encyclical  about  the  antag- 
onism of  the  wicked  world  to  "  Christ  and  His 
Church."  Yes,  there  has  been,  is,  and  will  con- 
tinue so  long  as  a  vestige  of  organised  Christianity 
remains,  an  antagonism  between  all  that  is  best  in 


280    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

the  world,  all  that  is  worth  living  and  fighting  for 
in  human  affairs,  and  the  solid  phalanx  of  opposi- 
tion to  knowledge,  backed  by  cruelty,  toadyism  to 
wealth,  privilege,  and  lust  of  oligarchic  power,  for 
which  in  the  main  "  Christ  and  His  Church  "  have 
always  stood.  The  men  of  movements  are,  after 
all,  largely  symbols.  It  may  well  be  that  the 
Idealist,  the  Socialist,  and  the  Free-thinker  of  the 
future,  will  oppose  to  the  memory  of  the  self- 
glorifying  Galilean  of  what  by  an  arbitrary  conven- 
tion (as  reckoning  from  the  27th  year  of  Augustus, 
A.u.c.  753)  we  term  the  first  century,  that  of 
the  self-effacing  Catalonian  of  what  by  the  same 
reckoning  we  term  the  twentieth  century. 


CHAPTER  XV 

PROBLEM  OF  THE  CATHOLIC  CHURCH  AS  THE 
DERELICT  OF  THE  AGES 


The  collapse  of  all  forms  of  dogmatic  Christianity 
during  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  is 
a  matter  that  will  repay  the  careful  attention  of 
the  student  of  history  and  sociology.  The  most 
interesting  example  of  this  collapse,  or  decay  from 
within,  is  afforded  by  the  Roman  Catholic  Church. 
The  great,  co-equal,  sometimes  rival,  sometimes 
coadjutor,  of  the  secular  powers  of  the  civilised 
world  during  the  Middle  Ages  is  now  left  stranded, 
a  hollow  wreck,  imperfectly  concealing  in  the 
quasi-integrity  of  its  outward  forms  the  decaying 
rottenness  within.  In  a  recent  work  the  ex-Jesuit 
father,  Mr  Joseph  M'Cabe,  has  traced  the  fact  of 
this  decay  and  shown  it  to  be  not  confined  to  one 
country  or  group  of  countries,  but  general  through- 
out all  the  nations  comprising  what  is  known  as 
Christendom.  He  shows  it  to  have  followed 
closely  in  all  cases  the  advance  of  education.     In 

281 


282    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

the  Latin  countries,  Catholic  religion  is  to  all 
intents  and  purposes  dead  in  the  large  towns, 
while  even  in  the  countryside  its  influence  is  not 
a  tithe  of  what  it  was  half  a  century  ago.  In 
France,  with  the  exception  of  some  of  the  districts 
in  the  south-west,  Catholicism  can  hardly  be  said 
to  exist  any  longer  as  a  living  faith.  It  would  be 
interesting,  could  we  get  at  the  facts  as  to  the 
number  of  "true  believers,"  that  is,  persons  for  whom 
the  appellation  Catholic  is  more  than  a  mere  label. 
An  eminent  authority  friendly  to  Catholicism 
has  estimated  the  number  of  French  Catholics 
at  not  more  than  "three  or  four  millions,"  all 
told,  out  of  the  nearly  forty  millions  of  the  French 
population.  This  estimate,  which  certainly  con- 
firms the  impressions  of  those  acquainted  with 
modern  French  life,  even  if  it  be  only  approxi- 
mately true,  would  fully  justify  the  statement  that 
Catholicism  as  a  national  faith  in  France  is  dead. 
The  same  writer,  Sabatier,  puts  the  number  of 
French  Catholics  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  at  thirty  millions.  These  figures, 
which,  as  Mr  M'Cabe  shows,  cannot  be  much 
exaggerated  on  either  side,  are  indeed  significant. 
A  similar  state  of  things  to  the  above  is  to  be 
found  in  the  other  Latin  countries,  with  the  ex- 
ception that  the  hold  of  the  Church  on  the 
peasantry,  who,  in  many  cases,  are  wholly  illiterate, 
is  proportionately  stronger. 


MODERN   CATHOLICISM  283 

In  the  German  Empire,  in  spite  of  appearances, 
the  strength  of  the  "  Centre  "  representation  in  the 
Reichstag  is  demonstrably  due  to  the  inequality 
of  electoral  districts.  Mr  M*Cabe  points  out 
that  while  a  Social  Democratic  deputy  represents 
70,000  votes,  a  Catholic  deputy  will  only  represent 
21,000.  The  Catholic  vote,  moreover,  is  shown 
to  have  fallen  from  27  to  19  per  cent,  in  twenty 
years.  In  Austria  the  Romano-Christian  faith, 
while  dead  to  all  intents  and  purposes  in  the 
large  centres,  retains  a  steadily  diminishing  hold  in 
many  peasant  districts  of  the  Tyrol,  Steiermark, 
Karnthen,  etc.  In  Hungary,  the  strength  of  the 
Church  Ues  exclusively  in  the  illiterate  peasantry. 
As  regards  the  smaller  countries  of  Western  and 
Central  Europe,  Holland,  Belgium,  Switzerland, 
they  all  tell  the  same  tale — to  wit,  a  heavy  loss  to 
the  Church  in  the  number  even  of  its  nominal 
adherents,  while  its  real  influence  is  reduced  to  a 
fraction  of  what  it  was  two  generations  ago,  or  even 
less.  The  statistical  and  other  details  confirming 
what  is  here  said  will  be  found  set  forth  in  Mr 
M'Cabe's  book.  The  Decay  of  the  Church  of  Rome. 

There  is  a  general  impression  abroad  that  though 
the  Catholic  Church  may  be  losing  in  the  Latin 
countries,  it  is  gaining  in  those  occupied  by  the 
Anglo-Saxon  race.  We  commend  to  those  who 
think  thus  the  chapters  in  which  Mr  M'Cabe 
conclusively  demolishes  this  notion.     As  regards 


284    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

the  English-speaking  world,  Mr  M'Cabe's  verdict 
is,  after  giving  figures  in  support  of  his  statement, 
that,  apart  from  France,  the  Roman  Catholic  Church 
has  lost  as  heavily  in  the  English-speaking  v^^orld 
as  it  has  done  in  the  Latin  vi^orld.  Of  the  United 
States  the  same  story  might  be  told  as  of  Great 
Britain  and  its  colonies.  A  million  of  the  "  faith- 
ful "  is  shown  to  have  fallen  away  in  the  last  decade 
of  the  nineteenth  century  alone.  The  general  loss, 
as  will  be  seen,  is  no  less  here  than  elsewhere, 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  of  late  years  the 
Church  has  undoubtedly  effected  some  transfers  to 
itself  from  the  dogmatic  Protestant  sects.  The 
change  from  one  form  of  dogmatic  Christianity  to 
another,  it  may  be  remarked,  does  not,  of  course, 
touch  the  general  decay  of  Christian  theology  all 
along  the  line. 

The  remarkable  rationalist  movement  within  the 
Roman  Church  which  has  sprung  up  during  the 
last  ten  years,  corresponding  to  similar  movements 
in  the  Protestant  Churches,  and  known  as  Modern- 
ism, has  rapidly  grown  to  such  proportions  as  to 
throw  the  authorities  at  the  Vatican  into  some- 
thing like  a  panic.  The  only  remedy  the  latter 
seem  to  have  been  able  to  devise  against  it,  in  the 
abjectness  of  their  terror,  is  the  exaction  of  a 
special  oath  from  its  clergy  pledging  themselves 
in  advance  not  to  accept  or  preach  the  doctrine 
even  before  they  have  investigated   it.      Such  a 


MODERN   CATHOLICISM  285 

measure  will  seem  to  most  impartial  persons  to 
partake  of  the  nature  of  Mrs  Partington's  opera- 
tion with  her  broom.  Yet  the  anxiety  of  the 
curia  "  bosses "  respecting  Modernism  is  not 
without  good  ground.  They  feel  that  once  the 
dogmatic  integrity  of  the  traditional  Church 
system  is  gone,  the  whole  liaison  d'etre  of  the 
Church  organisation  will  have  gone  too. 

Up  to  the  present  time,  while  the  Church  has 
lost  in  everything  else,  in  numbers,  influence, 
character,  there  is  one  point  in  which  it  has  not 
lost — namely,  in  money.  Its  real  property  and  its 
invested  funds  have  gone  on  increasing.  What 
this  is  may  be  gathered  when  it  is  said  that  on  a 
moderate  estimate  over  thirty  years  ago,  i.e.  in 
1880,  in  France  alone,  the  Jesuit  property  was 
computed  at  seven  hundred  million  francs,  or 
nearly  three  millions  sterling,  while  the  total  value 
of  the  real  estate  of  the  monastic  orders  has  been 
estimated  approximately  by  good  authorities  at 
£80,000,000  (eighty  millions  sterling).  This  is 
quite  apart  from  the  privileges  enjoyed  by  the 
Catholic  hierarchy  in  France,  by  which  they  are 
allowed  the  free  use  of  the  churches,  i.e.  the 
national  property,  in  itself  equivalent  to  a  large 
state  subsidy.  Such  being  its  financial  condition 
in  one  country  alone,  the  prodigious  wealth  of  the 
Church  as  a  whole  may  be  fairly  well  gauged. 
Its  possessions  in  Spain,  Italy,  and  Austria,  and 


286    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

in  the  Catholic  parts  of  the  German  Empire,  are, 
on  the  average,  certainly  not  less  in  proportion, 
and  in  some  cases  much  more.  Altogether,  the 
present  condition  of  the  Catholic  world  points  to 
the  probability  that  the  moribund  hulk  of  the 
once  mighty  organisation  is  kept  in  being  solely 
by  the  aid  of  its  material  assets,  and  that,  were 
it  deprived  of  these,  or  even  were  their  amount 
substantially  reduced,  the  Catholic  community 
would  in  a  very  short  time  sink  to  the  level  of  a 
small  sect. 

Not  the  least  striking  point  in  Mr  M'Cabe's 
exposure  of  the  decay  of  the  Roman  Church  is  his 
proof  of  the  fact  that  the  enormous  majority  of 
its  nominal  votaries  are  unable  to  read  or  write. 
Of  the  Vatican's  190,000,000  followers,  more  than 
120,000,000  are  iUiterate.  The  Latins  and  Slavs, 
we  are  told,  alone  furnish  more  than  100,000,000 
of  these  illiterate  followers.  This  means,  says  Mr 
M'Cabe,  "  that  the  majority  of  the  Roman 
Catholics  in  the  world  to-day  consist  of  American 
Indians,  half-castes,  negroes,  and  mulattoes ; 
Italian,  Spanish,  Russian,  and  Slavonic  peasants 
of  the  most  backward  character ;  and  Indian, 
Chinese,  and  African  natives  "  (pp.  304-5). 

In  the  following  section  I  deal  with  the  attempts 
made  by  the  Catholic  interest  to  bluff  the  real 
situation  as  regards  the  strength  and  influence  of 
Catholicism  and  to  make  the  world  believe  that 


MODERN   CATHOLICISM  287 

the  derelict  carcase  still  shows  signs  of  life,  and, 
indeed,  of  a  reviving  life,  in  endeavouring  to  make 
the  defence  of  Catholicism  an  up-to-date  pose  by 
attracting  to  it,  here  and  there,  a  smart  journalist, 
and  as  many  dabblers  in  literature  of  the  decadent 
and  intellectual  dude  type  as  can  be  roped  in. 

II 

The  question  we  have  to  consider  now  is  the 
inner  meaning  of  the  rapid  decay  of  Catholicism 
in  its  social,  political,  and  personal  influence.  The 
first  and  most  obvious  explanation  is  that  Catho- 
licism shares  in  the  common  fate  which  has  over- 
taken all  traditional  dogmatic  faiths  resting  on 
authority  —  the  "  institutional  religions  "  of  the 
world,  as  they  are  sometimes  termed.  The  latter 
respond  to  and  are  the  products  of  a  phase  of 
human  culture  which  civilised  mankind  in  modern 
times  is  fast  outgrowing  where  it  has  not  already 
outgrown  it.  The  early  and  classical  expression  of 
decaying  belief  is  the  familiar  antithesis  between 
the  devot  and  the  honnete  fiomme.  The  advance  of 
human  knowledge  and  the  condition  of  mind  en- 
gendered by  modern  thought  generally,  has,  within 
the  last  half  century  at  least,  caused  the  attitude 
of  the  honnete  homvie  to  become  the  typical  and 
normal  one  for  civilised  mankind  in  general.  Yet, 
in  spite  of  this,  we  see  the  forms  of  dogmatic 
Christianity  still  outwardly  subsisting,  at  the  worst, 


288    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

in  a  state  of  decayed  grandeur,  and  still  nominally 
exercising  some  influence.  How  is  this  ?  The 
answer  is,  that  the  decay  in  the  vitality  of  these 
dogmatic  creeds,  the  progress  of  the  outgrowing 
of  them  and  of  the  fundamental  conception  of  the 
world  on  which  they  are  based,  is  modified  in  its 
manifestations  by  two  important  factors — to  wit, 
(1)  the  conservatism  of  the  human  mind  as  regards 
forms,  even  after  all  the  vital  meaning  has  left 
them ;  and  (2)  the  instinctive  conviction  of  the 
dominant  classes  that  their  interests,  i.e.  the  exist- 
ing economic  and  political  structure  of  society,  is 
bound  up  with  their  maintenance  in,  at  least, 
apparent  outward  integrity. 

The  first  of  these  influences  is  a  sociologic 
phenomenon  familiar  to  students  of  folklore  and 
kindred  branches  of  inquiry.  All  interested  in 
these  subjects  know  how  prehistoric  modes  of 
thought  have  survived  in  peasant  communities  up 
to  modern  time.  Or,  to  take  a  historical  instance 
interesting  in  point  of  view  of  our  present  subject. 
St  Benedict  in  the  sixth  century,  more  than  two 
centuries  after  the  establishment  of  Christianity 
as  the  imperial  religion  by  Constantine,  found  at 
Monte  Cassino,  not  a  hundred  miles  from  Rome 
itself,  the  old  rites,  ceremonies,  and  beliefs  of 
Paganism  in  full  force  without  a  trace  of  Chris- 
tian influence  being  observable.  In  the  secluded 
valleys  of  Thessaly  it  is  said  that  the  rites  of  the 


MODERN    CATHOLICISM  289 

local  Zeus,  and  other  cults  dating  from  classic 
times  and  before,  continued  to  be  celebrated  un- 
interruptedly in  their  old  forms  far  into  the  early 
Middle  Ages.  Even  to-day  Mr  Farnell,  in  his  Cults 
of  the  Greek  States,  is  able  to  quote  an  instance  of 
peasant  practices  in  the  same  districts,  clearly  de- 
riving, with  but  Httle  modification,  from  the  ancient 
cult  of  Dionysos.  Taking  this  tendency  of  the 
human  mind  into  consideration,  the  wonder  is  not 
the  extent  to  which  Christian  observances  continue 
in  vogue,  but  rather  the  extent  to  which  they  and 
the  beliefs  of  which  they  are  the  expression  have 
lapsed,  and  that  within  a  comparatively  short 
period. 

As  regards  the  second  of  the  causes  mentioned 
as  tending  to  militate  against  the  rapid  extinction 
of  theological  creeds  and  their  cults — namely,  their 
being  so  intimately  bound  up  with  the  structure 
and  traditions  of  existing  society,  and  hence  with 
the  interests  of  the  economically  and  politically 
privileged  classes  of  that  society — it  is  unnecessary 
to  do  much  more  than  call  attention  to  the  fact, 
obvious  as  it  is.  This  fact,  however,  renders  it 
improbable  that  the  class-interests  in  question  will 
allow  dogmatic  theology  and  its  cultural  expres- 
sions to  die  a  natural  death  so  long  as  modern 
capitalist  society  continues  to  exist ;  and  hence  so 
long,  in  all  probabihty,  will  institutional   religion 

survive,  at  least  in  its  outward  manifestations.     It 

19 


•290    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

will  be  readily  understood  from  this  why  the 
policy  of  the  Catholic  Church  is  to  pander  to 
modern  capitalism  even  in  its  worst  forms.  It 
may  be  said  justly  that  the  State  Churches  of 
dogmatic  Protestantism  are  no  better  in  this 
respect,  being  mere  adjuncts  of  the  economical 
and  political  powers  that  be.  But  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  the  Catholic  Church  in  its  efforts  to 
ingratiate  itself  with  these  same  powers  often  does 
not  scruple  to  go  "  one  better "  than  its  rivals. 
The  fact  is,  moreover,  especially  noticeable  in  the 
case  of  Roman  Ecclesiasticism,  seeing  that  it  has 
always  claimed  an  independence  over  and  against 
the  secular  power  and  secular  interests,  whereas 
the  Protestant  Churches,  in  so  far  as  they  are 
State  Churches,  have  hardly  professed  to  be  much 
more  than  spiritual  satraps  of  the  governing  classes. 
Add  to  this  that  Roman  Catholicism,  while  quite 
prepared  to  be  up-to-date  in  making  its  peace  with 
all  forms  of  modern  capitalist  unrighteousness,  still 
retains  a  mediaeval  penchant  for  persecution  and 
cruelty. 

It  thus  embodies  in  its  present-day  form  often- 
times the  worst  characteristics  of  two  different 
periods  of  history.  While,  on  the  one  hand,  it  will 
back  up  colonial  expansion  and  aggressive  wars 
on  backward  races,  market-hunting,  and  capitalist 
exploitation  generally,  on  the  other  it  will  champion 
barbarous  forms  of  punishment.     There  is  no  more 


MODERN    CATHOLICISM  291 

zealous  advocate  of  the  death-penalty  in  criminal 
law  than  the  Roman  Church.  It  is  generally 
supposed  by  the  modern  man  that  the  apparent 
blood-lust  of  the  Catholic  Church  in  earlier  periods 
of  history  was  largely  attributable  to  the  general 
custom  and  spirit  of  those  times,  though  a  glance 
into  the  writings  of  eminent  modern  Catholic 
theologians  hardly  confirms  this  view.  What, 
however,  opened  the  eyes  of  the  world  at  large  to 
the  hideous  possibilities  inherent  even  in  modern 
Catholic  practice  was  the  atrocious  judicial  murder 
of  Francesco  Ferrer  at  Barcelona  in  the  autumn 
of  1909.  The  latter  event  afforded  striking 
evidence  of  the  fact  that  the  proceedings  of  the 
Inquisition,  etc.,  in  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth 
centuries  are  not  wholly  to  be  attributed  to  the 
general  character  of  the  period  in  question,  but 
that,  to  put  it  moderately,  a  considerable  share  of 
the  iniquities  perpetrated  is  deducible  from  the 
intrinsic  character  of  Catholic  Christianity  itself. 
The  Catholic  Church  can  be  modern  enough  in 
currying  favour  with  wealth  and  privilege,  by 
casting  its  segis  over  current  capitalism  and  its 
methods,  but  it  cannot  be  modern,  it  seems,  in 
adopting  latter-day  principles  of  toleration  and 
decent  humanity.  This  is  one  small  point  the 
apologist  of  Catholicism  might  do  well  to  ponder. 

The  question  now  arises  why — given  the  enor- 
mous   "  pull "   that  traditional  belief  and  custom 


292    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

have,  given  the  support,  tacit  or  avowed,  of  power- 
ful interests  in  modern  society,  and  last,  but  not 
least,  the  enormous  wealth  at  its  disposal — the 
Catholic  Church  has  not  made  a  better  fight  for 
its  numerical  standing  and  its  influence  than  it  has. 
Dead  in  the  Latin  nations  amongst  the  entire 
educated  sections  of  the  population,  and  with  a 
visibly  waning  influence  even  among  the  peasantry 
in  most  districts ;  even  in  Anglo-Saxon  countries 
fully  sharing  in  the  general  decline  of  dogmatic 
Christianity,  mainly  drawing  recruits,  where  it  does 
so  at  all,  from  the  other  sects,  and  in  no  way 
gaining  on  the  advance  of  rationalist  thought ;  in 
similar  case,  as  regards  the  vast  Germanic  popula- 
tions of  Central  Europe,  with  everything  else  in  its 
favour  and  only  education  and  enlightened  thought 
against  it,  one  would  certainly  have  imagined  that 
such  a  great  organisation  would  have  succeeded 
more  effectively  than  it  has  in  at  least  holding  its 
own.  Certainly  the  facts  suggest  either  a  want  of 
ability  or  a  gross  mismanagement  on  the  part  of 
the  heads  of  the  ecclesiastical  hierarchy  from  their 
own  point  of  view. 

And  what  has  the  Church  got  to  show  on  the 
other  side  ?  How,  it  may  be  asked,  has  it  suc- 
ceeded in  imbuing  many  not  unintelligent  persons  in 
this  country,  and  elsewhere,  with  the  notion  that  it 
is  making  progress  ?  The  answer  is,  bluff!  We  hear 
sometimes  talk  of  the  "  modern  Catholic  revival." 


MODERN    CATHOLICISM  293 

Where  is  this  "revival"  to  be  sought?  The  real  truth 
is  this  :  in  addition  to  the  old  logic-chopping  Jesuit, 
whose  intellectual  subtlety  and  profound  cleverness 
we  are  always  hearing  puffed,  there  does  exist  a 
small  "  cultured  "  sect,  mostly  of  literary  decadents, 
in  London,  Paris,  and  possibly  elsewhere,  who  are 
just  now  engaged  in  "running"  Catholicism  as  a 
"  going  concern."  In  this  country  these  are  mostly 
young  men  of  the  "  Yah  !  early  Victorian  ! "  type. 
They  need  not  necessarily  be  avowedly  Catholics 
themselves,  but  they  make  it  their  business  to 
adopt  the  Catholic  pose,  bowing  respectfully  to- 
wards the  Church  as  an  organisation,  and  defend- 
ing its  dogma  and  practice  in  an  indirect  and 
cryptic  manner  against  the  assaults  of  rationalism, 
which  are  waved  aside  in  a  lofty  manner.  Such 
also  talk  mysteriously  and  with  awe  of  the  mighty 
progress  and  universal  influence  of  the  Holy 
Catholic  Church.  The  one  thing  these  gentlemen 
dislike  is  plain  speech.  Straightforward  English  is 
for  them  too  utterly  "  early  Victorian."  [They  call 
everything  they  don't  like  "  early  Victorian  "  !] 

They  may  not  say  so  outright,  but  these  intellec- 
tual dudes  evidently  wish  to  convey  the  impression 
that  the  great  truths  established  in  the  fifties  and 
sixties  of  the  last  century,  and  that  have  become 
incorporated  as  matters  of  course  in  the  intellectual 
outlook  of  the  present  age,  are,  somehow  or  other, 
no   longer  true.     They  belong  to  the  same  type, 


294    PROBLEMS  OF  MEN,  MIND,  MORALS 

mutatis  mutandis,  that  in  the  early  eighties  we 
knew  as  tlie  knights  of  the  sunflower  and  the  hly, 
and  as  personified  in  Savoy  opera  in  the  character  of 
Bunthorne.  The  successors  of  this  type  are  machin- 
ing the  imaginary  "boom"  of  the  present  time.  The 
game  of  bluff  can  rarely  be  kept  up  for  very  long, 
and  this  Catholic  pose,  we  may  safely  assume,  will 
pass  into  some  other  before  many  years  are  over. 

If  it  should  be  asked,  Is  Protestantism  in  any 
better  case  than  Catholicism  ?  the  answer  must 
be  emphatically  in  the  negative.  Indeed,  it  is  the 
collapse  of  the  Protestant  sects,  or  at  least  of  their 
dogmatic  raison  cVetj^e,  which  has  given  a  super- 
ficially plausible  colour  to  the  notion  of  the 
increasing  influence  of  Catholicism,  especially  in 
Anglo-Saxon  countries.  Protestant  Christian 
dogma  as  such  has  ceased  to  count.  The  sects 
still  may  remain,  but  under  the  auspices  of  "  new 
theologies,"  with  their  character  completely 
changed.  The  old  theology  which  gave  them 
meaning  is,  in  any  case,  explained  away  with 
more  or  less  ingenuity,  where  not  openly  re- 
pudiated. To  speak  in  "  early  Victorian "  plain 
language,  the  belief  in  the  traditional  Protestant 
variations  is  no  less  moribund  than  in  the  dogmas 
of  the  Catholic  Church  itself. 


FKINTBD  BY  NKILL  AND  00.,  LTD.,    KDINBUKOU. 


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